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ABSTRACT 
In the aftermath of the Great Recession, the dominance of financial markets and their 
tendency towards crises have resulted in a small global elite capturing huge income increases 
while many working families have struggled with stagnating wages, job loss, and increasing 
poverty. At the same time, neoliberal policies, focusing on market deregulation and the decay of 
social safety nets, have been touted as the way forward despite their potential negative impacts 
on workers and the poor. In this dissertation, I examine the effects of neoliberalism and 
financialization on income inequality and distributional dynamics in affluent capitalist 
democracies in a variety of ways. Using an updated version of the Comparative Welfare States 
data set, I analyze 18 OECD nations from 1981 to 2011, a period where both neoliberalism and 
financialization have become the norm. First, I investigate the ways neoliberalism and 
financialization affect market-generated (pre-tax and pre-transfer) income inequality, 
redistribution, and state-mediated (post-tax and post-transfer) income inequality. Second, I focus 
on how these factors determine the top 1% share of total market-generated income because the 
1% have experienced the largest financial gains over the last few decades. Third, I incorporate 
data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to examine the ways neoliberalism and finance  
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have affected the 90-50 income ratio (comparing the top decile to the median worker), the 50-10 
income ratio (comparing the median worker to bottom decile), and the 90-10 income ratio 
(comparing the top and bottom income deciles). This dissertation contributes to theoretical 
debates on neoliberalism, financialization, and inequality and provides rigorous empirical testing 
of current theories. Because the current literature is primarily focused on the United States, this 
also contributes to the comparative literature on financialization and inequality by focusing more 
generally on advanced capitalist democracies. 
  
  
“Neoliberalism, Finance, and Income Inequality: 
 





Allen Thomas Hyde 
B.A., University of Alabama at Birmingham, 2009 






Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the 











 Copyright by 
 









































Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation 
 
 
“Neoliberalism, Finance, and Income Inequality:  




Allen Thomas Hyde, B.A., M.A. 
 
 
Major Advisor __________________________________________________      
Michael Wallace 
 
Associate Advisor _______________________________________________       
Mary J. Fischer 
 
Associate Advisor _______________________________________________       
Jeremy Pais 
 






   
 As they say with raising children, “It takes a village.” I believe that the same thing 
applies to getting a Ph.D. Without the help of my friends, family, mentors, and colleagues, I 
would not have achieved this milestone. I would like to begin by thanking my family. They 
sacrificed much, even though we had little, in order for me to achieve my dream of becoming a 
professor. Countless dollars of our limited income were sent over during my college and 
graduate school years, which helped me get through this financially. My mother, Rebecca, has 
been an extraordinary influence in my life and probably sacrificed the most to help me succeed. 
She stayed at home with me and my brother as a child to supplement our educations by reading 
us countless nature books, taking us on hikes in the woods to tell us about the plants and animals, 
and walks in creeks to find tadpoles and crawfish. She stimulated my curiosity and nurtured my 
interests in learning new things, which is vital for a successful career in academia. My father, 
Rickey, worked long hours to financially support our family. He was a role model growing up as 
he led my scout troop and coached my soccer teams. And my brother put up with me throughout 
life and provided an ear throughout the way. Another special thank you to my Grandmother 
Gene and Grandfather Carl for supporting me throughout my academic career. 
 In graduate school, no one has been more influential than my adviser Michael Wallace. 
While we butted heads at times over certain issues, he constantly pushed me to raise my 
standards, be more ambitious, and to never give up. He also helped me learn how to be a 
professional academic. Beyond that, countless hours were spent writing letters and providing 
feedback to my work. Certainly, my success is greatly indebted to his efforts. I would also like to  
iv 
thank Jeremy Pais for providing great methods and research feedback and guidance throughout 
the graduate school process. Mary Fischer helped me with research projects in urban sociology 
that have inspired me to pursue future research in that area. Simon Cheng helped me to refine my 
statistical skills and thinking. And Bradley Wright was around to crack jokes; and along with 
Mike Wallace, provided my first research experience in graduate school, which was an audit 
study on religious discrimination in job hiring. These individuals were certainly very influential 
in my graduate career. 
 In the Department of Sociology, I would like to thank the many graduate students who 
supported me along the way. First, Todd Vachon, a coauthor and great friend, has been a huge 
asset throughout my graduate school career, and I hope he continues to ruffle feathers with the 
union but also gets the great academic job that he deserves. I would also like to thank Heidi, 
Angran, Kathleen, and Jordan (most recently) who put up with my moodiness on the bad days 
and provided laughs on the good days. Other graduate students, like Trisha (my Half Door 
sociology buddy), Taylor, and Chriss, also provided great support and comments on my research 
along the way. Finally, I would like to thank my UAB/FYE friends, Carolyn, Derek, Libby, 
Braden, Sonja, Rena, John, Matt, and Brian, for many years of support as we have grown from 
young 18 year olds to adults. It is good to see that many of us turned out well (for the most part). 
UAB professors like Casey Borch, Andre Millard, Mark LaGory, Sarah Parcak, and Erika Austin 
also provided inspiration for me to pursue a career in academia. Finally, I should thank all of the 
guys and gals that played soccer at the UConn Post Office Fields and the Fieldhouse at the 
UConn Rec Center. They helped me take my mind off school and blow off steam from time to 
time.  
v 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………………………………..…1 
1.1 Research Problem…………………………………………………………………....1 
1.2 Dissertation Outline……………………………………………………………….....3 
Chapter 2: Linking Neoliberalism, Financialization, and Income Inequality…………………..11 
 2.1 Social Structures of Accumulation, Neoliberalism, and Financialization…………..11 
 2.2 Neoliberalism, the State, and Income Inequality…………………………………....19 
 2.3 Financialization and Income Inequality……………………………………………..25 
 2.4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………..55 
Chapter 3: Data and Methods……………………………………………………………………57 
 3.1 Data Sources and Descriptions………………………………………………………57 
 3.2 Analytical Method 
 3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Chapter 4: Neoliberal Reform, Financialization, and Income Inequality in 18 Affluent Capitalist 
Democracies…………………………………………………………………………………….81 
 4.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………81 
 4.2 Theory and Hypotheses……………………………………………………………..82 
4.3 Instantaneous and Short-Run Effects on Market-Generated Income Inequality, 
Redistribution, and State-Mediated Income Inequality…………………………………87 
4.4 Long-Run Effects on Market-Generated Income Inequality………………………..89 
4.5 Long-Run Effects on Redistribution………………………………………………...95 
4.6 Long-Run Effects on State-Mediated Income Inequality…………………………..100 
vi 
4.7 Discussion and Conclusions…………………………...…………………………...106 
Chapter 5: Free Markets, Finance, and Fat Cats: Neoliberalism, Financialization, and the Top 1% 
Share in 18 Affluent Democracies……………………………………………………………...111 
5.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………111 
5.2 Theory and Hypotheses……………………………………………………………..114 
5.3 Results………………………………………………………………………………121 
5.4 Discussion and Conclusion…………………………………………………………133 
Chapter 6: Rising Incomes for the Rich at the Expense of Whom? Neoliberalism, 
Financialization, and Upper-Tail, Lower-Tail, and Top-Bottom Income Inequality…….…….138 
 6.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………138 
 6.2 Theory and Hypotheses……………………………………………………………..146 
 6.3 Data and Methods Review………………………………………………………….150 
 6.4 Results………………………………………………………………………………155 
 6.5 Discussion and Conclusions………………………………………………………..167 
Chapter 7: Reflecting on Income Inequality in the Era of Neoliberal Financialization………..174 
 7.1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………174 
 7.2 Summary of Findings……………………………………………………………….176 
 7.3 Theoretical Implications………………………………………………………...….184 







CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Problem 
In recent decades, rising income inequality and financial instability have become 
pervasive features of the political economy in affluent capitalist democracies as symbolized by 
such iconic events as the Great Recession, the Occupy Wall Street Movement, and the Greek 
debt crisis that had an impact across the European Union. I contend that three distinct yet 
interrelated processes— globalization, neoliberalism, and financialization—underlie the 
polarization of income and proclivity to crisis in capitalist accumulation during the neoliberal 
era, which runs from the early 1980s to the present (see Kotz 2008; Baud and Durand 2012; 
Azkunaga, San-Jose, and Urionabarrenetxea 2013; Keaney 2014). The link between economic 
globalization and income inequality is well-established in the literature (see Brady, Beckfield, 
and Zhao 2007 for a review, and Alderson and Nielsen 2002 for an exemplary study) so while I 
will incorporate variables to tap globalization processes, they are not the central focus of this 
dissertation. On the other hand, there has been less empirical research on the ways that 
neoliberalism and financialization impact income inequality in affluent capitalist countries. In 
this dissertation, I address this shortcoming by examining the instantaneous, short-run, and long-
run effects of neoliberalism and three dimensions of financialization on a variety of measures of 
income inequality in 18 affluent capitalist nations from 1981 to 2011.  
Neoliberalism is prominently featured in recent discussions about inequality (Harvey 
2005, 2010; Wallerstein 2011). Neoliberal policies enacted by Margaret Thatcher in the United 
Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the United States helped launch neoliberalism as the master 
frame for global economic policy (Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism is motivated by a powerful 
ideology that unfettered free markets are inherently more efficient in organizing the economy 
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(Fligstein 2001), and it serves as the key lens for understanding capitalist development in 
affluent democracies since 1980. Neoliberalism encompasses economic practices such as 
reducing taxes and shrinking the size of government, deregulation and privatization of economic 
sectors, and free trade: all of which are designed to release the dynamism of the private sector of 
the economy. Although neoliberalism has had a ubiquitous impact in economies throughout the 
world, it is difficult to measure and its impact on income inequality has not been rigorously 
examined.   
Financialization refers to “the tendency for profit making in the economy to occur 
increasingly through financial channels rather than productive activities” (Krippner 2011:4). 
Recent scholarship explores financialization’s role in rising income inequality (Moller and Rubin 
2008; Zalewski and Whalen 2010; Assa 2012; Kus 2012; Arnum and Naples 2013). These 
studies point primarily to financialization’s role in increasing wages for financial employees and 
limiting wage growth for nonfinancial workers (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Lapavitsas 
2013), but other dimensions of financialization’s impact have not been adequately examined. I 
explore the effects of three dimensions of financialization on income inequality: finance, 
insurance, and real estate (FIRE) employment; credit expansion; and financial crises.  
This dissertation makes three major contributions to the literature on stratification in 
affluent nations. First, I examine how neoliberalism and financialization affect a variety of 
measures of income inequality. Many previous studies have primarily focused on either the pre-
tax and pre-transfer or the post-tax and post-transfer Gini index of income inequality, a standard 
measure in the literature, alone. While both of these measures represent the overall inequality in 
a society, they do not speak to whether inequality is a) being driven by inequality in the labor 
market or by a weakened state capacity to reduce inequality through redistribution and b) how 
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neoliberalism and financialization impact incomes at different parts of the income distribution. 
Second, this dissertation provides a comprehensive examination of the determinants of income 
inequality by examining one measure of neoliberalism, the neoliberal state, and three distinct 
components of financialization—FIRE employment, credit expansion, and financial crises—that 
have not been examined in detail in previous research. Third, this dissertation uses social 
structures of accumulation (SSA) theory to provide an overarching theoretical framework to 
understand inequality in the neoliberal era. I adopt Kotz and McDonough’s (2010:98) definition 
of the social structure of accumulation as being as “a coherent, long-lasting institutional structure 
that promotes profit-making and serves as a framework for capital accumulation.” SSA theory is 
useful for this dissertation because it focuses on long swings of growth and decline in capital 
accumulation, and several scholars argue that the 1980s marks the beginning of a new SSA in 
which neoliberalism and finance dominate (Kotz and McDonough 2010; Tabb 2010; Flaherty 
2010). These contributions provide insight into the mechanisms that connect neoliberalism and 
financialization to income inequality and will be elaborated throughout the rest of this 
dissertation. 
1.2 Outline of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 1, the current chapter, 
provides an introduction to the research questions, concepts, and organization of the dissertation. 
In Chapter 2, I provide the theoretical framework for the dissertation. First, I describe social 
structures of accumulation (SSA) theory first developed by Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) 
to provide the theoretical underpinning for why neoliberalism and financialization have 
contributed to capital accumulation and rising inequality during the neoliberal era. SSA theory is 
useful for this dissertation because its central focus on political economic institutions, policies, 
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and ideologies. Additionally, there are growing theoretical debates about neoliberalism, 
financialization, and inequality during the neoliberal era (Kotz and McDonough 2010). Second, I 
provide an in-depth discussion of the links between neoliberalism, financialization, and income 
inequality in affluent nations drawing upon literature and theory from social stratification and 
inequality, the sociology of finance, economics, and political science. Finally, I provide 
hypotheses for neoliberalism, the three components of financialization, and the six dependent 
variables used in this dissertation. 
Chapter 3 outlines the data and methods used to answer the research questions in this 
dissertation. The primary source of data is the Comparative Welfare States Dataset (CWS) by 
Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1997) and updated by David Brady and colleagues. Using publicly 
available macroeconomic and income inequality data, Michael Wallace, Todd Vachon, and 
myself updated and added to the CWS dataset to examine contemporary processes on inequality, 
globalization, labor, and other social processes.  This dataset spans approximately 40 countries 
from the years 1950 to 2012; however, this dissertation examines only 18 most affluent OECD 
countries for the years of 1981 to 2011 to limit the analyses to a grouping of affluent nations that 
share similar characteristics during the neoliberal period. The focus on 18 affluent nations is 
consistent with much prior research and extending beyond these 18 nations could dilute the 
quality of the sample as it would include affluent nations with those of lesser levels of 
development. Further, data availability for the variables of interest are not accessible before 1980 
or for the entire 40 countries in the dataset. These data are strongly balanced and include 540 
observations. 
Additionally, I improve upon the methodological approach of previous research on the 
effects of neoliberalism and financialization on income inequality by using error correction 
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models (ECMs) in the analyses of Chapters 4 and 5. ECMs are advantageous because they 
efficiently address common issues in the analysis of macroeconomic time series data, such as 
unit roots, autocorrelation, and panel heteroscedasticity (De Boefe and Keele 2008). Further, 
they allow for the coefficients of the independent variables to be decomposed into instantaneous, 
short-run, and long-run effects (De Boefe and Keele 2008). Instantaneous effects estimate the 
impact of x on y at year t (or the effect of x on y during the same year). Short-run effects 
estimate the impact of x at time t-1 on y at year t (or the effect of x on y one year later). Long-
run effects are spread out over time using the short-run coefficients and the error correction rates, 
to estimate the extent that an outside shock disrupts the trend in y, to project long-run processes 
over time. Higher error correction rates will result in deeper and shorter impacts on y while lower 
error correction rates result in smaller and longer effects. Previous research has primarily using 
traditional time series methods allows for models to be specified for different lag lengths; 
however, they do not have the capability of assessing simultaneously instantaneous, short-run, 
and long-run effects. Chapters 4 and 5 overcome these limitations by using ECMs. 
Chapter 6 uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to examine income 
inequality in different parts of the income distribution. The LIS data are appended to the primary 
CWS dataset used in Chapters 4 and 5. There are some important differences in the Chapter 6 
data structure that require me to use a slightly different method. The LIS data requires that I use 
an unbalanced panel design, meaning that some nations have more observations than others, with 
120 observations for 16 affluent nations. The smaller sample size means that I must be 
conservative in the amount of coefficients and estimates in my models because of degrees of 
freedom. Additionally, the variation in the number of observations by nation and the uneven gaps 
between observations cause the meaning of differences and lags in the dependent variables to 
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vary widely compared to the simple interpretation of a year-to-year change that is present in 
Chapters 4 and 5 due to its balanced design. As a result, I use fixed effects models using OLS 
and Driscoll-Kraay (Driscoll and Kraay 1998) adjusted standard errors to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity, autocorrelation, panel heteroscedasticity, and cross-sectional dependence. While 
these models to not adjust for unit roots, Fisher unit root tests lead to inconclusive results over 
whether or not they exist in the LIS data. More information about these analyses are provided in 
Chapters 3 and 6.  
In Chapter 4, I investigate the impacts of these neoliberalism and financialization 
variables on three dimensions of income inequality: market-generated (MG) inequality, or 
inequality before taxes and transfers; redistribution, or the net result of state-led efforts to 
redistribute income from the rich to the poor through taxes and transfers; and state-mediated 
(SM) inequality, or inequality after taxes and transfers. This chapter contributes to the literature 
by addressing the following research question: Do neoliberalism and financialization impact 
income inequality by creating more unequal market incomes (represented by MG inequality), by 
affecting redistribution, by creating more unequal incomes after taxes and transfers, or some 
combination of the three?  
Most previous cross-national studies of income inequality have focused exclusively on 
MG inequality because until recently these data were more widely available. Studies focusing on 
SM inequality alone are rare, but some studies have incorporated both MG and SM income 
measures (see Brady’s 2003 study of MG and SM poverty). A few studies have examined the 
determinants of redistribution (e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2009; Dallinger 2013; Baird 2014; 
Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, and Stephens 2003), but none have examined the effects of 
financialization. In short, while a few studies have focused on one or two of these dimensions, no 
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previous study has examined all three. I assert that it is crucial to go beyond just examining MG 
inequality as the state plays a prominent role in either reducing or exacerbating inequality, 
depending upon past political-economic decisions and contemporary reactions to economic 
crises. Examining all three measures is advantageous because it provides insight into the 
mechanisms that link neoliberalism and financialization to income inequality. Further, the 
redistributive responses of affluent nations to changes in neoliberalism and financialization are 
understudied. For example, when a financial crises occurs, does the welfare state typically 
respond by cutting social services and transfers and reducing redistribution or do existing 
policies blunt some of the impact of crises on redistribution? Using a combination of these three 
measures allows me to answer these questions. 
While Chapter 4 provides a general picture of how neoliberalism and financialization 
impact income inequality, Chapter 5 focuses on the top 1% share of income and examines one 
research question, How do neoliberalism and financialization impact the top 1% share in affluent 
nations? Until recently, top income shares have been relatively unexamined, but they are 
important in understanding the general dynamics of inequality for two major reasons. First, the 
top 1% share of income is one of the major factors driving rising inequality in affluent nations 
(Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2010). Additionally, the income sources and composition for the 
wealthy are distinct from other parts of the income distribution. Indeed, the richest top 1% often 
draws a greater portion of their income from rentier, entrepreneurial, and other financial sources 
(Alvaredo et al. 2016).  
This chapter is important because there is evidence that those in the top 1%, despite their 
small size, act as strong and powerful actors with shared interests in shaping markets, social and 
redistributive policies, and other social institutions in their favor. For example, Kim et al.. (2015) 
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found that high pay among CEOs was facilitated through status competition, social networks, 
and peer group influence in their study of individual- and firm-level data in the United States. As 
noted by C. Wright Mills (1956) a half century ago, while there may be competition and intra-
class divisions among the ultra-rich, they share powerful overarching class interests, particularly 
in regards to taxation, redistribution, and financial deregulation. These shared interests have 
likely only intensified in the neoliberal era. Illustratively, Volscho and Kelley (2012) examined 
the growth of top incomes in United States from 1949 to 2008 using data from the World Wealth 
and Income Database (WWID). In general, they found that rightward shifts in Congress, the 
decline of labor unions, lower tax rates on top incomes, increased  trade openness and laissez-
faire policies, and asset and stock price bubbles (aspects of financialization) all increased top 
incomes in the United States during the second half of the 20th and early 21st centuries. Also, in a 
study of 14 affluent nations from 1990 to 2010, Flaherty (2015) found that financialization 
increases the top 1% income shares by increasing the power of capital relative to labor in the 
market and in the creation of social policy. Chapter 5 builds upon these previous findings to 
explore how new components of financialization impact the top 1% share in 18 affluent nations 
from 1981 to 2011 to maximize generalizability among affluent nations during the whole of the 
neoliberal era. 
To date, there has been very little research examining the impacts of neoliberalism and 
financialization on different parts of the income distribution. In Chapter 6, I fill this gap in the 
literature using data collected from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The main research 
question is: Is rising inequality caused by neoliberalism and financialization being driven by 
upper-tail or lower-tail inequality? In particular, upper-tail inequality is measured as the 90-50 
ratio, or the ratio between the 90th income percentile and the 50th income percentile, representing 
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inequality between the rich and the median worker in the income distribution. Lower-tail 
inequality is measured as the 50-10 ratio, or the ratio between the 50th and the 10th percentiles, 
representing inequality between the median worker and the poor. This distinction between upper- 
and lower-tail inequality is largely inspired by Neckerman and Torche (2007) who demonstrate 
that much of the increase in general income inequality is driven by changes in the upper tail. 
Further, upper-tail inequality has outpaced lower-tail inequality in recent decades. A third 
measure of inequality, the top-bottom inequality, or the income gap between the 90th and 10th 
income percentiles, will also be examined to represent inequality between the rich and the poor. 
The 90-10 ratio allows me to triangulate with findings for the 90-50 and 50-10 ratios to gain a 
better overall understanding of the relative extent to which the 50th percentile, 10th percentile are 
losing income shares. Chapter 6 is important because much of the empirical research and 
theoretical debates revolving around financialization and inequality either focus on a broad 
definition of inequality or the top 1% while paying less attention to the middle class and 
especially the poor. In this chapter, I overcome this shortcoming.  
Finally, Chapter 7 returns to the original research questions and summarizes the key 
findings of each empirical chapter. I provide general conclusions from my dissertation research, 
discuss the implications of this research, and outline broader questions related to this topic that 
can guide future research in this area. Overall, I find that neoliberalism and financialization, two 
of the dominant systems of capitalist accumulation in the neoliberal SSA, have increased income 
inequality in affluent capitalist nations in a variety of ways. Some scholars have gone as far as 
saying that societies with high levels of neoliberalism and financialization have created two 
bifurcated economies within nations (Lapavitsas 2013). First, there is a financial economy that 
experiences high income growth yet produces little of value other than using capital to create 
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more capital. Second, there is a productive economy, which produces the goods and services that 
we use in everyday life, that has low income growth and sluggish profits. In other words, finance 
has decoupled itself from the rest of the economy. As a result, I discuss the implications of these 







CHAPTER 2: LINKING NEOLIBERALISM, FINANCIALIZATION, AND 
INCOME INEQUALITY 
2.1 Social Structures of Accumulation, Neoliberalism, and Financialization 
Over history, capitalism has gone through cycles of prosperity and crisis. After each 
crisis, a period of economic restructuring occurs to reboot the capital accumulation process. 
Social structures of accumulation (SSA) theory provides a useful framework to understand how 
major changes in the economy over the last few decades, specifically neoliberalism and 
financialization, have both contributed to efforts by capital to maximize capital accumulation  
and simultaneously led to rising economic inequality. Initially developed by Gordon, Edwards, 
and Reich (1982), SSA theory not only emphasizes shifts in the behaviors and norms among 
firms, labor, and capital; but it also places a central focus on the state’s role in shaping taxation, 
social welfare policy, redistribution, the regulation of industries such as finance and real estate, 
technological systems, monetary and credit systems, and trade among other nations. This makes 
it a broad yet useful framework for understanding inequality in the neoliberal era, which runs 
from the early 1980s to the present, in comparison to other periods in the history of capitalism. 
Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) argued that capitalism goes through a series of long 
swings, each consisting of a period of sustained economic growth followed by a period of 
decline. Every long swing consists of three phases: exploration, consolidation, and decay 
(Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1994). The exploration phase is when capitalists experiment with 
new ways to organize markets and systems of labor control in order to maximize accumulation. 
This is followed by a period of consolidation in which capitalists and firms create a more 
dominant and coherent social structure of accumulation within the economy based on the most 
successful practices from the exploration period. Consolidation typically coincides with 
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sustained economic growth and stability. Finally, each long swing ends with a period of decay 
where the current dominant SSA sees capital accumulation slow and eventually come to a halt 
because the old institutions that once produced prosperity become outmoded and are no longer 
suited for continued accumulation. The decay period typically ends with a series of crises that 
grow progressively worse. During the decay phase, capitalists simultaneously begin a new period 
of exploration as obstacles to capitalist expansion lead to experimental strategies and 
arrangements for renewed capitalist expansion, thus setting the stage for a new SSA to begin.  
Before describing in detail the literature on the SSA that has dominated contemporary 
capitalism since around 1980, it is important to first describe prior SSAs for historical context. 
While this discussion primarily focuses on the United States, I will briefly discuss similarities 
and differences between other affluent nations whenever possible. In Figure 2.1, I present a 
typology of the three SSAs in the United States from 1790 to the 1970s adopted from Gordon, 
Edwards, and Reich’s (1982) seminal book Segmented Work, Divided Workers: the Historical 
Transformation of Labor in the United States and Wallace and Brady (2010). The first SSA, 
initial proletarianization, began its exploration phase around 1790 and experienced decay from 
1873 to the late 1890s. During this period, the fundamental transformation in the labor process 
was the movement from self-employed agrarian work and independent artisans into the ranks of 
wage labor—i.e., working for someone else. A simple system of control was established as 
capitalists sought to increase capital accumulation by bringing workers under more constant 
supervision in factories or shops. A variant of simple control was entrepreneurial control where a 





Figure 2.1: Historical Forces Shaping the Organization of Work in the United States: Long Swings, Social structures of Accumulation, 
and Dominant Control Systems.   
         
SOCIAL STRUCTURE  INITIAL 
OF ACCUMULATION PROLETARIANIZATION  HOMOGENIZATION SEGMENTATION   
 
 
Dominant control  Simple: entrepreneurial,  
system    hierarchical    Technical   Bureaucratic   
 
Approximate  
Timing:    
 
1790-1820   
1820-mid 1840s Exploration 
 
mid 1840s-1873 Consolidation 
1873-late 1890s                           Decay  Exploration 
 
late 1890s-WWI  Consolidation 
WWI-WWII                                                                                                  Decay  Exploration 
 
WWII-early 1970s  Consolidation      




Long swings: Long periods of sustained economic growth (perhaps 25 years long) followed by long periods of sustained economic decline (perhaps 25 years 
long), usually connected to revolutionary, new modes of social and economic organization or "epoch-making inventions". 
 
Social structures of accumulation: The specific institutional environment within which the accumulation of capitalist profits takes place; includes such things 
as core technological systems, the way markets are organized, the monetary and credit systems, the pattern of government involvement in the economy, and the 
character of class conflict over the accumulation process 
 
Dominant control systems: This is the "contested terrain" of capitalist-worker relations: the dominant system of control used by capitalists to elicit compliance 
by workers to a prevailing system of production; a core component and a dynamic feature of the social structure of accumulation 
 
*Adapted from: Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982) and Wallace and Brady (2010) 
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The next SSA, homogenization, began its exploration phase during the 1873 to late 1980s 
period and experienced its decay between World War I and II (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 
1982; Wallace and Brady 2010). During this period, workers moved from smaller workplaces 
under the supervision of capitalists to larger factories with mechanized labor. Capitalists created 
a system known as technical control, which used machinery to create a common rhythm among 
workers in large companies where direct supervision was no longer practical. The assembly line 
became popular during this period, and the division of labor increased as workers were often 
assigned small, unskilled tasks. Ultimately, the Great Depression created both an economic crisis 
and a crisis in the system of control as workers began to organize and unionize. The labor 
movement grew rapidly and reached peak numbers coming out of the Depression and into World 
War II as unions and capitalists reached a tense but cooperative coexistence in order to promote 
the war effort at home and abroad.  
The primary SSA long swing associated with post-World War II boom in the United 
States is segmentation (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982; Wallace and Brady 2010). There are 
several key features of the segmentation SSA. The size and strength of unions during the capital-
labor accord that occurred in the economic expansion during the 1950s and 1960s, paired with 
strike activity, allowed wages to be strong and labor to be organized (Bowles and Gintis 1982). 
As a result, the middle class grew and income inequality decreased in the United States. 
Capitalists developed a system of bureaucratic control in response to these changes in power 
dynamics, which sought out to divide workers into different groups by industrial, occupational, 
race, gender, and class lines in order to break class consciousness and solidarity among workers 
associated with labor after World War II. During this time, labor became increasingly segmented 
into two sectors: the primary sector and secondary sector. Primary sector jobs tended to be in 
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larger, more profitable firms, were more likely to be unionized, and tended to be held by white 
men. Secondary sector jobs, on the other hand, tended to be low-skill and low-paying and tended 
to be held by women and racial and ethnic minorities. 
There are several other important aspects of the segmentation SSA that are worth noting. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, United States economic policy was firmly established in Keynesian 
principles of demand stimulus, which suggests that the government should spend and invest in 
goods, infrastructure, and services in order to stimulate a lack of demand in the private market 
(Reich 1994). This means that government policies were more concerned with galvanizing 
economic growth through spending and reducing unemployment and less concerned with the 
growth of public debt and inflation. These types of policies became cemented in the United 
States during the New Deal and carried over to varying degrees into the post-World War II 
period of the 1950s and 1960s. Additionally, the United States United States emerged from its 
isolationist agenda to take a much more influential international role. During this time, the 
United States’ economic, political, and military agenda would shift against the rise of 
communism, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. The goal was to ship the American brand of 
capitalism throughout the globe. 
The 1970s were a tumultuous time for many affluent nations, particularly the United 
States, and represent the decline of the segmentation SSA. In 1973, surges in oil prices created a 
series of crises by increasing the cost of manufacturing and transportation while shifting income 
and profits from the United States and other affluent nations to oil-producing nations in the 
Middle East and other regions (Tomaskovic-Devy and Lin 2011). Additionally, the power of 
unions from the post-war period led to struggles with corporate leadership over the distribution 
of income and wages in the United States and United Kingdom (Wolfson and Kotz 2010). 
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Segmentation helped divide workers; however, capitalists still had trouble accumulating capital. 
Combined, these processes caused stagflation, which is a period when economic growth is 
stagnant and inflation increases. With unstable financial markets, faltering profits, and what were 
seen as bloated incomes for workers, capitalists were left with a quandary: how do they regain 
power in a period of economic stagnation?  
Similar trends in both growth and relations between capital and labor occurred in other 
affluent nations from the 1950s to the late 1970s; however, scholars argue that there were two 
major types of affluent capitalist nations by the end of the period: coordinated market and liberal 
market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001). Coordinated market economies (CMEs), like 
Germany, Norway, Finland, and Sweden had comprehensive welfare states, strong labor 
movements, and corporate practices that focus on long-run relationships and planning. Liberal 
market economies (LMEs), like the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand had relatively weaker labor movements, weaker welfare states, and corporate practices 
that focus on short-term relationships and planning. Starting in the 1980s, CMEs and LMEs 
would become increasingly different as LMEs more fully embraced neoliberalism and 
financialization in the neoliberal era, as I will discuss later in this chapter. 
This summary of the postwar SSA in affluent nations brings us to the neoliberal era, 
which started in the early 1980s and runs until the present. There is evidence that the relationship 
between labor and capital, as well as the methods of capital accumulation, during the neoliberal 
era represent a distinct break from previous periods (Kotz 2003). Starting in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, there was increased power of corporations and capital, a retrenchment of the welfare 
state, the deregulation of many industries, and increased global trade and interdependency, 
particularly in the United States and United Kingdom (Wolfson and Kotz 2010). In the United 
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States, there was also a massive anti-union movement that would crush much of the power of 
labor relative to capital. While income inequality decreased in the United States after World War 
II due to union strength and income growth for the middle class, these trends would reverse in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s in a process known as the Great U-Turn (Bluestone and Harrison 
1982; Harrison and Bluestone 1988). Inequality began to increase in many affluent other 
capitalist democracies in the late 1970s and 1980s as well (Aldersen and Nielsen 2002). 
There are three competing, but somewhat complimentary, theoretical strands within the 
SSA literature that define accumulation during the neoliberal era: spatialization, neoliberalism, 
and financialization. First, spatialization (Brady and Wallace 2000; Wallace and Brady 2010) 
focuses on the spatial restructuring of the labor process. This means that various parts of the 
labor process, such as different aspects of labor and management, no longer had to be located in 
the same physical space as is epitomized with the auto industry in Detroit during the post-World 
War II era. Instead, cars and other commodities could be manufactured all over the world, 
wherever labor was cheapest. Assembly of cars could take place Alabama or other states with 
lower labor costs and less unions while management could be located in Detroit. Changes in 
trade, communication, and technology led to a new system of social control, technocratic control 
that allowed management to move production sites to locations with favorable labor costs while 
maintaining control over production from afar. In the 1980s, there was a shift in the 
manufacturing of many goods from core, affluent nations to lower-income, periphery nations 
where there are lower labor costs. In the era of spatialization, capital disciplines labor in affluent 
nations through the relocation, or the threat of relocation, of production. New international trade 
agreements allowed corporations to move their production sites and to avoid costly tariffs for 
imports. Although Brady and Wallace (2000) only examined foreign direct investment and 
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outsourcing as characteristics of spatialization, the movement of production to other countries is 
not the only way that capital can relocate production. Production can also be shifted from urban 
centers to rural areas within a nation given that wages and unionization are often lower and there 
tends to be less regulation in rural areas. All in all, the growth of globalization and spatialization 
has led to negative effects for the wages and working conditions of many workers in affluent 
nations.  
While spatialization is often discussed as being distinct from globalization in the SSA 
literature, spatialization is often discussed as a part of globalization in the literature examining 
the relationship between economic globalization and income inequality (Alderson and Nielsen 
2002; Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007). In this literature, scholars tend to use two measures 
associated with globalization, imports and inward FDI, which I control for in this dissertation. 
There has been much less empirical research on the impacts of neoliberalism and financialization 
in the literature therefore they are the focus of this dissertation. Neoliberalism serves as the 
political ideology and policy framework that allowed capital to regain power relative to labor by 
reducing taxes, cutting or privatizing state social programs, deregulating markets, attacking 
unions, and increasing international trade agreements (Kotz and McDonough 2010). Of 
particular interest in this dissertation is the neoliberal reform of the state, which has a vital role of 
shaping market incomes and processes of redistribution within affluent nations.  
The SSA literature on financialization, on the other hand, examines the development of 
the financial sector as a powerful political and economic actor in affluent nations (Tabb 2010). 
Deregulation of finance and the growth of the shareholder conception of the firm played vital 
roles in the development of financialization in the United States and other affluent nations 
(Krippner 2011; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Lapavitsas 2013). Additionally, scholars 
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have increasingly linked financialization to rising income and wealth inequality (Moller and 
Rubin 2008; Zalewski and Whalen 2010; Assa 2012; Kus 2012; Arnum and Naples 2013). In 
particular, the shifts from commercial to investment banking and from loans to securities have 
primarily benefitted the bank accounts of the wealthy (Guttman and Plihon 2008). Despite this 
growing body of literature, there is still room for improvement. Below, I expand upon how 
neoliberalism and financialization have contributed to capital accumulation and income 
inequality during the neoliberal era. 
2.2 Neoliberalism, the State, and Income Inequality 
Coming out of the economic crises related to oil shocks and stagflation in the United 
States and other nations during the 1970s, the global economic and political elites were left with 
a conundrum: how do they reshape the global economy to escape stagflation and the strength of 
organized labor to reinstitute another period of economic prosperity and capital dominance? One 
of the most resounding and influential answers to this problem in many nations was 
neoliberalism (Harvey 2005). In their reinterpretation of classical economics, early proponents of 
neoliberalism like Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek argued that market deregulation and 
economic freedom were the best policies for generating economic growth and creating optimal 
outcomes for all economic actors (see Jones 2012). For neoliberals, the state’s role is to establish 
and maintain market sovereignty with minimal state intervention. This is accomplished by 
strengthening property rights, deregulating markets, promoting free trade, and reducing taxes and 
government spending (Harvey 2005). By enacting these reforms, private enterprise is released 
from government restriction, which according to neoliberal ideology, leads to a maximization of 
growth and prosperity.  
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While the ideas of Hayek and Friedman did not catch on immediately, they would 
become the cornerstone of economic policy under the administrations of Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990 and President Ronald Reagan in 
the United States from 1981 to 1989. Both argued that neoliberal policies were the answer to 
sluggish economies and what they saw as a bloated government and strong labor movement. In 
affluent nations, neoliberalism tends to revolve around three major policy agendas: liberalization, 
privatization, and stabilization (Kotz and McDonough 2010). The first is liberalization, which 
focuses on the deregulation of markets from state intervention and trade agendas that promote 
the movement of goods and capital (but not people) across national borders. Second, 
privatization focuses on taking public goods and services out of the control of the government 
and putting them under the auspices of the free market. For neoliberals, the free market is always 
more efficient at providing goods and services than the government. Finally, stabilization, refers 
to monetary policies that focus solely on limiting inflation and balancing budgets rather than 
focusing on lowering unemployment or stimulating economic growth. During the 1980s, the 
Thatcher and Reagan administrations pushed these three policy agendas, which were a major 
shift from the post-war era. Increasingly, neoliberalism has become the dominant ideology of the 
global economy; however, nations enact neoliberal policies to varying degrees and prioritize 
different components (Hall 2001).  
There is debate among scholars whether neoliberalism reduces interventionism of the 
state or whether it actually redirects state intervention to benefit capitalists and the wealthy 
(Wolfson and Kotz 2010). It is clear that there are class contradictions in the neoliberal SSA, 
however. In particular, most varieties of neoliberalism result in a reduction of state programs that 
benefit the working class, such as unemployment insurance and state pensions, while 
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implementing tax breaks and business studies that benefit the wealthy (Kotz and McDonough 
2010). Most notably, there has been increased activism by the state to weaken labor unions in 
affluent nations. Perhaps the most evident examples of this are American President Ronald 
Reagan’s breaking of the Professional Air Traffic Control Organization (PATCO) strike in 1981 
by quickly firing nearly 13,000 government workers and British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher’s defeat of the Miners Union in 1984 and 1985. After these events, it was clear that 
both corporations and the state were actively trying to reduce the power of unions during the 
1980s. Ultimately this led to wage concessions, union busting strategies by employers, and a 
dramatic weakening of labor during the 1980s. 
While there are numerous varieties of neoliberalism with different components, this 
dissertation specifically focuses on the impacts of neoliberalism on the state because changes in 
the tax structure, government spending, and social programs can have large impacts on the 
distribution of market incomes and redistribution by the welfare state. Like Kotz and McDonough 
(2010), I identify several ways that neoliberalism shapes the role of the state in market economies. 
First, state spending and investment is dramatically reduced in an effort to minimize inflation. In 
the previous SSA, most economic policy was directed towards reducing unemployment and 
stimulating economic growth through spending and investment. Government spending helped to 
stimulate underutilized demand in the economy, which was not tapped into by capitalists. 
Investments in science and the arts, which may not be a priority for private firms, helps provide 
jobs, innovation, and spurs additional economic growth and tend to benefit the general public over 
private interests (Wright and Rogers 2015). As a result, unemployment rates in affluent nations 
like France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States in period between 1950 and 1973 
were relatively low, varying between 1.8 percent in the United Kingdom and 6.1 percent in Italy 
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on average over the period (OECD 2008). Under neoliberalism, the state’s primary goal is to attain 
balanced budgets and minimize inflation while there is less concern for unemployment and 
stimulating economic growth (Kotz and McDonough 2010). As a result, unemployment rates were 
higher on average in the current SSA between 1980 and 2000, varying between a low of 6.4 percent 
in the United States to 10 percent in France and 10.7 percent in Italy (OECD 2008). 
Second, there has been a reduction in state programs that help the middle class and the poor 
under neoliberalism as many states sought to balance their budgets and reduce government 
spending (Harvey 2005). In neoliberal states, there has been a sharp reduction in social wage 
programs that subsidize the incomes of the working and middle classes, such as unemployment 
insurance, retirement pensions, disability insurance, and educational subsidies. Additionally, there 
has been a shift in the provision of services and public goods provided by public agencies and 
organizations (Kotz and McDonough 2010; Wright and Rogers 2015). While the government still 
provides basic public goods like transportation, infrastructure, education, and criminal justice 
systems, private corporations and entities are playing increasing roles in shaping the content and 
provision of these services. Overwhelmingly, the poor and middle class utilize these goods and 
services to supplement their incomes and improve their quality of life. As a result, the retrenchment 
of these programs increases inequality. 
Third, there has been a change in the tax structure used to fund government programs in 
affluent nations. Increasingly, the rich have seen their taxes decline while the tax burden has been 
shifted to the middle and working classes (Kotz and McDonough 2010). In many nations, the tax 
revenue lost to tax cuts for the rich has resulted in budget deficits and fiscal crises, which puts 
pressure on states to further reduce social programs and services. As a result, the rich have seen 
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their incomes after taxes and transfers increase in nations where neoliberalism is the norm. This 
particular component of the neoliberal state will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5. 
The measure of neoliberalism used in this dissertation is the neoliberal state index, which 
provides insight into how much impact neoliberalism has had on state policies and size. The 
neoliberal state index, collected by Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013), is comprised of several 
components discussed in the previous discussion of neoliberalism: government consumption 
spending, government transfers and subsidies, government investment, and the top marginal tax 
rate. This index ranges between 0 and 8 with greater values representing a more neoliberal state. 
In Figure 2.2, I present trends in the neoliberal state index for 18 affluent nations from 1981 to 
2011. Overall, there is a trend toward developing the state into a neoliberal project in affluent 
nations, despite variation in this process. Liberal market economies, like the United States, 
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, have experienced a steady movement toward a more 
neoliberal state throughout the neoliberal era. Coordinated market economies in Scandinavia, 
like Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway, had relatively low levels of neoliberalism in the 
1980s and ended the period with low to moderate levels of neoliberalism despite some slight 
increases. Other nations, like Ireland, Italy, and New Zealand, saw neoliberalism increase from 
1980 to the mid-1990s and early-2000s; however, neoliberalism declined in afterwards. Nations 
like France and Germany saw fluctuation throughout the neoliberal era; however, there was a 
general trend toward a more neoliberal state. Finally, Netherlands had a general decline in the 
neoliberal state. Occasionally, there are some nations that experience sharp increases in the 
neoliberal agenda scale, which represent major changes in policy. On the whole, there is 




Figure 2.2: Trends in the Neoliberal State Index by Nation, 1981 to 2011. 
 
 Despite extensive theorizing on the subject, few rigorous empirical accounts of the 
effects of neoliberalism on inequality exist. In an analysis of 80 countries from 1970 to 2005, 
Bergh and Nilsson (2008) found that movement toward economic freedom increased inequality, 
especially in high-income nations. From the empirical literature, it is unclear how neoliberalism 
will impact the incomes of the middle class and poor. However, one can conclude from the 
theoretical discussion above that a movement toward a more neoliberal state will result in a 
reduction in social spending, top marginal tax rates, and social programs. These policy change 
would reduce redistribution, increase incomes for the top rich after taxes, and likely decrease 
incomes for the middle class and poor after taxes and transfers.  
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Below, I present the hypotheses for the neoliberal state’s relationships with the measures 
of income inequality for each chapter. The first hypothesis is Hypothesis 4.1 because it is 
associated with Chapter 4 and the first key independent variable, the neoliberal state. To remind 
the reader, market generated (MG) inequality represents income inequality before taxes and 
transfers are accounted. Redistribution represents reduction in income inequality by taxes and 
transfers. State-mediated (SM) inequality is income inequality after taxes and transfers. 
Hypothesis 5.1 is from Chapter 5 and focuses the neoliberal state’s predicted impact the top 1% 
share of income, which represents the income shares of the wealthy. Finally, Hypothesis 6.1 is 
for Chapter 6 and is associated with the predicted relationships between the neoliberal state and 
upper- and lower-tail inequality, measured as the 90-50 and 50-10 income ratios respectively, 
and top-bottom inequality, measured as the 90-10 income ratios. Given the theoretical discussion 
above, I predict that:  
Hypothesis 4.1: The neoliberal state will increase MG income inequality, 
decrease redistribution, and increase SM income inequality. 
Hypothesis 5.1: The neoliberal state will increase the top 1% share. 
Hypothesis 6.1: The neoliberal state will increase the upper-tail inequality, lower-
tail inequality, and top-bottom inequality.  
2.3 Financialization and Income Inequality 
Financialization Defined 
Financialization is a process of economic restructuring in which large, institutional 
financial actors (e.g., commercial or investment banks, insurance companies, and investment 
companies) assume an increasingly prominent role in the economy (Krippner 2011). Over the 
last several decades, the role of the financial sector has risen dramatically throughout the global 
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economy (Epstein 2005). One way to illustrate the importance of finance in national economies 
is by the percent of value added by finance. In 1970, no affluent nation generated more than 10% 
of value added from the financial sector. By 2008, this figure had risen to at least 20% in 28 of 
34 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Assa 2012). 
During the neoliberal era, the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Germany all 
experienced steady and significant increases in value added by finance, insurance, and real estate 
industries (Lapavitsas 2013).  
Another way to examine the importance of finance is by comparing financial profits as a 
percent of total profits. Among affluent OECD nations, the United States had the most dramatic 
rise in financial profits. In 1981, approximately 20% of profits came from financial activities in 
the United States (Lapavitsas 2013). United States financial profits peaked around 38% in 2004, 
dipped to around 10% during the financial collapse of 2008, and rebounded back to around 35% 
in 2009 and 2010. In the 1980s, financial profits were often less than 20% of total profits in the 
United Kingdom, then dropped down to 10% of total profits during the 2000 dot com and tech 
bubble, and finally rebounded to around 30% in 2007 leading up to the Great Recession 
(Lapavitsas 2013). Japan faced a less pronounced, upward trending process. During 1980, 
financial profits made up approximately 10% of total profits in Japan (Lapavitsas 2013). 
Japanese financial profits peaked around 20% during the mid-1990s and then hovered between 
13% and 17% for the remainder of the neoliberal era. In summary, there is substantial evidence 
that finance has become an increasingly powerful actor in national economies throughout the 
globe; however, the influence of finance varies across nations and over time. 
 As finance has become such an influential actor in the economies of affluent nations, it 
has increasingly become uncoupled from the productive sector, particularly manufacturing 
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(Lapavitsas 2013). The United States, one of the most financialized nations, epitomizes this 
process. In the early 1980s, the real annual compensation (wages and salaries) of the financial 
sector and the rest of the private sector were approximately equivalent (Wright and Rogers 
2015). By 2008, financial sector workers were compensated approximately 2.5 times that of 
nonfinancial private sector workers. This has led some scholars to argue that liberal market 
economies like the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia now have two 
separate economies within each nation (Lapavitsas 2013; Wright and Rogers 2015). First is the 
financial economy, which is highly profitable despite volatility and has strong income growth for 
workers. Second, the rest of the economy, including manufacturing, services, and other 
industries, has sluggish profits, increased reliance on labor-cutting technology and outsourcing, 
and stagnant or declining wages for workers. This creates a paradox in highly financialized 
nations: finance, which uses money to create more money, has begun to dominate the global 
economy without actually producing anything of real value (Lapatvitsas 2013). The real 
economy, which produces the items and objects that we use, has taken a back seat to finance and 
is struggling. This paradox serves as one of the major motivations for this dissertation: as finance 
has become unshackled from the real economy, what are the implications for these trends on 
income inequality within nations? And in what ways do different components of financialization 
impact different parts of the income distribution? 
Finance became such a powerful actor in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
other nations for two major reasons: deregulation and the movement from stakeholder to 
shareholder conceptions of the firm. These two major factors planted the seeds for finance to 
grow to be one of the most powerful actors in the economies of affluent nations. The discussion 
of financialization in the neoliberal era below primarily focuses on the United States because the 
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majority of financial transactions tend to have connections to or flow into the United States 
(Tabb 2007; Tabb 2010; Krippner 2011); however, similar trends in deregulation and a growing 
focus on corporate stock prices are apparent in many other affluent nations. 
Financial Deregulation 
Regulation over financial industries in the United States and other affluent nations has 
varied widely throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. While finance is an important component of 
the economy because it allows for the investment in future goods and services, the overextension 
of finance through debt-based activities can have devastating impacts on the general public. As a 
result, regulation over finance is important to limit the exposure of the general public to the risky 
actions of banks and other financial institutions. Since 1980, there has been increasing 
deregulation of financial industries, particularly in liberal market economies like the United 
States, United Kingdom, and Canada (Lapavitsas 2013). Deregulation, a key aspect of 
neoliberalism, of the financial sector is best understood by examining it historically. The 
following discussion will focus on the United States from the 1920s to the present; however, 
many other affluent nations experienced similar patterns in financial deregulation (Lapavitsas 
2013).  
During the 1920s, speculative activities and risk-taking were commonplace on Wall 
Street. Stock prices were soaring, business was booming, and the American jazz age ushered in 
an era of prosperity where the wealthy in the United States gained enormous economic and 
political power, which would not last forever. This would all come crashing to a halt on Black 
Friday October 25th, 1929 when the New York Stock Exchange crashed. Experts have identified 
a number of factors that contributed to the collapse, such as a weakly developed system of 
branch banks, excessive competition among financial institutions that led to excessive risk 
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taking, and the government’s failure to provide a swift monetary response (Krippner 2011). 
Many scholars believe that the biggest contributor to the 1929 collapse was the union between 
commercial and investment banks.  
At commercial banks, everyday citizens and businesses make deposits into banking 
accounts and then withdraw their money to pay for bills and other expenses. Most deposits in 
commercial banks are known as liquid assets, which means that the depositor has immediate 
access to their funds (Wright and Rogers 2015). Banks typically use deposits to make loans to 
other businesses and individuals. Those who deposit money in banks benefit from a small 
amount of interest on their accounts, which is paid to them by banks. Banks, on the other hand, 
make money off of interest rates attached to the loans that they provide. Each loan comes with a 
risk as there is always a chance that the borrower will not pay it back. Credit scores help banks to 
determine the risks associated with potential borrowers and their loans. Prime loans are given to 
individuals with good credit histories and stable sources of income. Subprime loans are those 
given to individuals with bad credit histories or who have unstable income sources. These 
distinctions are important in order for banks to prevent themselves to being exposed to too much 
risk in the lending market. 
Investment banks, on the other hand, are banks that deal with capital markets directly and 
are often associated with much greater risk (Wright and Rogers 2015). Investment banks do not 
have depositors but instead gain capital from investors and loans from other banks. They also 
directly engage in speculative activities and try to minimize losses through derivatives, or 
investments that partially insure speculative activities if a loss occurs. When commercial and 
investment banking functions are combined in one bank, it creates a potentially disastrous 
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situation because banks are allowed to use the general publics’ money, in the form of deposits, to 
engage in speculative activity.  
After the 1929 crash, panic among average citizens ensued, which created “a run on the 
bank” (Wright and Rogers 2015). A run on the bank occurs when a financial crisis, such as a 
massive default of loans or a stock market crash, causes citizens to go to the bank and demand 
their deposits. At this time, the union between commercial and investment functions meant that 
banks were using deposits to invest in other speculative instruments and therefore did not have 
money in liquid assets to provide to their customers immediately. As news spread that banks 
were low on reserves and not issuing withdrawals, more people flooded to the banks to demand 
their money. Because banks issue loans to other banks and create an interlocking system of debt, 
failure at one bank can quickly spread to other banks causing a systemic crisis.  
In response the calamity caused by the 1929 stock market crash to Glass-Steagall Act, 
which was passed in 1933 by the Roosevelt administration in response to (Krippner 2011). 
Glass-Steagall, also known as the Banking Act of 1933, contained several important provisions 
that prevented banks from exposing the public to excessive risk due to speculation of financial 
institutions. First, it created the Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation (FDIC), which is a 
federal agency that insures deposits up to sizable amount (currently $250,000) made in 
commercial banks and discourages risky investments. Even if a financial crisis occurs and a bank 
collapses, anyone with a deposit of $250,000 or less can get their full deposit refunded. Thus, the 
FDIC serves as an important financial protection for the general public. However, there are some 
negative consequences of the FDIC, which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
Second, the Glass-Steagall Act had a clause to prevent banks from having both 
commercial and investment functions (Krippner 2011). By separating these two banking 
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functions, it prevented overly speculative activities by investment banks from using deposits of 
federally insured accounts (Krippner 2011). This serves two purposes. First, it provides 
additional protection from runs on the bank. Second, it helps to prevent speculative manias and 
crises as investment banks are limited in the amount of capital that they can use for speculation. 
While the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, as well as similar regulations in other nations, 
would help provide stability in U.S. and global financial markets for much of the post-World 
War II era, stagflation and a lack of financial capital during the 1970s encouraged capitalists to 
push for deregulation during the 1980s (Krippner 2011; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). 
Third, Glass-Steagall provided restrictions on banks mergers, which limited the size of 
banks (Krippner 2011; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Limiting the size of banks is 
important because if banks become too large then bank failure can have disastrous macro-
economic impacts. Not only does it create major risks for consumers who hold deposits at large 
banks, but as banks increase in size then it also increases the likelihood that their assets will be 
tied to assets of other banks as they package loans and sell them. Most importantly, the creation 
of the FDIC meant that the government backs the loans of most commercial banks. If a bank 
were to get too large and subsequently default, then the federal government would have to step in 
to save that bank because a) the FDIC makes the government responsible for the loans and b) the 
failure of a very large bank would cause a massive financial crisis. As such, these bloated banks 
with huge financial assets are known as “too big to fail” (TBTF) banks because the government 
would be forced to bail them out even if they made poor speculative risks that result in massive 
losses (Wright and Rogers 2015). The deregulation of these three components of Glass-
Steagall—the creation of the FDIC, the divorce of commercial and investment banking, and 
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restrictions on bank mergers—are vital for understanding the 2008 financial collapse, which will 
be discussed later in this chapter. 
During the 1950s, regulation of the financial sector of the United States was at its peak 
(Wright and Rogers 2015). In the 1950s, a series of laws were passed that restricted the size of 
banks and limited them from operating across state boundaries. In response, Wall Street and 
other banks began a series of political moves to try to deregulate banks and other financial 
institutions. In their mind, regulations were constricting their profits and making them less 
competitive with banks in Europe. While their initial attempts were unsuccessful, banks would 
find more success several decades later as neoliberalism became the norm in American politics. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the 1970s and 1980s were a period when capitalists 
and the wealthy mobilized to install neoliberalism as the primary frame for government 
economic policy in the United States and United Kingdom. During this period, the state’s 
policies were oriented to favor market forces over government regulation to develop a business-
friendly climate (Harvey 2005; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Stagflation during the 1970s 
caused bank profitability to drop dramatically. In response, the Federal Reserve Bank fought 
inflation by rapidly increasing interest rates (Krippner 2011). While this would reduce inflation, 
it also created huge profits for banks and other financial institutions and encouraged a frenzy of 
international investment from other nations, particularly Japan and China. These flows of 
international capital fueled debt-based consumption by consumers, corporations, and the U.S. 
federal government and fed U.S. financialization (Orhangazi 2008). Debt-based consumption 
also caused credit markets to expand in the United States as there was increased pressure to relax 
restrictions on the provision of credit.  
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Under the Carter administration, the 1980s began with a key law that helped propel 
financialization forward. The Banking Depository Institutions and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
repealed a set of regulations associated with the Glass-Steagall Act, which were designed to limit 
risk in financial markets (Krippner 2011; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). In particular, it 
released restrictions on bank merges, removed regulatory control over interest paid on savings 
accounts, and removed state usury caps on interest rates charged by financial institutions 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011:544). This act weakened the distinction between mutual 
funds, commercial banks, and savings and loan firms.  
Financial deregulation continued during the presidency of Bill Clinton as Wall Street and 
other financial actors became more influential by increasing their lobbying efforts, which would 
culminate in 1999 with the repeal of Glass-Steagall. In 1994, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
and Branching Act allowed banks to operate across state lines (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 
2011). Given that banks were allowed to merge and operate across state lines, the assets of the 
major banks in the United States grew steadily during the 1990s. During the 1990s, the Federal 
Reserve and the Securities and Exchange Commission (FEC) pulled back their regulatory role 
over finance and promoted complex and risky financial instruments such as derivatives and 
mortgage-backed securities, which were potentially more profitable, but also very risky 
(Krippner 2011).  
Finally, the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 effectively repealed the last 
remaining regulations of Glass-Steagall by allowing investment banks, commercial banks, and 
insurance companies to combine operations. This was passed under Bill Clinton’s 
administration; however, Congress was controlled by Republicans. Regardless, Wall Street had 
lobbyists working for both parties, which allowed them to achieve their policy goals. At this 
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time, Wall Street was effectively self-regulating. To summarize, by the year 2000 banks could a) 
grow to massive sizes due to a lack of restrictions on merges and interstate operations; b) were 
allowed to use complex and risky financial instruments; and c) were allowed to use the deposits 
of their customers in risky financial deals due to the reunion of commercial and investment bank 
functions with the guarantee that the federal government would insure their customers deposits if 
the bank were to fail. These three major characteristics of deregulation during the 1980s and 
1990s would set the stage to a speculative bubble in the 2000s and the financial collapse of 2008, 
which I will discuss in greater detail later in this chapter. 
Financial deregulation occurred in many other affluent nations as well. In 1970, 
Competition and Credit Control legislation began to dismantle international restrictions over 
British banks (Lapavitsas 2013). As a result, London became an even bigger player in the 
financial markets of Europe they were allowed to do more international transactions. 
Deregulation of banking policies throughout Europe in the 1990s led to a growth the size of 
banks throughout Europe, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, and other 
nations (Lapavitsas 2012). As banks grew in size and deregulation increases, the exposure of the 
public to the risky activities of these banks increased. The 1996 Amendment of the Basel 
Accords made provisions to allow increased market risk as long as that risk was tied to securities 
(Lapavitsas 2013). As a result, bank balance sheets began to increasingly reflect security prices 
in open markets. Private credit agencies began to evaluate the risk of banks instead of 
government agencies. Given the ties between many financial organizations and the high 
profitability of risky financial actions, there were not incentives in place to curtail risk in 
financial markets. If anything, there were incentives to underestimate risk and encourage 
speculation. While deregulation and the size of banks tended to be much greater in the United 
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States, financial markets throughout Europe were exposed to similar risks leading up to the 2008 
crash. 
Shareholder Conception of the Firm 
  The deregulation of financial industries in the United States and other nations allowed 
Wall Street and financial institutions to make riskier and potentially more profitable moves in the 
global economy. Beyond political factors, there were also changes within nonfinancial firms that 
helped fuel financialization, specifically the development of the shareholder conception of the 
firm (Fligstein 2001; Davis 2009; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Before the 1980s, 
managerial decisions were typically based upon long-term goals such as profits, and managers 
would typically use profits to reinvest in productive infrastructure and workers. This process 
typically benefitted all of the stakeholders, or individuals interested in the performance of a 
company for reasons not related to stock appreciation such as workers and the local community. 
A variety of factors during the 1980s shifted incentives for managers to prioritize stock values 
and the interests of shareholders over stockholders. More than just firm strategy, the shareholder 
conception of the firm was based upon the idea that maximizing profits and stock values to 
satisfy shareholders would create a more efficient company (Fligstein and Shin 2007). This 
implies that no other constituency, such as workers, communities, or consumers, should matter 
quite as much when managers make decisions. The shareholder conception of the firm developed 
through a series of changes during the 1980s related to trends within and outside of firms, which 
I describe below.  
 During the 1970s and early 1980s, sluggish economic growth and high interest rates left 
many low stock prices while some larger corporations had large cash reserves (Krippner 2011). 
If companies failed to satisfy shareholders and started to sell their stocks, then stock prices would 
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fall. As stock values of many large firms fell, companies were at risk of being bought up by 
larger corporations in a series of hostile takeovers (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and Shin 2007). 
Indeed, hostile takeovers became common practice during the 1980s. In the event of a hostile 
takeover, mangers are likely to lose their jobs as they are replaced as duplicate management 
personnel are streamlined. To avoid this scenario, companies began to focus more on increasing 
stock values because if stock values remained high then it was more difficult for other companies 
to buy them up in a hostile takeover. 
Additionally, top management pay became linked to stock options rather than long-term 
market shares, sales, or production-based profits in an effort to increase stock values and prevent 
hostile takeovers and to make (Fligstein 2001; Fligstein and Shin 2007; Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Lin 2011). As a result, nonfinancial firms began to increasingly focus on shareholder value to the 
detriment of productive investments. Indeed, Orhangazi (2008) found that increased financial 
payments to managers resulted in significantly less capital investments in nonfinancial firms. To 
satisfy shareholder interests and attract investors, firms increasingly used mergers, layoffs, and 
labor-saving technology (such as automation), which led to reduced employment and pay, 
particularly in unionized workplaces (Fligstein and Shin 2007). These practices did not 
necessarily lead to increased profitability, however. Any profits were simply reinvested into the 
stock market instead of focusing on increasing market share, workers, or innovation. The 
shareholder conception of the firm also led to increased connivance within firms. Firms that 
prioritized shareholders over stakeholders were also more likely to engage in financial 
manipulation of their corporate accounts (Prechel and Morris 2010). While deregulation allowed 
managers and CEOs to manipulate financial markets and do risky activities, the shareholder 
conception of the firm provided increased incentives for this manipulation to occur 
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(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). As a result, deregulation and the shareholder conception of 
the firm have implications for the growth of finance in the neoliberal era, as well as rising 
income inequality.  
Contributions of this Dissertation to the Financialization and Inequality Literature 
In this dissertation, I examine three components of financialization and their relationships 
with income inequality: finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) employment, credit expansion, 
and financial crises. FIRE employment has been rising steadily in affluent nations Assa (2012) 
shows that no OECD countries had more than 10% employment in finance in 1970; but 23 were 
above 10% in 2008, and seven were above 15%. Wage and income growth in finance has also 
outpaced other nonfinancial workers (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-
Devey 2013; Wright and Rogers 2015). In the United States, financial and nonfinancial sector 
workers had approximately the same real annual compensation, which includes wages and 
salaries (Wright and Rogers 2015). By 2007, financial sector workers were compensated nearly 
twice that of nonfinancial workers. During the 2008 recession, financial workers faced a small 
drop in pay; however, this would recover over the next few years while nonfinancial private 
sector workers’ compensations remained flat. 
Another important factor illustrating the power of finance is credit. Many nations 
experienced steady increases in the growth of credit—and relatedly public and private debt— 
over the last several decades (Dobbs et al.. 2015). In response to rising inequality and stagnant 
wages in the United States and other affluent nations, households began to rely on debt to 
maintain their standard of living (Lapavitsas 2013; Wright and Rogers 2015), a trend fueled the 
2008 financial crisis. While household debt is important, there is less discussion about increased 
debt among private enterprises, particularly banks and other financial institutions, which played 
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an even bigger role in the 2008 collapse. As I will discuss later in this chapter, deregulation of 
finance set into motion a series of very risky processes that can have disastrous impacts on 
national economies and the general public.  
Deregulation allowed the provision of credit in the private sector to expand rapidly in 
financialized nations (Krippner 2011; Lapavitsas 2013). Additionally, deregulation left banks 
and other financial institutions particularly exposed to risk as they were now allowed to increase 
debt that exceeded their assets. Further, they could bundle debt into packages and then resell the 
debt to other institutions, which set up an interlocking system of risk. If everyone pays back their 
debts on time and there are minimal defaults, then tidy short-term profits can be made. If a series 
of defaults occurs, then the interlocking nature of debt can lead to systemic crisis. So while 
higher rates of private sector debt have fueled risky financial ventures that can increase short-
term profits, they can also lead to financial crises if left unchecked (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). 
Because of increased financial interconnections across international borders, a crisis within one 
nation can trigger a global financial crisis, as evidenced by the 2008 Great Recession. Later in 
this chapter, I will discuss the theoretical literature linking each of these three components—
FIRE employment, credit expansion, and financial crises—to income inequality in affluent 
nations. 
However, before a detailed review of the literature on each of these topics, I provide a 
brief overview of some of the general limitations of previous research. Several recent studies 
examining the effect of financialization on income inequality have emerged in the fields of 
sociology, economics, and political science. While these studies have added to our 
understanding, there is room for advancement in the literature in several ways. For example, 
Zalewski and Whalen (2010) find a significant positive correlation between a financialization 
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index and the Gini index in 19 OECD countries in 1995 and 2004, but their study is based only 
on an examination of bivariate trends without adequate controls. A few studies (Tomaskovic-
Devey and Lin 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Arnum and Naples 2013) provide more 
rigorous statistical analyses of the effects of financialization and inequality in the U.S., but do 
not consider other countries. Other studies (Kus 2012; Assa 2012) encompass a wider sample of 
affluent countries, but either fail to incorporate adequate control variables or fail to utilize a time 
period that coincides with the era of neoliberalization. Epstein’s (2005) edited volume provides 
an eclectic set of case studies on the effects of financialization in the economies of both affluent 
and developing countries, but none of the contributions offers a generalized account of these 
processes in affluent democracies.  
In addition, previous studies focus extensively on market-generated (MG) or state-
mediated (SM) inequality alone and fail to consider other dimensions of inequality, which I 
examine in this dissertation. In Chapter 4, I examine MG inequality, redistribution, and SM 
inequality to determine how financialization impacts market inequality, taxes and transfers, and 
disposable income. Chapter 5 focuses on the incomes of the rich by examining the top 1% share. 
Finally, Chapter 6 examines other portions of the income distribution by exploring upper-tail 
inequality, lower-tail inequality, and top-bottom inequality. Also, with the exceptions of Assa 
(2012) and Kus (2012), these studies fail to consider more than a single dimension of 
financialization. My research overcomes these limitations by examining the effects of three 
distinctive dimensions of financialization—FIRE employment, credit expansion, and financial 
crises—on a variety of interconnected dimensions of inequality for a comprehensive set of 18 





 The first aspect of financialization, FIRE employment, focuses on the growing share of 
workers associated with finance, insurance, and real estate industries, as well as secondary 
workers who provide ancillary services to these workers in market-based, financialized 
economies (Lapavitsas 2013). FIRE employment has been rising steadily in all 18 nations 
examined in this dissertation. In Figure 2.3, I present the trends for FIRE employment for each 
nation from 1981 to 2011. One of the most important things to note from these graphs is that 
there is the steadiness of the increase in FIRE employment across all 18 nations over this time 
period. The familiar case of the United States shows that less than 10% of workers were 
employed in FIRE industries in 1981. By 2011, nearly 20% of workers were employed in FIRE 
industries. The increase in FIRE workers in the United States was particularly dramatic after 
2000 with a sharp increase around 2003, which is likely due to the deregulation of Wall Street 
and speculation in technology and real estate (Wright and Rogers 2015). Switzerland, a nation 
famous for its banking and financial sector strength, had comparable employment in FIRE 
industries. Despite Switzerland’s prowess in finance and banking, Switzerland maintains a 
relatively robust welfare state, a highly-skilled labor force, and restrictive immigration policies 
given that they are not a member of the European Union, which shields many workers from the 
negative impacts of financialization (Hall and Soskice 2001). The United Kingdom is another 
major finance-oriented economy that saw rising FIRE employment in the neoliberal era. 
Financial services in the United Kingdom are centered in London, which serves as a major 
financial and trade hub in the Europe (Sassen 2001). Beyond Wall Street in New York City and 
London, many other affluent nations have global cities that act as financial nodes in the global 
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network, such as Amsterdam, Tokyo, Toronto, Stockholm, Frankfurt, and Paris, which have 
contributed to the growing representation in FIRE industries within the workforce.  
Figure 2.3: Trends of FIRE Employment as a Percent of Total Employment by Nation, 
1981 to 2011. 
 
  
More broadly, the expanding share of employment in the FIRE sector is indicative of the 
growing economic clout of the financial sector. For instance, Assa (2012) showed that FIRE 
employment is highly correlated with share of value added in the FIRE sector, a more general 
indicator of the FIRE sector’s importance. Also, FIRE employment and compensation coincide 
with other key financial indicators like financial profits and market concentration in the banking 
sector (Wright and Rogers 2015). Central to this surge in FIRE employment was the deregulation 
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of the financial industries. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the repeal of Glass-Steagall 
allowed banks to grow in both assets and employment due to relaxed restrictions on mergers, the 
division between commercial and investment banks, and the types of financial activities that 
banks could use (Krippner 2011; Lapavitsas 2013). Deregulation of the types of speculative 
activities helped give rise to larger investment banks, which manage an increasing array of 
complicated financial transactions. The growth of hedge funds, or large investment agencies that 
pursue highly speculative investments using borrowed funds and other risky activities in the 
pursuit of large capital gains, also led to a boom in employment in the financial sector 
(Lapavitsas 2013). Hedge funds were first developed in the 1990s in the United States but 
quickly spread throughout the globe as financial profits grew. As profitability in the financial 
sector grew, employment followed suit.  
FIRE employment is connected not only to the growth of financial institutions, but also 
the financialization of non-financial firms which require ever-increasing financial services to 
manage debt and maintain profitability (Krippner 2011). Additionally, the growth of the financial 
sector is tied to speculation in real estate markets (Wright and Rogers 2015), as well as 
consumers’ reliance on debt to offset stagnating wages (Leicht and Fitzgerald 2006). Thus, there 
are a variety of factors that fueled growth in employment in the finance, insurance, and real 
estate industries in affluent nations. 
There is mounting empirical evidence that FIRE employment is associated with greater 
income inequality in both cross-national studies (Arnum and Naples 2013; Assa 2012) and U.S.-
based studies (Moller, Anderson and Nielsen 2009). FIRE employment should positively 
influence income inequality for several reasons. First, employment in the FIRE sector 
disproportionately affects labor markets in financialized economies. Financialization extracts 
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rents from nonfinancial workers to disproportionately increase the pay of financial employees 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013). This process can increase 
income inequality in several ways. First, it increases compensation of workers in the financial 
sector and incomes for the wealthy who make their income through capital gains. Second, it puts 
downward pressure on wages of nonfinancial workers, which would decrease earnings for the 
median worker. Third, it increases the demand for low-wage service workers who cater to the 
needs of financial workers, which would contribute to greater lower-tail inequality.  
Additionally, I expect that FIRE employment should decrease redistribution for two reasons: 
large financial institutions have been effective in lobbying for greater deregulation and a 
reduction in the size of the state. Also, most countries tax capital gains at lower rates than 
workers’ earnings, which reduces the redistributive capacity of the state. Thus, I offer the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 4.2: The percent of workers employed in FIRE industries will increase 
MG income inequality, decrease redistribution, and increase SM income 
inequality. 
Hypothesis 5.2: The percent of workers employed in FIRE industries will increase 
the top 1% share. 
Hypothesis 6.2: The percent of workers employed in FIRE industries will increase 
the upper-tail inequality, lower-tail inequality, and top-bottom inequality. 
Credit Expansion 
The second aspect of financialization is credit expansion, specifically the amount of 
credit extended to firms in the private sector relative to a country’s economic output. Credit 
expansion is a fundamental aspect of financialization because it accentuates the role of financial 
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institutions in managing credit flows (Krippner, 2011). Generally, if credit is extended to the 
middle and working classes to purchase consumer goods like housing, it could decrease income 
inequality, particularly in low income nations. However, as larger shares of credit shift to 
businesses and financial institutions in the private sector, it tends to increase income inequality. 
In financialized capitalism, credit to businesses is used to bolster sagging profits, but economic 
instability often occurs when provisions to the private sector grow excessively (Lapavitsas, 
2013).  
Trends in private sector credit vary largely by country. In Figure 2.4, I present trends in 
private sector credit provided by the banking sector in 18 affluent nations from 1981 to 2011. On 
average, there is a general upward trend among the 18 nations. On one extreme, Japan began the 
1980s with private sector credit that was around 200% GDP and increased to around 320% by 
2011. While the United States is famous for fueling its public sector debt with loans from China 
and Japan (Lapavitsas 2013), Japan has consistently supported its own economic growth through 
high levels of public debt from the 1980s to the present. On the other extreme, Norway had 
private sector credit that was around 50% of its GDP in 1980 and around 100% of GDP in 2011. 
Anglo-Saxon nations, like Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States saw 
steady increases in private sector credit over the period. Other nations like France, Austria, and 
Norway had relatively stable levels of private sector credit.  
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Figure 2.4: Trends of Private Credit Provided by Banking Sector by Nation, 1981 to 2011.
 
 
In the neoliberal period, credit expansion occurs most often in deregulated financial 
environments. A major driver of the expansion of private sector credit is a practice known as 
leveraging, which means that banks and other firms make investments that are more highly 
dependent on borrowed assets (Lapavitsas 2013). Banks typically increase their leverage by 
taking out loans from other banks in order to use borrowed money to then make additional 
investments and financial gains. This creates an interlocking system of debt between banks and 
fuels speculation. Deregulation contributes to leveraging in a variety of ways, and the buildup to 
the 2008 financial crisis in the United States and other nations illustrates this process very well. 
First, repeal of Glass-Steagall allowed banks to merge and giving rise to mega-banks that were 
too big to fail (Wright and Rogers 2015). Second, the Financial Services Modernization Act 
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allowed banks to use deposits of their customers to engage in speculation in investment markets 
while at the same time the federal government, through the FDIC, insured that they would be 
bailed out if investments went sour (Krippner 2011; Wright and Rogers 2015). As one would 
expect, this incentivized banks to use their customers’ money as extra capital to use in 
speculation during the 2000s. As I will discuss in greater detail in Chapter 5, leveraged 
investments can be potentially very profitable for firms and wealthy individuals in markets 
where prices are rising. When prices fall, losses can be dramatic, and the interlocking nature of 
the financial system exposes many to the risks associated with speculation. As a result, the 
financial sector sought to develop instruments to minimize risk for traders. 
An important development in global financial markets during the neoliberal era that 
contributed to leveraging was the growth of derivatives markets, which were intended to help 
minimize risk for speculating investors (Lapavitsas 2013). Derivatives are a type of security, or 
tradable asset, which derives its value from the performance of another underlying financial 
instrument. Derivatives were initially designed to provide insurance for default and other 
downside risks. For example, if one wanted to invest in an agricultural firm’s stock, you could 
buy a derivative based on rainfall for a region that would provide partial insurance in the event 
that a drought occurred, which would reduce crop yield and profits and thus reduce stock prices 
for that firm. As such, wealthy individuals can invest in derivatives to hedge their losses in the 
event of a bad deal (Guttman 2008). Many middle class Americans, who own stocks but do not 
have access to excess capital, are not able to take advantage of derivatives and other types of 
securitized investments. As a result, inequality is built into leveraged financial markets. 
Most derivative occur in over-the-counter swaps, which means that they are traded and 
privately negotiated between two parties instead of on an exchange or through an intermediary. 
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In other words, they are largely unregulated (Lapavitsas 2013). While derivatives can be useful 
for speculators, they can create moral hazard in financial markets, especially because large 
investment banks tend to sell them (Tabb 2010). For example, it is estimated that JP Morgan had 
nearly $2.2 trillion in credit derivative exposure in mid-2006 just before the collapse. Lenders do 
not worry about the quality of derivatives because they believe that they are protected by the 
FDIC. As a result, they are not monitored closely, if they are monitored at all. And sellers of 
derivatives may not monitor them because they are quite complex. The problem is that complex 
derivative instruments are often highly leveraged and illiquid. As a result, the growth of the 
derivatives market led to increased risk in the financial system. Derivatives are potentially very 
profitable and at least provide some insurance in risky investments; however, they can also 
potentially lead to massive losses for banks in the event that a series of derivative investments 
failed. 
While leveraged financial transactions potentially yield vast increases in profits for 
financial institutions, the interlocking nature of these transactions exposes financial institutions, 
non-financial firms, and consumers to excessive risk, bankruptcy, and financial crisis 
(Lapavitsas, 2013). Highly leveraged transactions played a major role in the 2008 financial crash 
in the United States and abroad by initially creating huge profits for speculators but later 
eventually led to massive losses as the entire system came tumbling down. The connections 
between credit, leveraging, and financial crises are further explored in the next section. In sum, 
the expansion of credit mainly serves the interests of large financial institutions and high-income 
individuals, so it should be positively associated with income inequality. 
Studies of the impact of credit expansion on income inequality are rare, have tended to 
focus on developing countries, and have yielded mixed results. For example, in a study of 80 
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nations between 1960 and 1999, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2005) found that credit 
extended to households increased the incomes of the poor resulting in reduced income inequality. 
But since this examines household credit, the implications for private sector credit and inequality 
are uncertain. Canavire-Bacarreza and Rioja (2008) found that credit expansion in Latin America 
increased incomes in the top three quartiles but had no impact in the bottom quartile. The only 
relevant study examining private sector credit’s impacts on income inequality in affluent nations 
is Flaherty’s (2015) analysis of financialization’s impact on the top 1% share of income. In this 
study, Flaherty found that a positive but nonsignificant effect on the top 1% share of income 
despite his hypothesis that it would increase incomes for the rich. Overall, I contend that credit 
expansion during the neoliberal era mainly increases income inequality by increasing financial 
sector profits and incomes for financial workers (Bank for International Settlements, 2001; 
Borrio and Lowe, 2002; Evans, 2003). While there is evidence that private sector credit can 
increase income inequality by increasing incomes for those at the top, it is unclear how it will 
impact the incomes of the median worker relative to the poor. Thus: 
Hypothesis 4.3: The share of domestic credit provided to the private sector will increase 
MG income inequality, decrease redistribution, and increase SM income inequality. 
Hypothesis 5.3: The share of domestic credit provided to the private sector will increase 
the top 1% share. 
Hypothesis 6.3: The share of domestic credit provided to the private sector will increase 





Finally, I consider the role of financial crises, measured as stock market crashes, which 
tend to accompany other types of financial crises (banking, default, or hyperinflation) or signal 
severe price fluctuations in important commodities like oil. Increasingly, scholars believe that 
financialized capitalism will become more volatile leading to more frequent and extreme boom 
and bust cycles as the social structures of accumulation increasingly rely on debt and leveraging 
(Minsky 1982; Harvey 2010; Lapavitsas 2013). Recent events such as the U.S. stock market and 
financial crisis in 2008 signal the vulnerability to financial collapse caused by excessive risk.  
In the 2000s, speculation in real estate, fueled by what was assumed to be ever-rising 
housing prices, led to a housing bubble in the United States (Wright and Rogers 2015). Due to 
the deregulation of housing loans, there was an explosion of subprime loans, or loans to 
individuals who did not have standard credit scores or high enough incomes, which in turn 
increased the amount of risk in mortgage markets. Many subprime loans were issued as 
adjustable rate mortgages, which means that the interest rates were fixed for a short period of 
time but would later reflect market interest rates after the initial period expires. Additionally, 
banks often deceived some of their customers into acquiring subprime loans by misrepresenting 
their long-term costs, which is a practice known as predatory lending. Financial institutions 
would then package these toxic loans together and sell them to other banks as derivatives or 
mortgage-backed securities because this allows banks to issue new loans and gain more profits 
through the collection of interest (Tabb 2010). As a result, banks made tidy profits during the 
housing boom prior to the crash. 
The problem with this process is that it created a highly leveraged interlocking system of 
debt from the mortgage markets. As interest rates peaked in 2007, many Americans began to 
default on their loans at unexpected rates (Wright and Rogers 2015). Housing values also began 
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to decline in 2007 in reaction to the increases in mortgage default. Large investment banks, like 
Lehman Brothers, began to fail as so much of their portfolio was tied to mortgage-backed 
securities. Lehman Brothers made most of its investments through leveraging, which connected 
its assets to many other banks. When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, it set up a domino 
effect in the system, and almost immediately American International Group (AIG) was sent over 
the edge. Panic ensued. Stocks began to plummet and credit froze as no one was willing to give 
out loans. Other large financial firms like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began to fail. Because of 
the FDIC and the rise of too big to fail banks, the federal government of the United States 
ultimately had to step in and use taxpayer money to bail out the banks and other financial 
institutions. Over the next few years, millions of Americans lost their jobs, had their pay frozen 
or cut, or lost their homes in the foreclosure crisis. Because investors and financial institutions 
had interlocking ties to American banks, the subprime crisis in the United States quickly became 
a full blown global crisis. 
While there are a variety of different types of financial crises, I focus on stock market 
crashes in this dissertation because they represent volatility in financial markets. Given the 
importance of shareholder values of stocks in financialized capitalism, stock market failures can 
have large impacts on the decisions and strategies of firms, which have impacts on workers and 
the income distribution (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Additionally, stock market crashes 
are often associated with other financial crises, such as banking crises, hyperinflation, and 
sovereign default (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). In Table 2.1, I present the frequencies and years 
of financial crises, operationalized as stock market crashes, in the 18 affluent nations between 
1981 and 2011. Financial crashes occurred frequently among the 18 countries in the sample 
ranging from 4 crises in Australia to 13 in France. As discussed earlier, every affluent nation was 
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impacted by financial crisis during 2008 due to the interlocking nature of global financial 
institutions. The tech bubble and crisis of 2000 and 2001 affected all countries in the sample 
except for Australia and New Zealand. It is also worth noting that consecutive years of crises 
represent deeper and more long-lasting financial instability, which can have disastrous impacts 








Table 2.1: Financial Crises for 18 Affluent Nations, 1981 to 2011 
Countries 
Number of 
Crises Years Occurred  
Australia 4 1981, 1982, 1990, 2008 
Austria 9 1983, 1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1991, 1992, 2007, 2008 
Belgium 9 1980, 1981, 1990, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 
Canada 4 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 
Denmark 8 1980, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2008 
Finland 7 1989, 1990, 1991, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008  
France 13 1980, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 
Germany 10 1980, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 
Ireland 8 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 
Italy 10 1981, 1982, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 
Japan 11 1990, 1991, 1992, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2007, 2008 
Netherlands 8 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 
New Zealand 5 1982, 1987, 1988, 1990, 2008 
Norway 10 1982, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008 
Sweden 8 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 
Switzerland 6 1985, 1986, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2008 
United Kingdom 4 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 
United States 10 1980, 1981, 1982, 1989, 1990, 1991, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2008 
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Like FIRE employment, financial crises are tied to the financialization of banks, non-
financial firms, and households. As banks’ liabilities dwarf their assets and non-financial firms 
and household debt increase to unsustainable levels, the risk of financial collapse rises (Reinhart 
and Rogoff 2009). Although scholars have speculated about how these crises relate to inequality, 
little empirical research has examined this topic. Two competing perspectives distinguished 
mainly by their impact on redistribution have emerged—the “austerity thesis” and the “welfare 
state stabilization thesis.” To remind the reader, redistribution is the reduction in market-
generated inequality caused by taxes and transfers. Thus, the difference between these two 
perspectives is based on how the welfare state responds to a crisis. 
The austerity thesis contends that financial crises can negatively affect welfare state 
generosity by reducing resources to fund social programs and diverting resources to bail out 
failing financial institutions (Harvey 2010). The 2008 financial crisis offers a case in point: state 
efforts to reboot the economy prioritize policies to rescue “too big to fail” investments banks 
rather than policies to rescue the middle class or the poor. Private nonfinancial firms caught up in 
the collapse impose mass layoffs or wage freezes in order to cut losses, which further increases 
MG and SM inequality. The loss of tax revenues from businesses and workers creates a fiscal 
crisis that cripples the ability of the state to extend welfare programs to all who need them, thus 
decreasing redistribution. Following this logic, the austerity thesis predicts:  
Hypothesis 4.4a: Financial crises will increase MG income inequality, decrease 
redistribution, and increase SM income inequality. 
 The welfare state stabilization thesis agrees with the austerity thesis that financial crises 
cause increases in MG and SM inequality, but differs about its effect on redistribution. This 
perspective argues that modern welfare states engage in “automatic stabilization” (see Dolls, 
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Fuest, and Peichl 2012) whereby a severe economic collapse activates existing social support 
programs to respond to displaced workers and other needy citizens or creates emergency 
programs to assist them. Supporting this view, Heathcoate, Perri, and Violante (2010) found that 
low-income households in the U.S. experienced larger losses in earnings relative to high-income 
households during recessions, but SM inequality did not increase as much as might be expected 
because of existing state programs. Similarly, Dolls et al. (2012) found that European nations 
had more redistributive capacity during crises than the U.S., yet not enough to offset the overall 
positive impact of crises on SM inequality (see also Baird 2014).  Thus, the welfare state 
stabilization thesis predicts: 
Hypothesis 4.4b: Financial crises will increase MG income inequality, increase 
redistribution, and increase SM income inequality. 
The impact of financial crises like stock market crashes on different parts of the earnings 
distribution is less clear. As stated previously, the incomes of the affluent are typically less 
drastically impacted than the middle class and poor (Heathcoate, Perri, and Violante 2010); 
however, the wealthiest individuals may not follow this pattern. Given the fact that the incomes 
of the wealthiest individuals in affluent nations tend to be reliant on stocks, rentier, 
entrepreneurial and other financial sources (Alvaredo et al. 2013), the top 1% is likely to take a 
substantial hit in their incomes during a financial crisis. Despite this, we have seen the income 
growth of the top 1% outpace the rest of the population in the United States during the recovery 
after the Great Recession, which is a common trend of economic recoveries in many other 
affluent nations over the past few decades (Wolfers 2015). As a result, the income shares of the 
top 1% are likely to decrease for a few years after a financial crisis (Piketty and Saez 2015; Saez 
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2015). There have been fewer empirical studies of how crises impact the incomes of the rich in 
other nations.  
That being said, there is evidence that low-income individuals and families are also at 
high risk during financial crises. Heathcoate, Perri, and Violante (2010) found that low-income 
households in the U.S. experienced large reductions in wages during recessions from 1967 to 
2006 while high-income households were less affected. The middle class also receives fairly 
large reductions in incomes during financial crises (Heathcoate, Perri, and Violante (2010). 
Thus: 
Hypothesis 5.4: Financial crises will decrease the top 1% share. 
Hypothesis 6.4: Financial crises will increase upper-tail and top bottom inequality. It is 
unclear how it will affect lower-tail inequality. 
2.4 Conclusion 
The social structures of accumulation in the period from the 1980s to the present are 
characterized by increasing neoliberalism and financialization (Tabb 2010; Kotz and 
McDonough 2010). In Anglo-Saxon nations like the United States and United Kingdom, these 
processes have led to bifurcated economies (Lapavitsas 2013). One economy is based on finance, 
is often very profitable and experiences large amounts of income growth; however, its risky 
behaviors lead to crises that impact the general public. The other, based on manufacturing and 
services, often experiences sluggish growth of incomes and profits. Overall, there is increasing 
theoretical and empirical evidence that neoliberalism and financialization impact income 
inequality.  
There are still some unanswered questions in the literature, however, which I explore in 
this dissertation. First I examine, does neoliberalism and financialization impacted income 
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inequality by creating more unequal market incomes, affecting redistribution, or both? Second, 
how has the top 1% been impacted by these processes? Third, how have upper- and lower-tail 
inequality been affected? In the next chapter, I describe the data and methods that I use to 




CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 Data Sources and Descriptions 
The primary data source for the dissertation is the Comparative Welfare States (CWS) 
dataset, compiled by Huber, Ragin, and Stephens (1997), updated through 2008 by David Brady 
and colleagues, with further additions and updates by Michael Wallace, Todd Vachon, and 
myself. For Chapters 4 and 5, I examine the effects of neoliberalism and financialization on 
several measures of income inequality between 1981 and 2011 in 18 countries: Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. These countries represent the most affluent capitalist democracies and are typically 
grouped together in analyses of income inequality. The analyses run from 1981 to 2011 for 
empirical and theoretical reasons. Empirically, several key variables are not available before 
1980. Theoretically, these years coincide with the neoliberal period of capitalist development 
which emphasizes unfettered free markets, privatization, deregulation, free trade, and a reduced 
state role in markets and the provision of social services. The first year of the analyses, 1981, is 
generally acknowledged as the dawn of the neoliberal era (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011), 
and the last year, 2011, encompasses the Great Recession.  
In Chapter 6, I use data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to examine how 
neoliberalism and financialization impact upper-tail and lower-tail inequality. The LIS data are 
appended to the CWS file used in Chapters 4 and 5 in order to link them with the key 
independent variables and controls. The LIS is the only international dataset available that 
includes individual level income data that allows one to derive information about specific shares 
of the income distribution. As a result, it is necessary to use the LIS given the research questions 
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of Chapter 6. In Table 1, I present the countries and years that are available in the LIS. In total, 
there are 16 countries (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States) and 120 country-years that are available. Because New Zealand is not represented in the 
LIS and Japan only had data available for 2008, these countries will not be used in the Chapter 6 
analyses. Given that the LIS data are not available for all 18 countries in all 31 years, the 
analyses in Chapter 6 will require the use of an unbalanced panel design, which means that each 
country will not have the same number of observations and years represented. In this data, Italy 
has the most observations (11) while Switzerland has the least (5). 
Dependent variables 
 For Chapter 4, I utilize three dependent variables, each derived from the Gini index, to 
capture different aspects of income inequality. The first is market-generated inequality, which 
represents the amount of income inequality generated by the market before taxes and social 
Table 3.1: Luxembourg Income Study Data Availability, Countries and Years 
Countries Number of Years Years Available  
Australia 8 1981, 1985, 1989, 1995, 2001, 2003, 2008, 2010 
Austria 6 1987, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2004 
Belgium 6 1985, 1988, 1992, 1995, 1997, 2000 
Canada 10 1981, 1987, 1991, 1994, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010 
Denmark 7 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010 
Finland 7 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010  
France 6 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000, 2005, 2010 
Germany 9 1981, 1983, 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010 
Ireland 8 1987, 1994, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010 
Italy 11 1986, 1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2010 
Netherlands 8 1983, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2010 
Norway 7 1986, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010 
Sweden 6 1981, 1987, 1992, 1995, 2000, 2005 
Switzerland 5 1982, 1992, 2000, 2002, 2004 
United Kingdom 8 1986, 1991, 1994, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2007, 2010 
United States 8 1986, 1991, 1994, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2007, 2010 
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transfers. This measure is calculated as the pre-tax, pre-transfer Gini index of household income 
inequality multiplied by 100. The second dependent variable is redistribution, which represents 
the percent reduction of market-generated inequality caused by state mediation via taxes and 
transfers. This is measured by subtracting state-mediated inequality (described below) from 
market-generated inequality, dividing by market-generated inequality, and multiplying by 100. 
The third dependent variable is state-mediated inequality, which represents the amount of 
income inequality after taxes and social transfers. This is measured as the post-tax, post-transfer 
Gini index of household income inequality multiplied by 100. In Chapter 5, there is just one 
dependent variable, the top 1% share, which represents the amount of income captured by the 
wealthy. This is measured as the percent of market-generated income (pre-tax and pre-transfer) 
reported on tax returns by the top 1% of earners. 
All of the measures of inequality in Chapters 4 and 5 are taken from the Standardized 
World Income Inequality Database (SWIID), Version 4.0, compiled by Frederick Solt (2009; 
updated in 2013). The SWIID database is unique because it optimizes the comparability of 
countries (by measuring inequality in a standardized manner) and years (by estimating inequality 
for missing years). While the data in Chapters 4 and 5 come from the SWIID, Solt derived the 
data from different sources. The data in Chapter 4 use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Gini 
indices of income inequality as the standard for the measures of MG inequality, redistribution, 
and SM inequality. The SWIID improves upon the LIS data by using a custom missing-data 
multiple imputation algorithm to standardize observations and estimate missing data from a 
variety of other sources like the OECD Income Distribution Database, Eurostat, the United 
Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database, and the World Bank’s PovcalNet (see 
Solt 2009 for more information). Solt derived the top 1% share data in Chapter 5 from the World 
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Wealth and Income Database (WWID), which was collected by Alvaredo, Atkinson, Picketty, 
and Saez (2013). Although the WWID is widely recognized as the gold standard for national data 
on top income shares and wealth inequality, it lacks cross-national comparability because of 
differences in the types of income and wealth data collected by different national agencies, as 
well as differences in whether data are collected at the individual or household level (Atkinson 
and Picketty 2010). Solt’s SWIID data incorporates Monte Carlo simulation to derive 
standardized measures of inequality and to interpolate values of these measures for missing years 
which in turn overcomes the limitations of the WWID and permits cross-national comparisons. 
The SWIID data have been widely used by scholars interested in the causes and consequences of 
inequality.1 For these reasons, the SWIID data are the optimal data for constructing cross-
nationally comparable measures of income inequality for the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5.  
For Chapter 6, I use the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) to derive three measures of 
income inequality based upon the income shares of different percentiles.  Upper-tail inequality 
represents the income disparity between the rich and the median worker. This is operationalized 
as the income ratio between the 90th percentile and the median (i.e., the 50th percentile). Lower-
tail inequality represents the income disparity between the median worker compared to the poor. 
This is measured as the income ratio between the median of the income distribution and the 10th 
percentile. Finally, the top-bottom inequality represents the disparity between the rich and the 
poor and is measured as the income ratio between the 90th percentile and 10th percentile of the 
income distribution. Using these three measures allows me to triangulate how inequality is being 
affected at each point in the income distribution. These data are collected from the Inequality and 
Poverty Key Figures dataset provided by the LIS, which were derived from calculations using 
                                                          
1According to SCOPUS, the SWIID has been cited 190 times. 
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individual-level tax data collected from national tax agencies. These data are derived from 
disposable household income, or income after taxes and transfers have been accounted. 
Neoliberalism variable 
 I include one measure of neoliberalism—the neoliberal state. This is a composite 
measure compiled by Gwartney, Lawson, and Hall (2013) representing the extent to which 
neoliberal policies have reduced state size in a nation.2 The components of this measure include: 
a) general government consumption spending as a percent of total consumption; b) general 
government transfers and subsidies as a percent of GDP; c) government investment as a share of 
total investment; and d) the top marginal tax rate. The neoliberal state measure ranges from 0 
representing a large, interventionist state to 8 representing a neoliberal state that has minimal size 
and influence in the market.  
Financialization variables 
 I conceptualize financialization as a multi-dimensional concept with three interrelated yet 
distinctive characteristics. First, FIRE employment is the percent of the labor force employed in 
finance, insurance, and real estate industries.3 The second dimension is credit expansion, 
measured as the stock of domestic credit provided by the banking sector to the private sector as a 
percent of GDP. Credit expansion introduces new opportunities for leveraging—with attendant 
potential for greater financial gains, but also increased risk in financial markets—which has been 
                                                          
2These data were only available from 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000-2011 so intervening values were 
interpolated. Overall, the values for the neoliberal state variable do not change much from observation to 
observation so interpolation should be relatively safe in this instance. Additionally, this is logical given 
that policy changes related to the neoliberal state tend to operate through slow-moving bureaucratic and 
political processes that do not change and fluctuate widely from year to year. 
3An alternative measure, percent of value added by the financial sector, might be preferable, but this 
measure does not exist for all countries and years. However, for six countries with complete data on value 
added in the financial sector (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway), it is correlated, 
on average, .91 with the employment-based measure I use. 
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overlooked in empirical studies of financialization and inequality. Finally, financial crisis, 
derived from Reinhart (2010) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2011), represents the occurrence of stock 
market crises and their after-effects over time.4 Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) suggest that the 
aftershocks of these crises can last for at least three years. I suspect that the after-effects of 
financial crises on inequality may increase initially before slowly dissipating in subsequent 
years. As shown in Figure 1, I model this process with a five-year stepwise lag variable that 
starts at a value of 1 in the year of the crisis, increases to 2 in year 2, increases to 3 in year 3, 
declines to 2 in year 4, declines to 1 in year 5, and returns to 0 in year 6. When crises occur in 
adjacent years, the effects are cumulative. That is, the values for crises in adjacent years are 
added together, which allows consecutive crises to create greater dislocations than solo crises. 
Hypothetically, the financial crisis variable can vary between 0 and 9, reaching the highest value 
when there are crises in five consecutive years. Empirically, this variable achieves a value of 9 in 
two years in the data set, 1981 and 1982 for the U.S.  
                                                          
4 While some of Reinhart and Rogoff’s research has come under criticism lately (see, for example, 








The analyses incorporate several control variables. I include two measures of the business 
cycle. The first is economic growth, which is measured as the annual percent growth rate of GDP 
at market prices based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars and is collected from the World Bank 
National Accounts Data. If economic prosperity tends to bring equal rewards to all citizens, then 
we would expect economic growth to decrease income inequality. If economic prosperity tends 
to benefit the rich over other groups, then we would expect economic growth to increase 
inequality. The second is unemployment, which is the unemployment rate for adult workers 
collected from the OECD Main Indicators. Unemployment is expected to increase income 
inequality because it is associated with a greater supply of workers relative to demand, which 
decreases the bargaining power of labor relative to capital. 
Additionally, I use two measures of labor market structure. The first is government 
employment, which his measured civilian government employment as a percentage of total 
civilian employment and is collected from Cusack (2004). Second is union density, which is 
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(2013). Both government employment and union density are predicted to decrease income 
inequality because they tend to provide more middle-wage jobs with better worker protections. 
Finally, previous research has extensively examined the link between globalization and 
income inequality, so I control for two measures of globalization. The first is imports, calculated 
by dividing the value of imports by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each country-year. Past 
research suggests that import penetration increases income inequality by providing products 
from low-wage countries that compete with domestically-produced products (Alderson 1999). 
The second indicator is inward FDI, which is inward foreign direct investment stock as a percent 
of GDP. Inward FDI generally reflects the search for lower-cost sources of labor and favorable 
tax policies that tend to increase income inequality. Two other measures of economic 
globalization often used in empirical analyses are outward FDI—representing investment in 
other nations—and immigration (see Wallace, Vachon, and Hyde 2016); however, these two 
variables will not be used in this dissertation in order to save degrees of freedom. Further, I 
added them to the models as robustness checks, and they do not cause major changes to the 
coefficients of the key neoliberalism and financialization variables. 
3.2 Analytical Method 
The analyses for Chapters 4 and 5 utilize single-equation error correction models (ECMs) 
(see Beck 1991; De Boef and Keele 2008) for 18 countries over 31 years (1981-2011), a total of 
558 country-years. There are several methodological issues associated with time-varying data of 
this type that must be accounted for in the analyses. The most common problem is the presence 
of unit roots, or nonstationarity, which occurs in OLS estimation when variables are highly 
trended, causing changes in the independent variables to create long-lasting shocks in the 
dependent variables. I performed panel-specific Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root tests for MG 
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inequality, redistribution, and SM inequality, and found that the null hypotheses should be 
rejected in all three cases, suggesting that nonstationarity was present in at least one panel for 
each dependent variable. ECMs were selected in part because of their ability to address both 
problems of nonstationary and integrated variables (for example, see Kristal 2010; Lin and 
Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Volscho and Kelley 2012). Another appealing aspect of ECMs is their 
ability to model both short-run effects and long-run equilibrium relationships, which has made 
them increasingly popular in sociological research utilizing cross-sectional, time series datasets.  
Based on Hausman tests (c.f., Halaby 2004), I determined that fixed effects models are 
preferred over random effects. I include country fixed effects terms to account for time-invariant, 
country-specific factors that are unobserved in the data.5 I also include continuous measures for 
time and time squared to control for cross-national influences of time. This procedure ensures 
that the estimates are derived from within-country variance in the rate of change instead of 
unobserved between-country differences. I employ panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) to 
correct for serial- and year-clustered heteroskedasticity (see Beck and Katz 1995), and I use a 
panel-specific, first-order autoregressive (AR1) correction to correct for serial- and year-
clustered heteroscedasticity.  
Following Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), I directly estimate the long-run multiplier 
effects—or simply “long-run” effects—of each measure and its standard error by estimating the 
Bewley transformed model (Bewley 1979) with the predicted change in income inequality. The 
single-equation ECMs in the analyses are specified as: 
Δ𝑌𝑖,𝑡= 𝛼1,𝑖+ t + t
2 -  𝛽1𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2Δ𝑋𝑖,𝑡+ 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
                                                          
5For example, there may be systematic country-level differences in the inequality data (e.g., what 
comprises income), differences in inequality in countries that have robust public pension systems and 
those that do not, or other unobservable characteristics that are due to the history or culture of a nation. 





where ΔYt denotes the first difference Yt -Yt-1, 𝛼1,𝑖 represents the country-specific deviation in 
change, t and t2 represent the time trend, 𝛽1 represents the adjustment or error correction rate of 
Y, 𝛽2 represents the instantaneous effect of Δ𝑋𝑖,𝑡 on the Δ𝑌𝑖,𝑡, and 𝛽3 represents the short-run 
effect of 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1on ΔY. This modelling strategy is advantageous because it predicts instantaneous 
and short-run effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables. The model shows 
that, conditional on other covariates, a unit increase in ΔYt-1 leads to a 𝛽1unit decrease in ΔY and 
therefore a 1 − 𝛽1 increase in Yt. As a result, the long-run effect of a unit increase in X on Y is 






where k represents the number of discrete time units following the direct effect. This geometric 
series converges into 𝛽1
−1𝛽2. To directly estimate the effect of X and its standard error, I estimate 
the Bewley (1979) model with the predicted ΔY: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1
−1𝛼1,𝑖 +  𝑡 +  𝑡
2 − 𝛽1
−1(1 − 𝛽1)∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽1
−1𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡. 
To examine the robustness of the findings and identify influential cases, I estimate 18 
jackknife models in which I replicate the models excluding one country at a time (510 cases 
each) to check the robustness of the significant coefficients. I use this procedure to identify the 
number of “discordant models” (out of 18); that is, models from the jackknife results that are not 
statistically significant or in the same direction as the effect in the overall model.6 
                                                          
6 Another consideration in models like these is the possibility of Nickel bias, which occurs when country-
level fixed effects are used with a lagged dependent variable (Nickell, 1981; Baltagi, 2013). Nickel bias 
can result in inconsistent estimators due to the correlation between the error terms. This is primarily a 
concern for small T, large N designs. However, as T gets larger relative to N, the potential for Nickell 
bias decreases (Baltagi, 2013). Since I have a large T (31 years), small N (18 nations) design, the potential 
for Nickell bias in the models is small. Nevertheless, I tried several alternative model specifications to 
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Due to the unbalanced nature of the data in Chapter 6, there some important variations to 
the analyses that were made. I use an unbalanced panel design because the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS) data are not available for all 18 countries in all 31 years. This analysis will have 16 
countries and 120 country-year observations, and the average number of years available for each 
country is approximately 7.44. While the drawback to these data is a reduced sample size, these 
are the most appropriate data available for addressing the important questions in Chapter 6. The 
strength of these data is that they are derived from the actual microdata from tax returns that can 
then be aggregated up to create precise estimates of upper- and lower-tail income inequality.  
The analyses in Chapter 6 focus on upper-tail inequality, lower-tail inequality, and top-
bottom inequality. Because of the focus of this chapter, I use data from the Luxembourg Income 
Study (LIS), which is the only cross-national dataset available that provides data with sufficient 
detail on the entire range of the income distribution. To remind the reader, these LIS data yield 
an unbalanced sample for 16 countries and 120 country-years. This has several implications for 
the analysis in Chapter 6. First, two countries (Japan and New Zealand) are excluded altogether 
from the Chapter 6 analysis. Second, the “unbalanced” nature of the data means that countries in 
the sample are represented by anywhere from five (Switzerland) to eleven (Italy) years in the 
analysis (see Table 3.1 for details). Third, the sample for Chapter 6 is skewed toward the second 
half of the neoliberal period under consideration in this dissertation. In other words, the 
“balanced” sample for Chapters 4 and 5 consists of 18 countries for each year from 1981 to 2011 
and is centered on a mean year of 1996. The “unbalanced” sample for Chapter 6 consists of 16 
                                                          
assess the robustness of the findings. I dropped the country-level fixed effects and added year fixed 




countries with a variable number of years per country and is centered on a mean year of 
approximately 1997.  
The unbalanced design of the sample has four implications for the interpretation of the 
results in Chapter 6 as compared to those in Chapters 4 and 5. First, because the Chapter 6 
sample is skewed toward the second half of the neoliberal period, this conceivably could result in 
different levels and restricted variation for the covariates in the analysis compared to the samples 
in Chapters 4 and 5. I examine this issue in greater depth below, but to foreshadow the 
discussion there, I found the variations in the sample to be relatively slight all things considered.  
Second, the unbalanced sample used in Chapter 6 results in uneven intervals between LIS 
survey years for the various countries; that is, the intervals between survey years vary between 
one and ten years. For example, there are seven years between the first two LIS surveys for 
Austria and Ireland (1987 and 1994), but only one year between the second and the third years 
(1994 and 1995). This effectively means that the dependent variables cannot be constructed as 
change scores as in Chapters 4 and 5 and that the effects of the covariates in the analysis should 
be interpreted as their effects on levels rather than changes (or first differences) in the dependent 
variables. The unbalanced panel design does not, however, affect the lag structure of the 
covariates. Since all covariates are derived from the CWS, not the LIS, the one-year lags of all 
covariates are retained.    
  Third, unbalanced design of the LIS data undermines two key assumptions of ECM 
models, rendering this method unsatisfactory for the analyses in Chapter 6. The uneven time 
intervals between data points violates a key assumption of any multivariate time series technique 
that there are constant intervals between data points. And the inability to construct the dependent 
variables as first difference measures prevents ECM estimation. As a result of these limitations, 
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in Chapter 6 I utilize OLS regression with lagged independent variables, country-level fixed 
effects, and Driscoll-Kraay (Driscoll and Kraay 1998) standard errors. Below, I present the 
equations for the models used in the analyses:  
𝑌𝑖,𝑡= 𝛼1,𝑖+ t + t
2 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
 
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 equals the dependent variable at t, 𝛼1,𝑖 represents the country-specific deviation in Y, t 
and t2 represent the time trend, 𝛽1 represents the effect of 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1on Y, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 equals the error 
term. Flaherty (2015) used a similar method in his analyses of financialization’s impacts on the 
top 1% for 14 nations between 1990 and 2010.  
OLS regression with lagged independent variables, country-level fixed effects, and 
Driscoll-Kraay (Driscoll and Kraay 1998) standard errors addresses three of the four major 
problems that are typically present in macroeconomic time series analysis: autocorrelation, panel 
heteroscedasticity, and cross-sectional dependence. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are an 
extension of common nonparametric covariance matrix estimation techniques that yield standard 
error estimates that are robust to general forms of autocorrelation, panel heteroscedasticity, and 
cross-sectional dependence (Driscoll and Kraay 1998; Hoechle 2007). The Driscoll-Kraay 
estimator is derived from standard heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance 
matrix estimation techniques (c.f., Parks 1967; Kmenta 1986; Newey and West 1987; Andrews 
1991; Beck and Katz 1995), but it provides a more adequate means to address cross-sectional 
(e.g., spatial) dependence. 
The fourth potential problem associated with macroeconomic time series is the issue of 
unit roots, which ECMs address by differencing and lagging the dependent variables in order to 
make them stationary. However, the unbalanced panel design of the LIS data make these 
computations problematic. It is unclear that unit roots are a problem in these data. However, in 
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an effort to determine if unit roots were present, I ran Fisher unit root tests which are designed to 
examine unit roots in unbalanced panel data; however, the sample size (N=120) is not large 
enough for the test to run properly. As a result, it is impossible to determine whether or not these 
data have unit roots. Thus, to summarize, OLS regression with lagged independent variables, 
country-level fixed effects, and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors resolves three of the four common 
problems that were addressed by ECMs, and it is impossible to determine if the fourth 
problem—unit roots—are a problem in these data. 
Another consideration related to Chapter 6 is the extent to which values of the 
independent variables in the smaller sample of years (120) is different from the values of the 
independent variables in Chapters 4 and 5 in the larger sample (540). I will explore this 
particular issue in greater detail later in this chapter. To foreshadow for the reader, there are 
differences between the samples in Chapter 4 compared to 5 and 6; however, these differences 
are not substantial.  
Finally, the fourth implication for the analysis in Chapter 6 is the considerably smaller 
sample size (N=120) compared to the sample size of the design used for Chapters 4 and 5 
(N=540). As a result parameter estimates of the same magnitude are less likely to achieve 
statistical significance by conventional standards, all else equal. This means that extra caution 
must be used in drawing substantive conclusions from the analysis in Chapter 6.  
 In summary, error correction models are not practical for the analyses in Chapter 6 
because of the unbalanced panel design of the LIS data, which yields a small sample size and 
uneven intervals between observations. Therefore, in Chapter 6 I use OLS regression with 
country fixed effects and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, which adequately address common 
problems in macroeconomic, time series data such as autocorrelation, panel heteroscedasticity, 
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and cross-sectional dependence. This method leaves the problem of unit roots unaddressed, 
however. Even with this limitation, the importance of addressing this aspect of the relationship 
between neoliberalism, financialization and income inequality justifies the analyses in this 
chapter. Given the limitations of the data, OLS estimation with country fixed effects and 
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors is the best method for these analyses. 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for the three income inequality measures used in Chapters 4 and 
5, as well as the lagged values of the shared independent variables, are presented in Table 3.2. 
For Chapter 4’s key independent variables MG income inequality has a mean of 40.27, a 
standard deviation of 5.01. MG inequality was lowest in Belgium during 1985 with a value of 
26.82. MG inequality was highest in Sweden in 2011 with a value of 49.08, which may be 
surprising given that Sweden is often known as being a very egalitarian nation. However, recall 
that this figure represents the level of inequality prior to redistribution and reveals one of the 
limitations of exclusively studying pre-tax, pre-transfer inequality. Redistribution reduced 
inequality by an average of 29.38%, which means that SM inequality is 29.38% less than its 
value for MG inequality for the average nation. Redistribution has a standard deviation of 
10.86%. There is a relatively large range in redistributive capacity: the minimum is 4.02% for 
New Zealand in 2008 while the maximum is 52.65% for Sweden in 2003. So while Sweden has 
some of the highest values for MG inequality, it also heavily redistributes through taxes and 
transfers thus making it one of the most equal affluent nations in the world. Finally, as expected, 
SM inequality is lower than MG inequality because all nations in the sample redistribute and 
reduce MG inequality to varying degrees. The mean value for SM income inequality is 28.16, the 
standard deviation is 4.13. SM0 inequality ranges from 19.22 for Finland in 1983 to 37.80 for 
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United States in 2007, which is the year of the Great Recession. Scandinavian nations, like 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland, have some of the lowest values for SM inequality. For Norway 
and Finland, this is accomplished through medium levels of MG inequality and medium levels of 
redistribution. As mentioned earlier, Sweden maintains low levels of SM inequality despite very 
unequal market incomes because it has substantial redistributive policies. Anglo-Saxon nations, 
like the United States and United Kingdom, typically have the highest values for SM inequality. 





Table 3.2. Chapters 4 and 5 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent 
Variables for 18 Affluent Capitalist Democracies 1981-2011 (N=540) 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max     
Chapter 4 Dependent Variables           
 MG inequality 40.27  5.01  26.82  49.08    
 Redistribution 29.38  10.86  4.02  52.65    
 SM inequality 28.16  4.13  19.22  37.8    
  MG inequality 0.2  1.27  -5.55  6.85    
  Redistribution 0.12  2.02  -11.8  12.61    
  SM inequality 0.1  0.6  -2.18  2.6    
Chapter 5 Dependent Variables           
 Top 1% share 8.16  2.79  3.49  18.33    
  top 1% share 0.08  0.69  -8.74  4.96    
Business cycle           
 Unemployment (t-1) 6.86  3.26  0.18  17.15    
 Economic growth  (t-1) 2.32  2.28  -8.54  10.92    
Labor market structure            
 Government employment (t-1) 17.01  6.64  5.34  31.78    
 Union density (t-1) 40.30  20.76  7.58  87.44    
Globalization           
 Imports (t-1) 33.63  16.03  6.87  84.08    
 Inward FDI (t-1) 28.45  32.98  0.00  200.28    
Neoliberalism           
 Neoliberal state (t-1) 4.71  1.34  1.63  7.46    
Financialization           
 FIRE employment (t-1) 11.10  3.37  2.52  18.33    
 Credit expansion  (t-1) 120.14  57.54  22.90  328.99    
 Financial crisis (t-1) 2.24  2.37  0.00  9.00    
                        
            
            
Because the ECM models examine change scores, I also present descriptive statistics for 
the change scores for MG inequality, redistribution, and SM inequality. On average, MG 
inequality increased by .2 units per year in the sample with a minimum value of -5.55 and a 
maximum value of 6.85. On average, nations in the sample increased redistribution by around 
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.12% per year. This ranged from -11.8% and 12.61%. Finally, SM inequality increased by 
around .1 units per year. This ranged between a -2.18 and 2.6. As one can see, MG inequality 
and redistribution had more year-to-year variation while SM inequality was relatively stable. 
The only dependent variable for Chapter 5 is the top 1% share of income. The top 1% 
share has an average value of 8.16%. The top 1% share ranges from 3.49% in Finland in 1983 to 
a whopping 18.33% for the United States in 2007. This matches up closely with the low and high 
years and nations for SM inequality. Looking at the change in this measure, on average, the top 
1% share increases by .08% each year in the sample. The year-to-year change in the top 1% 
share is rather volatile, however: it ranges between -8.74% and 4.96%. As I shall show, these 
changes are largely dependent on the economic, political, and financial conditions of a nation.  
Among the key independent variables in Chapters 4 and 5, the neoliberal state variable 
has a mean value of 4.71 with a standard deviation of 1.34. With a theoretical range of 0 to 8, 
this variable varies from 1.63 to 7.46 where lower values represent larger, more interventionist 
states while higher values represent smaller states preferred by advocates of neoliberalism. For 
most countries, states become increasingly neoliberal from 1981 to 2011, especially after the 
year 2000. The exception to this pattern is Netherlands, which actually had a less neoliberal state 
in 2011 than it did in 1981. 
Among the financialization variables, FIRE employment has a mean value of 11.10%, a 
standard deviation of 3.37%, and ranges from 2.52% to 18.33%. Overall, FIRE employment rose 
steadily in every nation in the sample, which reinforces the validity of this measure as an 
indicator of financialization. Credit expansion, or credit provided to the private sector as a 
percent of GDP, has a mean of 120.14%, a standard deviation of 57.54%, and ranges from 
22.90% to 328.99%. In other words, the stock of outstanding credit in the average country-year 
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exceeds the annual GDP, indicating that countries have become extremely reliant on credit and 
debt during the neoliberal period. There are two major types of trends for private sector credit in 
this sample. Some nations, like Austria, France, and Norway, remained relatively stable. Other 
nations, like Ireland, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, saw rapid increases in 
private sector credit. Japan is the only country that started with relatively high levels of credit in 
1980, nearly 200% of GDP, and ended with even an even higher percentage in 2011, which was 
almost 300% of GDP. Finally, the financial crisis variable has a mean of 2.24 and a standard 
deviation of 2.37 and ranges from 0 to 9. This variable achieves a value of 9 in two years in the 
data set, 1981 and 1982 in the U.S, following a tumultuous period of several crises during the 
late 70s and early 80s. Altogether, financial crises and their ripple effects occurred in about 24% 
of the country-years in this study.  
Finally, I will discuss the control variables. Among the business cycle variables, 
unemployment was on average around 6.86% in the sample. This ranged from a very small value 
of .18% to a very large value of 17.15%. Economies on average were growing in during this time 
period, as well. On average, economic growth was 2.32% and ranged from -8.54% to 10.92%. I 
control for the labor market structure using government employment and union density. 
Government employment was on average 17.01% in the sample and ranged from 5.34% to 
31.78%. Union density, a measure of labor strength, was on average 40.30% in the sample; 
however, there was significant variation. Union density ranged from 7.58% to 87.44%. Finally, I 
control for two measures of globalization: imports and inward FDI. Imports was on average 
equivalent to approximately 33.63% of GDP in the sample and ranged from 6.87% and 84.08% 
of GDP. Inward FDI was on average 28.45% of GDP; however, this ranged widely from 0 to 
200.28% of GDP. 
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As discussed earlier in this chapter, the analysis in Chapter 6 utilizes an unbalanced panel 
design with 120 cases compared to the balanced panel design of Chapters 4 and 5, which has 540 
cases. Due to data availability for the dependent variables from the Luxembourg Income Study, 
there are uneven gaps between observations in Chapter 6, and some nations have more 
observations than others in the sample. Additionally, Japan and New Zealand were dropped from 
the sample due to a lack of data. While different dependent variables are used in Chapter 6, the 
same independent variables from the Comparative Welfare States dataset with one-year lags are 
used.  
Because of the unbalanced panel design and different dependent variables used in 
Chapter 6, a separate set of descriptive statistics for these analyses are presented in Table 3.3. 
There are three dependent variables in Chapter 6: upper-tail inequality, lower-tail inequality, and 
the top-bottom inequality. The reader should note that I do not present change values for the 
Chapter 6 dependent variables because this chapter assesses the determinants of levels of 
inequality rather than changes in inequality. While change values are used in the ECMs in 
Chapters 4 and 5, they are not used in Chapter 6 because of the uneven time periods between 
observations. Turning first to the dependent variables, upper-tail inequality, measured as the 90-
50 income ratio, has an average value of 1.83, which means that the 90th percentile’s income is 
on average 1.83 times larger than the median worker’s. Upper-tail inequality has a standard 
deviation of .18 and ranges between 1.51 for Finland in 1987 and 2.19 for the United States in 
2010. Lower-tail inequality, measured as the 50-10 income ratio, has a mean value of 1.99. This 
means that the median worker on average has 1.99 times more income than the 10th percentile. 
Lower-tail inequality has a standard deviation of .25 and ranges between 1.61 for Sweden in 
1981 and 2.72 for the United States in 1986. Finally, the top-bottom inequality, measured as the 
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90-10 income ratio, has a mean value of 3.67. This shows that the 90th percentile earns on 
average 3.67 times more income than that of the 10th percentile. Top-bottom inequality has a 
standard deviation of .80 and ranges between 2.43 for Sweden in 1981 and 5.73 for the United 
States in 2007, which was the year of the Great Recession.  
There are several important things to note in the patterns of these data. First, the United 
States has the highest values for all three dependent variables. Given that the United States has 
some of the highest levels of neoliberalism and financialization, this is not surprising. Other 
Anglo-Saxon nations, like the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, tend to 
rank high on the measures of SM inequality. Second, the lowest values tend to be in 
Scandinavian countries like Finland and Sweden, which have historically resisted neoliberalism 
and have strong welfare states and labor movements. Nations ranking in the middle of the pack 




Table 3.3. Chapter 6 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent 
Variables for 16 Affluent Capitalist Democracies 1981-2011 (N=120) 
 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max      
Chapter 6 Dependent Variables            
 Upper-tail inequality 1.83  0.18  1.51  2.19     
 Lower-tail inequality 1.99  0.25  1.61  2.72     
 Top-bottom inequality 3.67  0.80  2.43  5.73     
Business Cycle            
 Unemployment (t-1) 7.45  3.34  0.18  17.15     
 Economic growth  (t-1) 2.00  2.84  -8.54  9.92     
Labor Market Structure             
 Government employment (t-1) 17.74  6.32  8.32  31.41     
 Union density (t-1) 40.17  20.26  7.75  87.44     
Globalization            
 Imports (t-1) 33.96  15.27  9.97  75.35     
 Inward FDI (t-1) 27.50  25.75  0.00  140.04     
Neoliberalism            
 Neoliberal state (t-1) 4.69  1.33  1.63  7.29     
Financialization            
 FIRE employment (t-1) 11.35  3.39  3.43  17.84     
 Credit expansion  (t-1) 116.68  46.64  42.05  235.52     
 Financial crisis (t-1) 2.19  2.34  0.00  7.00     
                         
             
             
An important purpose of this table is to assess the extent to which the skew of the LIS-
based sample in Chapter 6 influences the means and standard deviations of the covariates 
compared to the overall sample in Chapters 4 and 5. To remind the reader, the Chapter 6 sample 
is slightly skewed toward the latter half of the neoliberal era. I ran t-tests to determine the 
differences in the mean values for the independent variables in Chapters 4 and 5 versus those in 
Chapter 6. There are statistically significant differences in the mean values of four variables: 
unemployment, economic growth, government employment, and FIRE employment variables. 
Unemployment, government employment, and the FIRE employment had higher mean values in 
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the Chapter 6 sample. The higher values in Chapter 6 are likely due to the sample being skewed 
towards the latter period, which is more heavily dominated by neoliberalism. Economic growth 
had a higher mean value in Chapters 4 and 5.  These small differences on the four variables may 
have some effect on the interpretation of the results, but overall the effect should be slight.  
Among the key independent variables in Chapter 6, the average value for the neoliberal 
state was 4.69 with a standard deviation of 1.33. This ranged between 1.63 for Sweden in 1981 
and 7.29 for the United States in 2004. FIRE employment was on average 11.35% of total 
employment in the sample with a standard deviation of 3.39%. FIRE employment was lowest in 
Italy during 1986 with a value of 3.43% and highest in the United States during 2010 with a 
value of 17.84%. Credit expansion, measured as private sector credit as a percent of GDP, had an 
average value of 116.68% with a standard deviation of 46.64%. Credit expansion ranged 
between 42.05% for Australia in 1985 and 235.52% for the United States in 2007. Finally, 
financial crises had a mean value of 2.19 units and a standard deviation of 2.34. This ranged 
between 0 and 7, which occurred 8 times in the sample. The values of the four key independent 
variables are largely similar to those in Chapter 4 and 5; however, a notable difference is that 
credit expansion has lower values because Japan, which was dropped from the LIS data since it 
had only one observation, runs so much of its economic output using private sector debt. 
 In chapter 4, I control for several other alternative factors that may be driving upper- and 
lower-tail inequality. I control for two business cycle variables to account for changes in the 
economy of nations. The mean unemployment was 7.45% in the sample with a standard 
deviation of 3.34%. Economic growth was on average 2.00% with a standard deviation of 2.84. 
Among the labor market structure variables, government employment was on average 17.74% 
with a standard deviation of 6.32%. Among the civilian workforce, the average nation in the 
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sample had 40.17% as members of a union. This had a standard deviation of 20.26%. Finally, I 
control for two measures of globalization: imports and inward FDI. Imports were on average 
33.96% of GDP in the sample and had a standard deviation of 15.27%. The mean value for 
inward FDI was 27.50% of GDP and had a standard deviation of 25.75%. The values for the 
controls are largely similar to those in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 Overall, these data and methods give me the ability to analyze the motivating questions 
of this dissertation. Chapter 4, the next chapter, examines how neoliberalism and financialization 
impacts income inequality before taxes and transfers (MG inequality), redistribution, and income 
inequality after taxes and transfers (SM inequality). Chapter 5 explores how neoliberalism and 
financialization have affected the income shares of the rich, operationalized as the top 1% share 
of income. And finally, Chapter 6 investigates whether neoliberalism and financialization benefit 
the rich at the expense of the middle class, the poor, or both through analyses of upper-tail 
inequality (the income ratio between the 90th and 50th income percentiles), lower-tail inequality 
(the income ratio between the 50th and 10th percentiles), and top-bottom inequality (the income 





CHAPTER 4: NEOLIBERAL REFORM, FINANCIALIZATION, AND INCOME 
INEQUALITY IN 18 AFFLUENT CAPITALIST DEMOCRACIES 
4.1 Introduction 
 During the neoliberal era, neoliberalism and financialization are two of the dominant 
transformations to the social structures of accumulation in affluent nations that have shaped 
capital accumulation and are increasingly linked with income inequality (Kotz and McDonough 
2010). While previous research has found that financialization increases income inequality 
(Zalewski and Whalen 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Assa 2012; Arnum and Naples 
2013), there are several unresolved issues that this chapter examines in order to provide 
additional insight into these processes. Previous studies of financialization’s effects on income 
inequality have largely focused on either MG or SM inequality alone (Zalewski and Whalen 
2010; Assa 2012; Arnum and Naples 2013) or have examined income differentials between 
financial and nonfinancial industries in the United States (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). 
From this literature, it is unclear whether financialization is simply creating more unequal market 
incomes, putting fiscal pressure on the state to reduce welfare state capacity and redistribution, or 
if it is affecting both. Additionally, previous studies have largely focused on one or two measures 
of financialization, often FIRE employment and occasionally FIRE value added to GDP. While I 
agree that these measures are appropriate representations of some aspects of financialization, 
there are other aspects of financialization in the literature, such as credit expansion and financial 
crises, which are largely unexplored in empirical studies.  
In this chapter, I examine how one measure of neoliberalism, the neoliberal state, and 
three measures of financialization impact three measures of income inequality—market 
generated (MG) inequality, redistribution, and state mediated (SM) inequality—in 18 affluent 
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nations from 1981 to 2011 to address these shortcomings in the literature. The three measures of 
financialization are FIRE employment, credit expansion, and financial crises. The primary 
research question in this chapter is: Do neoliberalism and financialization impact income 
inequality by creating more unequal market incomes (represented by MG inequality), by 
affecting redistribution, more unequal incomes after taxes and transfers (represented by SM 
inequality), or a combination of the three? This information will provide a greater understanding 
of the mechanisms that link these processes to income inequality.  
Additionally, this chapter examines the timing of the effects of neoliberalism and 
financialization on income inequality by examining instantaneous, short-run, and long-run 
effects using error correction models (ECMs). Previous studies of neoliberalism, financialization, 
and income inequality have primarily used traditional time series methods, which make 
assumptions about the lag lengths of the independent variables. In review of the discussion of 
Chapter 3, ECMs allow one to simultaneously estimate instantaneous, short-run, and long-run 
effects. To anticipate the results below, I find that most of the effects are long run so that is the 
primary focus of this chapter. ECMs are also advantageous because they can address several 
methodological problems common in macroeconomic time series analyses, namely units roots, 
autocorrelation, and panel heteroscedasticity (De Boefe and Keele 2008). Below, I discuss the 
theoretical links between neoliberalism, financialization, and income inequality, as well as 
develop hypotheses for the analyses. 
4.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
 Chapter 4 serves as the empirical lynchpin to this dissertation and sets the stage for the 
analyses in Chapters 5 and 6, which focus on different parts of the income distribution. As such, 
much of the theory related to this chapter was discussed in Chapter 2 as a way to frame the main 
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theoretical arguments of this dissertation. To remind the reader, I reiterate the hypotheses 
associated with this chapter below, which were introduced in Chapter 2, as well as provide brief 
justifications of those hypotheses. 
 The transformation of the role of the state in shaping markets and social welfare is one of 
the hallmark characteristics of neoliberalism in the current SSA (Kotz and McDonough 2010). 
There are several important changes in the state’s role in the market and social welfare that have 
occurred during this period, which are captured by the neoliberal state variable that I use in my 
analyses. First, there has been a reduction in the tax burden of the wealthy in many affluent 
nations (Kotz and McDonough 2010). In the neoliberal era, the burden primarily falls on wage 
earners and other groups. Second, the state has played a lesser role in the creation of aggregate 
demand (Harvey 2005; Kotz and McDonough 2010). During the post-World War II era, many 
states used public spending and investment to supplement market demand in order to boost 
economic growth and reduce unemployment. During the neoliberal era, it has been argued that 
the state should minimize spending in order to minimize inflation but at the expense of economic 
growth and unemployment. Third, there has been a reduction in state-sponsored social programs 
that supplement the wages of working individuals, such as pensions, unemployment insurance, 
and educational subsidies (Harvey 2005; Kotz and McDonough 2010; Wright and Rogers 2015). 
These cuts have reduced the incomes of the middle and working class after taxes and transfers. 
Fourth, many public goods like transportation, social welfare programs, education and job 
training have been cut or privatized, thus reducing redistribution (Harvey 2005; Kotz and 
McDonough 2010; Wright and Rogers 2015). Additionally, cuts to transportation and skills-




Hypothesis 4.1: The neoliberal state will increase MG income inequality, 
decrease redistribution, and increase SM income inequality. 
 I examine aspects of financialization and their relationship with income inequality as 
well. The first is FIRE employment, which represents the size and power of finance, insurance, 
and real estate agencies in the labor market. Additionally, it represents the finance industry’s 
power in politics and the economy. FIRE employment is the most commonly used measure of 
financialization in the literature examining income inequality. FIRE employment is expected to 
increase income inequality because financial sector wages have been growing at a much faster 
rate than nonfinancial workers, even after controlling for productivity and human capital 
characteristics (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Additionally, wealthy individuals, 
particularly those in finance, have sponsored policies that reduce the tax burden on capital gains 
and other financial incomes for the wealthy while shifting the tax burden onto the poor. For these 
reasons, I predict:  
Hypothesis 4.2: The percent of workers employed in FIRE industries will increase 
MG income inequality, decrease redistribution, and increase SM income 
inequality. 
 Credit expansion is the second component of financialization examined in this chapter 
and refers to higher levels of credit and leveraging, or an increase in borrowed assets relative to 
real assets used to purchase investments, in the private sector issued by banks. This concept 
represents the extent that credit culture and leveraging dominates the private sector and relates to 
inequality in several ways, which are outlined in detail in Chapter 2 but are summarized below. 
Due to deregulation of the banking industry, policies limiting leveraging of banks have been 
curtailed in the United States and other nations throughout the neoliberal era (Krippner 2011; 
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Lapavitsas 2013). As a result, banks and other firms have increased the amount of risky 
investments that have led to windfall profits for firms and wealthy individuals (Bank for 
International Settlements 2001; Borrio and Lowe 2002; Evans 2003). Though the potential 
profits related to leveraged investments may be large, there is also risk of major losses as profit 
variability increases. Wealthy individuals and banks reduce their susceptibility to major losses by 
securitizing their investments and using derivatives, which cushion losses for investors (Guttman 
2008; see Chapters 2 for a more detailed discussion of securities and derivatives and Chapter 5 
for a more detailed discussion of how the 1% uses them). As such, I develop the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4.3: The share of domestic credit provided to the private sector will increase 
MG income inequality, decrease redistribution, and increase SM income inequality. 
The third and final measure of financialization is financial crises, which represent 
financial instability in markets caused by increased risk and deregulation. Overall, there are two 
major theories that predict how financial crises bear upon income inequality and redistribution, 
which largely differ on the direction of the effect on redistribution. The austerity thesis contends 
that financial crises increase inequality because there are long-term impacts on the market 
incomes of the middle class and the poor (Heathcoate, Perri, and Violante 2010). While the 
wealthy (such as the top 1%) often take a big hit in their income shares during a crisis, their 
incomes typically recover much more quickly than the middle class and poor in affluent nations 
(Piketty and Saez 2015; Saez 2015). The austerity thesis contends that financial crises can 
negatively affect welfare state generosity by reducing resources to fund social programs and 
diverting resources to bail out failing financial institutions (Harvey 2010). The 2008 financial 
crisis offers a case in point: state efforts to reboot the economy prioritized policies to rescue “too 
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big to fail” investment banks rather than policies to rescue the middle class or the poor. Private 
nonfinancial firms caught up in the collapse imposed mass layoffs or wage freezes in order to cut 
losses, which further increased MG and SM inequality. The loss of tax revenues from businesses 
and workers created a fiscal crisis that crippled the ability of the state to extend welfare programs 
to all who need them, thus decreasing redistribution. Following this logic, the austerity thesis 
predicts:  
Hypothesis 4.4a (Austerity Hypothesis): Financial crises will increase MG 
income inequality, decrease redistribution, and increase SM income inequality. 
 The welfare state stabilization thesis agrees with the austerity thesis that financial crises 
cause increases in MG and SM inequality, but differs about its effect on redistribution. This 
perspective argues that modern welfare states engage in “automatic stabilization” (see Dolls, 
Fuest, and Peichl 2012) whereby a severe economic collapse activates existing social support 
programs to respond to displaced workers and other needy citizens or creates emergency 
programs to assist them. Supporting this view, Heathcoate, Perri, and Violante (2010) found that 
low-income households in the U.S. experienced larger losses in earnings relative to high-income 
households during recessions, but SM inequality did not increase as much as might be expected 
because of existing state programs. Similarly, Dolls et al. (2012) found that European nations 
had more redistributive capacity during crises than the U.S., yet not enough to offset the overall 
positive impact of crises on SM inequality (see also Baird 2014).  Thus, the welfare state 
stabilization thesis predicts: 
Hypothesis 4.4b (Welfare Stabilization Hypothesis): Financial crises will increase 




 To test these hypotheses, I estimate the effects of neoliberalism and financialization on 
MG inequality, redistribution, and SM inequality in 18 affluent nations from 1981 to 2011 using 
error correction models (ECMs). To do so, I first estimate single-equation error correction 
models, which provide coefficients for the instantaneous effects, short-run effects, and the error 
correction rates. After a brief discussion of the instantaneous and short-run effects, which are not 
too prominent for these dependent variables, I focus most of the attention in this chapter on the 
long-run effects. Long-run effects are estimated using the Bewley transformation. In the next two 
sections of this chapter, I discuss the results of the analyses. 
4.3 Instantaneous and Short-Run Effects on Market-Generated Income Inequality, 
Redistribution, and State-Mediated Income Inequality 
 Now, I will turn to the results of the analyses examining the instantaneous and short-run 
effects of neoliberalism and financialization on income inequality in 18 affluent nations. As 
stated in Chapter 3, ECMs provide the advantage of estimating instantaneous, short-run, and 
long-run effects. Instantaneous effects represent the effect of x at t on y at t. Short-run effects 
represent the effects of x at t-1 on y at t. Long-run effects represent the effect of x on y spread 
out over time and are derived from the Bewley transformation.  
 Starting first with the instantaneous effects, FIRE employment increase the rate of change 
in both MG and SM inequality while it has no effect on redistribution, which supports 
Hypothesis 2.1. As FIRE sector employment grows, inequality increases in the same year 
because financial sector workers tend to be paid more than nonfinancial workers (Tomaskovic-
Devey and Lin 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013) and because there is increased demand 
for low-pay and low-skill service work to cater to the needs of the affluent (Moller, Anderson 
and Nielsen 2009). None of the other variables have significant instantaneous effects. FIRE 
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employment likely has significant instantaneous effects because it is directly tied to the labor 
market, which is more immediately connected to the income distribution than the other key 
variables. 
 For short-run effects, financial crises are associated with an increase in the rate of change 
in MG inequality. In other words, income inequality tends to rise in nations in the years affected 
by financial crises. This particular finding supports both Hypotheses 4.1a and 4.1b, but it does 
not adjudicate between the austerity and welfare state stabilization hypotheses because they both 
predict that financial crises increase MG inequality. Additionally, credit expansion is associated 
with an increase in the rate of change in SM inequality, which provides support for Hypothesis 
3.1. As private sector credit increases, there are immediate gains for the wealthy. This is because 
financial institutions and the wealthy use leverage and securities to engage in profitable but risky 
behaviors with some assurance that any losses will be partially protected (Guttman 2008), which 
increase SM inequality. 
 In summary, I find some evidence that each financialization measures is associated with 
income inequality either through instantaneous and short-run effects during the neoliberal era. 
While neoliberalism does not have any instantaneous or short-run effects on income inequality, 
all three measures of financialization increase either MG or SM inequality and are consistent 
with my hypotheses. None of the key independent variables had instantaneous or short-run 
impacts on redistribution, however. As I show in the next section, neoliberalism and 
financialization tend to impact inequality more through long-run processes. While the 
magnitudes of the long-run effects will differ from the instantaneous or short-run effects, the 
directions of the significant coefficients will largely corroborate a similar story of how 
neoliberalism and financialization have shaped income inequality during the neoliberal era. 
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4.4 Long-Run Effects on Market-Generated Income Inequality  
I display the results for ECMs estimating the long-run effects of the covariates on the 
three dependent variables in Tables 4.1 through 4.6. In Table 4.1, I present the models predicting 
MG income inequality. For each set of models, I first estimated the ECM and then performed the 
Bewley transformation to acquire the long-term effects of each independent variable. In models 1 
through 4, I display the long-term effects for each key independent variable alone with the 
controls. Then in model 5, I present the long-term effects for all key independent variables   
together with controls. This allows me to see how each key independent variable impacts MG 
inequality alone and net of the other key independent variables.  
The relatively sizable error correction rates for MG inequality in models 1 through 5, 
ranging from -.258 to -.251 indicate that the causal impact of the independent variables tends to 
be strong and quickly dissipates over time. The error correction rate is the rate at which an 
economic shock causes the time series trend to correct, or readjust, after being affected by 
something like an economic crisis in the next year. For example, if you have an error correction 
rate of -0.256 (which is from model 1 and represents a moderately high value), then 25.6% of the 
initial shock will adjust after the first year, and an additional 25.6% in the second year of the 
remainder, and so on. As a result, the effects of the selected variables on MG inequality are 
relatively deep and short-lasting as compared to a long-lasting hypothetical value of -0.154 for 
an error correction rate. The R2 values shown in the tables are from the original ECM models 
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because the models that utilize Bewley transformations do not produce R2 values.7 
 
Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate   0.277***  0.254***  0.311***   0.268***   0.375***
(0.035) (0.034) (0.044) (0.036) (0.036)
Economic growth 0.016  0.087*    0.091+     0.127**    0.166***
(0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.043) (0.043)
Government employment 0.037 0.055  0.045      0.100*     0.118*  
(0.048) (0.050) (0.063) (0.048) (0.051)
Union density 0.011 -0.022  0.009     -0.044*     -0.023   
(0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
Imports  0.045*   0.026  0.009      0.052**    0.041*  
(0.019) (0.020) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019)
Inward FDI  0.019***  0.021***  0.017**    0.016**    0.025***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Neoliberal state  0.488***                                        0.604***
(0.136)                                       (0.139)
FIRE employment              0.170*                               0.240** 
           (0.077)                            (0.081)
Credit expansion                           0.012**                 0.013***
                      (0.004)              (0.003)
Financial crisis                                        0.307***   0.251***
                                    (0.032) (0.032)
Error-correction rate  -0.256***   -0.258***   -0.251***    -0.256***    -0.256***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)
Constant  27.884***  29.916***    29.783***    30.927***   23.412***
(1.161)    (0.902)      (1.001)      (0.597)     (1.412)   
R
2
0.198 0.200 0.194 0.205 0.213
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
a—Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Table 4.1: Long-Run Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on MG Inequality 








Labor market structure 
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First, I will discuss briefly the effects of the controls in models 1 through 5. 
Unemployment, as one would expect, increases MG inequality in models 1 through 5, most 
likely due to the fact that unemployment reduces workers’ bargaining power and causes wages to 
decline. Economic growth increases MG inequality in models 2, 4, and 5, and it has a marginally 
significant positive effect in model 4. This finding suggests that economic growth in the 
neoliberal era does not lead to shared prosperity but instead to rising incomes for the rich. 
Government employment, generally, does not impact MG inequality, except in models 4 and 5. 
After controlling for the key neoliberalism and financialization measures in model 5, government 
employment is associated with greater MG inequality. While this effect is not particularly robust 
to different variables being the models, it does suggest that government employment can actually 
increase inequality of market incomes, possibly due to the presence of high-paid bureaucratic 
workers. Union density primarily has no significant effects on MG inequality, except in model 4 
where it decreases MG inequality as one would expect. This provides some evidence that unions 
do help reduce inequality, most likely by compressing the income distribution. Consistent with 
previous research (Alderson and Nielsen 2002), we can see that imports increase MG inequality 
in models 1, 4, and 5, but these effects are nonsignificant in models 2 and 3. This suggests that 
the influx of cheaper goods from abroad, as well as the lack of manufacturing goods within one’s 
own nation, tends to weaken the bargaining power of workers and increases income inequality. 
Additionally, inward FDI is associated with greater MG inequality in all 5 models, which is 
consistent with previous research (Alderson and Nielsen 2002). As inward FDI increases, it puts 




Turning to the primary focus of the analysis, the neoliberal state is associated with greater 
MG income inequality over the long-run in models 1 and 5, which supports Hypothesis 1.1. As 
shown in model 5, a one-unit increase in the neoliberal state index is associated with a .604 unit 
increase in MG inequality. The three dimensions of financialization also have consistently 
positive effects on MG inequality over the long run in models 2, 3, 4, and 5. Focusing on model 
5, a one-percent increase in FIRE employment is associated with a .240 unit increase in MG 
inequality, supporting Hypothesis 2.1. A one-percent increase in credit as a share of GDP creates 
a .009 unit long-run increase in MG inequality, supporting Hypothesis 3.1. A one-unit increase in 
the crisis measure is expected to have a .349 unit increase in MG inequality, supporting 
Hypotheses 4.1a and H4.1b. This effect, however, does not distinguish between the austerity and 
welfare state stabilization hypotheses, which will be adjudicated in the analyses of redistribution. 
Taken as a whole, all three aspects of financialization are detrimental to a more egalitarian 
distribution of market incomes.  
The results of model 5 in Table 4.1 are replicated in Table 4.2 in the form of jackknife 
models. To estimate the jackknife models, 18 sets of models were run dropping one nation at a 
time to determine if the results are robust regardless of the nations in the models. The results for 
the neoliberal state and financial crises variables are robust for all jackknife models. The positive 
effect of FIRE employment is robust except in the models excluding Belgium and Ireland. 
Similarly, credit expansion is robust in all models, except those excluding Belgium. On the 
whole, these results provide strong support for the hypotheses that each key variable in the 
analysis increases MG inequality. Belgium is an extreme case for three of the four variables, 
specifically all three financialization variables. While finance and banking are important 
industries in Belgium, the nation has experienced some economic difficulties throughout the 
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2000s (Rumney 2016). This is largely due to labor market fragmentation and high levels of 
public and private debt, which likely explains why Belgium seems to be an influential case in 
determining the significance of the positive coefficients for FIRE employment and credit 
expansion. As the headquarters of European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), this may make Belgium unique in these analyses, as well. Nonetheless, the results from 






Table 4.2. Jackknife Models of the Long-Run Effects Predicting Market-Generated Inequality 
 Full ECM Jackknife Low Jackknife High Discordant 
Models
a Variable Coefficient Coefficient Country Coefficient Country 
Neoliberalism       
Neoliberal state      0.604***      0.397*** New 0.846*** Norway 0 
     (0.127)        (0.144) Zealand  (0.152)   
Financialization       
FIRE employment 0.240** 0.091  Belgium 0.407*** Australia 2 
     (0.081)        (0.083)   (0.087)   
Credit expansion      0.013***     -0.000 Belgium   0.022*** Netherlands 1 
     (0.003)       (0.003)   (0.003)   
Financial crisis      0.251***      0.183*** Netherlands 0.367***  Belgium 0 
     (0.032)        (0.032)   (0.034)   
       
N       540       510     510   
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests). 
a—Number of country models with non-significant results from the jackknife analyses (out of a possible 18) at p < .10. “NA” 
means that the coefficient was not significant in the full model. 
Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses.  





4.5 Long-Run Effects on Redistribution  
I present the long-run effects predicting redistribution in Table 4.3. One should note that 
the error correction rates for redistribution are lower in magnitude than those for MG inequality, 
and they range between -.208 and -.202. The lower error correction rates suggest that the long-
run effects dissipate more slowly over time than those of MG inequality. First, I turn to the 
results for the control variables in models 1 through 5. Unemployment, on average, is associated 
with more redistribution over the long run in all five models. This is not surprising as it tends to 
cause unemployment insurance and other protections to kick in, thus increasing incomes for 
bottom earners. Economic growth is associated with more redistribution over the long run; 
however, this is only significant in models 4 and 5. As the economy grows and income 
distributions become more unequal, the welfare state responds by reducing some of the 
inequality. Government employment is associated with more redistribution in models 1 through 
4. So while government employment was found to be associated with more MG inequality, more 
government employment is associated with greater redistribution. Union density does not have a 
significant long-run effect on redistribution, except in model 2, which suggests that this effect is 
not very robust. Imports is associated with less redistribution in models 1 through 5. As imports 
increase, there is additional pressure on the welfare state to cut taxes and transfers, which 
exacerbates inequality. Finally, inward FDI does not have a significant effect on redistribution 
over the long run in models 1 through 4, although there is a marginally significant negative effect 
in model 5. Similarly, there is some evidence that there is competition between by reducing taxes 





Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate   0.202**    0.219***   0.251***    0.303***    0.270***
(0.062) (0.063) (0.068) (0.065) (0.065)
Economic growth 0.037 0.03 0.045    0.162*      0.169*  
(0.072) (0.072) (0.074) (0.077) (0.080)
Government employment  0.254**  0.261**   0.264**     0.323***    0.242** 
(0.082) (0.087) (0.093) (0.084) (0.084)
Union density 0.041  0.058*     0.052       0.034       0.033   
(0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032)
Imports -0.096*   -0.083*    -0.086*     -0.090*   -0.073+  
(0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039)
Inward FDI -0.010   -0.010    -0.012    -0.009    -0.020+  
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Neoliberal state  -0.542*                                      -0.493+  
(0.259)                                    (0.259)
FIRE employment            -0.280*                           -0.309*  
          (0.123)                        (0.134)
Credit expansion                        -0.027***              -0.033***
                      (0.006)             (0.006)
Financial crisis                                   0.178**   0.183** 
                                 (0.058) (0.056)
Error-correction rate  -0.202***   -0.207*** -0.208***  -0.203*** -0.206***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
Constant 14.237*** 12.625*** 11.449*** 11.449***  3.674***
(2.152) (1.647) (1.522) (1.522) (1.013)
R
2
0.159 0.160 0.162 0.160 0.166
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
a—Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Table 4.3: Long-Run Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on Redistribution 










Turning to neoliberalism, I find that the neoliberal state decreases redistribution in model 
1 and has a marginally significant negative effect in model 5, which supports Hypothesis 1.1. In 
model 5, a one-unit change in the neoliberal state measure causes a .493 percent long-run 
increase in redistribution. Looking at FIRE employment in models 2 and 5, there are negative 
effects on redistribution, which supports Hypothesis 2.1. A one-percent increase in FIRE 
employment results in a .309 percent decrease in redistribution over the long run in model 5. The 
second measure of financialization, credit expansion, is associated with less redistribution in 
models 3 and 5 as expected by Hypothesis 3.1. As credit increases by one percent, there is a .033 
percent long-run reduction in redistribution in model 5. Finally, financial crises are associated 
with more redistribution in models 4 and 5, which supports Hypothesis 4.1b and fails to support 
Hypothesis 4.1a. Contrary to Harvey’s (2010) austerity hypothesis, these findings support the 
welfare state stabilization hypothesis. Though, it should be noted that the effect of crises in 
model 5 is weaker and less significant after controlling for other measures of financialization and 
neoliberalism than it was model 4. This suggests that some of the effect of financial crises on 
redistribution operates through changes in neoliberal state policies and the other financialization 
measures, which were likely impacted by the financial crisis itself. A one-unit increase in the 
crisis measure leads to a .183 percent long-run increase in redistribution in model 5. These 
particular findings are robust with and without the presence of the neoliberal state variable, 
which controls for social spending, top marginal tax rates, and government consumption. As the 
labor market struggles to recover from financial woes, the welfare state “automatically” kicks in 
to partially supplement the loss of market incomes (Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl 2012). This is done 
through existing social policy such as unemployment insurance, types of welfare like food 
assistance, health insurance, and other state social programs which have direct and indirect 
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benefits for the unemployed and poor. Additionally, as incomes of the middle class and poor 
decrease, they tend to be taxed at lower rates and receive greater transfers due to progressive 
taxation policies. While austerity may occur in some nations like Greece, Brazil, and other 
middle and lower income nations, the level of austerity in affluent nations appears to be lower. 
The jackknife models predicting redistribution are presented in Table 4.4. Overall, the 
jackknife results illustrate that the models predicting redistribution are less robust than those 
predicting MG inequality. The result for the neoliberal state was only marginally significant in 
model 5 of Table 4.3; however, it was in the predicted negative direction. Here, we can see that 
dropping any one of five nations—Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, or the 
United States—causes the effect of the neoliberal state to become nonsignificant. The effect of 
FIRE employment becomes nonsignificant when one of seven nations are dropped from the 
models—Australia, Denmark, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, or Switzerland. The 
effect of credit expansion is the most robust: it only becomes nonsignificant when France is 
dropped from the models. Finally, the financial crisis variable becomes nonsignificant when 
Germany, France, or New Zealand are dropped from the models. This relatively large number of 
discordant models may be related to vastly different redistributional processes not captured by 










Table 4.4. Jackknife Models of the Long-Run Effects Predicting Redistribution 
 Full ECM Jackknife Low Jackknife High Discordant 
Models
a Variable Coefficient Coefficient Country Coefficient Country 
Neoliberalism       
Neoliberal state      -0.493†      -0.946*** Belgium  -0.089 Sweden 5 
     (0.259)        (0.251)   (0.152)   
Financialization       
FIRE employment -0.309**     -1.227***  Italy  -0.151 Australia 7 
     (0.134)        (0.083)   (0.087)   
Credit expansion      -0.033***     -0.060*** Belgium  -0.010 France 1 
     (0.006)       (0.005)   (0.007)   
Financial crisis      0.183***      0.042 France 0.469***  Belgium 4 
     (0.056)        (0.057)   (0.055)   
       
N       540       510     510   
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests). 
a—Number of country models with non-significant results from the jackknife analyses (out of a possible 18) at p < .10. “NA” 
means that the coefficient was not significant in the full model. 
Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses.  





4.6 Long-Run Effects on State-Mediated Income Inequality  
Finally, I present the long-run effects predicting SM income inequality in Table 4.5. Here 
the error correction rates are appreciably smaller than those for the previous two sets of models, 
suggesting that the long-run effects for SM inequality dissipate more slowly than those for MG 
inequality and redistribution. The error correction rates range from -.177 to -.162. Focusing first 
on the controls, both unemployment and economic growth are related to more SM inequality in 
models 1 through 5. Again, unemployment increases inequality because it decreases the demand 
for workers and weakens their bargaining power. Economic growth increases inequality because 
the affluent tend to benefit more during times of economic prosperity. Government employment 
is associated with less SM inequality in models 1 through 5, however. While I found that 
government employment is associated with greater MG inequality, government employment is 
associated with more redistribution and less SM inequality. This suggests that the redistribution 
associated with government employment, through pensions and other benefits, overtakes any 
inequality in market incomes and reduces inequality after taxes and transfers, which is consistent 
with previous research. Additionally, more government workers could result in a more organized 
political voice to defend and expand state services that help reduce inequality. Union density is 
not related to SM inequality in models 2 through 4; however, this effect is surprisingly positive 
in models 1 and 5. This finding contradicts previous research on unions and inequality, but it is 
not particularly robust given that the effect comes in and out of significance depending on other 
variables in the models. However, union density’s ability to reduce inequality may act through its 
ability to put pressure on the welfare state to increase redistribution. Further, countries that are 
more neoliberal also tend to have much lower unionization rates. This negative correlation may 
be masking the true relationship between union density and neoliberalism.  
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Regarding the globalization variables, I find that imports is unexpectedly associated with 
less SM inequality, especially given the fact that it was associated with more MG inequality and 
less redistribution in the previous models. This effect remains significant in models 1 through 5.8 
Inward FDI has a positive effect on SM inequality as expected, an effect that is robust in models 
1 through 5. Investments from foreign firms puts downward pressure on wages, taxes, and 
transfers thus causing SM inequality to increase due to competition to attract investors. 
                                                          
8 This particular finding is likely due to model specification and the variables in the models. Imports is associated 
with more SM inequality in models that include inflation, immigration, and industrial employment. Additionally, 




Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate   0.176***  0.161***  0.175***  0.177***   0.246*** 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019)
Economic growth  0.077***  0.144***  0.118***  0.152***   0.153*** 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.023) (0.023)
Government employment  -0.186***  -0.186***  -0.170***  -0.178***   -0.146*** 
(0.031) (0.030) (0.040) (0.031) (0.030)
Union density 0.033**  0.012  0.021     0.002      0.033*** 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.010)
Imports -0.022*    -0.037***  -0.046***  -0.033***   -0.030**  
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010)
Inward FDI  0.026***  0.026***  0.024***  0.025***   0.030*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Neoliberal state  0.524***                                      0.666*** 
(0.070)                                     (0.069)
FIRE employment            -0.030                          0.119*   
           (0.048)                         (0.048)
Credit expansion                         0.023***               0.029*** 
                       (0.002)              (0.002)
Financial crisis                                      0.139***   0.109*** 
                                  (0.015) (0.015)
Error-correction rate -0.169*** -0.162***  -0.168***  -0.164***  -0.177***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032)
Constant 26.669*** 30.353*** 28.663*** 30.199*** 22.310***
(0.678) (0.626) (0.714) (0.468) (0.797)
R
2
0.117 0.122 0.126 0.117 0.145
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
a—Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Variable Model 1 Model 3
Table 4.5: Long-Run Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on SM Inequality in 
18 Affluent Democracies, 1981-2011 (N=540)a
Financialization
Business cycle





With regard to neoliberalism and financialization, all four hypotheses for SM inequality 
are supported to varying degrees. First, the neoliberal state has a significant, positive effect on 
SM inequality in models 1 and 5, supporting Hypothesis 1.1. In model 5, a one-unit increase in 
the neoliberal state variable is linked to a .666 unit long-run increase in SM inequality. All three 
indicators of financialization are associated with greater SM inequality; however, FIRE 
employment has a less robust effect. In model 2, there is a negative and nonsignificant 
coefficient for FIRE employment; however, this coefficient becomes positive and significant in 
model 5 when neoliberalism and the other two financialization measures are included. A one-
percent increase in FIRE employment is associated with a .119 unit long-run increase in SM 
inequality in model 5, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2.1. Credit expansion is related to 
greater SM inequality in models 3 and 5. A one-percent increase in credit provided to businesses 
in the private sector leads to a .029 unit long-run increase in SM inequality in model 5, which 
supports Hypothesis 3.1. Finally, financial crises increase SM inequality in models 4 and 5. A 
one-unit increase in the financial crisis variable leads to a .109 unit long-run increase in SM 
inequality supporting Hypothesis 4.1a and Hypothesis 4.1b. On balance, the finding that financial 
crises increase MG and SM inequality but decrease redistribution compliment the welfare state 
stabilization hypothesis by suggesting that although affluent democracies have the capacity to 
initiate a countercyclical response to financial crises, they do so within parameters that do not 
fundamentally alter the basic structure of inequality in capitalist societies. These automatic 
stabilizers simply buffer some, but not all, of the inequality caused by financial crises. 
In Table 4.6, I present the results for the jackknife models predicting SM inequality. 
Notably, the positive significant results for the neoliberal state, credit expansion, and financial 
crises variables on SM inequality remain robust across all 18 jackknife models indicating these 
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findings are very robust. FIRE employment, on the other hand, becomes nonsignificant when 
either Italy or New Zealand are dropped from the models. Overall, this indicates that the models 






Table 4.6. Jackknife Models of the Long-Run Effects Predicting State-Mediated Inequality 
 Full ECM Jackknife Low Jackknife High Discordant 
Models
a Variable Coefficient Coefficient Country Coefficient Country 
Neoliberalism       
Neoliberal state      0.666***      0.323*** France 1.060*** Norway 0 
     (0.069)        (0.067)   (0.081)   
Financialization       
FIRE employment      0.119*      0.039  Italy 0.270*** Australia 2 
     (0.048)        (0.045)   (0.047)   
Credit expansion      0.029***      0.018*** Belgium   0.034*** Ireland 0 
     (0.003)       (0.002)   (0.002)   
Financial crisis      0.109***      0.068*** Australia 0.183***  Belgium 0 
     (0.015)        (0.015)   (0.016)   
       
N       540       510     510   
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests). 
a—Number of country models with non-significant results from the jackknife analyses (out of a possible 18) at p < .10. “NA” 
means that the coefficient was not significant in the full model. 
Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses.  





4.7 Discussion and Conclusions  
In this chapter, I examined the long-run effects of neoliberalism and financialization—
two of the dominant features of the neoliberal SSA—on income inequality in 18 affluent 
democracies between the years 1981 to 2011. These analyses seek to overcome several 
limitations of previous research in this field. First, this analysis simultaneously investigates 
determinants of three interconnected aspects of inequality—market-generated inequality, 
redistribution, and state-mediated inequality—allowing us to develop a more complete 
understanding of income inequality in affluent democratic nations. Second, I conceptualize 
financialization as a multi-dimensional concept and examine the effects of three distinctive 
dimensions—FIRE employment, credit expansion, and financial crises. Third, I utilize error 
correction models, the state-of-the-art method for addressing common problems in 
macroeconomic time series analysis such as unit roots, autocorrelation, and heteroscedasticity 
(Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013). ECMs additionally allow me to determine whether 
neoliberalism and financialization impact income inequality through instantaneous, short-run, or 
long-run processes. Finally, I examine a broad array of 18 affluent capitalist democracies from 
1981 to 2011, which eclipses previous studies that were limited to fewer countries or shorter time 
frames.  
Table 4.7 provides an overview of the findings as they relate to my four hypotheses. I 
find support for 12 of the 12 specific hypotheses that I made regarding neoliberalism and 
financialization. Notably, while I find support for the general finding that financialization 
increases income inequality like other scholars (Zalewski and Whalen 2010; Tomaskovic-Devey 
and Lin 2011; Assa 2012; Arnum and Naples 2013), I show that it does so in a more multi-
dimensional and nuanced way than previous research. Also, on balance, the jackknife models 
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indicate that the findings for the neoliberal state and three financialization variables are relatively 
robust to the exclusion of individual countries from the models for MG and SM inequality; 
however, the results for redistribution were much less robust.  
Starting at the bottom of the table, I find that financial crises significantly increased MG 
inequality (Heathcoate et al.., 2010), redistribution, and SM inequality. The first and third 
findings were in accord with expectations, and the second is consistent with the welfare state 
stabilization hypothesis (Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl 2012). This suggests that financial crises do 
increase income inequality; however, welfare state policies that offer security and insurance to 
workers during crises kick in and reduce some, but not all, of the inequality. While extreme 
austerity may be common in some less developed nations (Harvey 2010), this does not seem to 
be the case for affluent nations. Social transfers, particularly generous systems of unemployment 
insurance in affluent European nations, drive much of the income stabilization process. As seen 
in the 2007-2009 recession, unemployment insurance is an important, and often 
underappreciated, component of the welfare state that provides security to workers in times of 
crisis. 
 Table 4.7: Comparing the Long-Run Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on 
Three Measures of Income Inequality in 18 Affluent Democracies, 1981-2011  
 Variable  MG Inequality  Redistribution  SM Inequality   
           
 Neoliberalism         
  Neoliberal State  +  -  +   
 Financialization         
  FIRE Employment  +  -  +   
  Credit Expansion  +  -  +   
  Financial Crisis  +  +  +   
                     
Note: "+" and "-" represent significant positive and negative findings from Tables 4.1, 
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Credit expansion has the most straightforward and easily interpretable effects as it has 
positive effects on MG and SM inequality but negative effects on redistribution. The circulation 
of credit from large investment banks to business organizations in the private sector is a primary 
channel by which inequality is exacerbated in affluent democracies in the era of financialization. 
It has allowed the wealthy to make speculative moves that can create great wealth for a select 
few while spreading out risk throughout the economy (Guttman 2008). This process has not been 
beneficial to average citizens that do not have a stake in financial markets or traders that do not 
have access to securities. Credit expansion is also associated with less redistribution. Further, 
credit expansion puts fiscal pressure on the state to reduce taxes and transfers, thus reducing 
redistribution, as firms lobby for business friendly policies and a neoliberal state to allow them to 
maximize their profits. Overall, this suggests that credit culture in the private sector contributes 
to rising inequality. 
I find that FIRE employment increases MG inequality (Moller et al.. 2009) and SM 
inequality. Because financial sector workers are compensated at rates higher than nonfinancial 
workers (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Wright and 
Rogers 2015), this creates inequality in market incomes. Further, as financial industries gain 
more power and influence in the market, their ability to shape policies in their favor increases. 
FIRE employment also reduces redistribution; however, the negative effect of FIRE employment 
on redistribution is questionable since it becomes nonsignificant when any one of seven 
countries are dropped from the jackknife models. It appears that the ability of FIRE employment 
to alter the redistributive process of the state is highly variable across the affluent democracies. 
The ability for financial workers and other wealthy stock traders to lobby for tax and transfer 
policies in their favor may vary widely across nations. Thus I suggest that further investigation of 
109 
 
the conditions under which FIRE employment either increases or decreases redistribution is a 
topic for future research. 
Finally, I find that the neoliberal state increases MG and SM inequality, as expected, and 
I find weak support that it reduces redistribution. The negative effect of the neoliberal state 
variable was marginally significant in model 5 of Table 4.3 and was nonsignificant in 5 of the 18 
jackknife models. Overall, this suggests that changes in the neoliberal state impact inequality 
primarily by generating more unequal market incomes. Its effect on redistribution seems to vary 
across countries, though. In some cases, the extreme market inequality created in very neoliberal 
states may force the welfare state to step in and reduce some of that extreme inequality. More 
often than not, however, the neoliberal state decreases redistribution and exacerbates inequality 
in the labor market. I encourage more research on this topic in the future. 
The second major question addressed in this chapter is whether neoliberalism and 
financialization impact income inequality and redistribution in the near term or in the long run. 
The neoliberal state only had long-term effects. Given that this is a policy-based and 
macroeconomic concept and measure, this is not too surprising. The effects of changes in the 
neoliberal state and their impacts on redistribution tend to occur gradually over several years. 
FIRE employment had instantaneous effects on MG and SM inequality, as well as long-run 
effects on MG inequality, redistribution, and SM inequality. Because FIRE employment is a 
labor market variable and fluctuations in FIRE employment have immediate implications for 
employment and income distribution, it is the only variable to have instantaneous effects. Credit 
expansion had a positive short-run effect on SM inequality, positive long-run effects on MG and 
SM inequality, and a negative long-run effect on redistribution. The financial crisis variable had 
a positive short-run effect on MG inequality, positive long-run effects on MG and SM inequality, 
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and a positive long-run effect on redistribution. Overall, this chapter shows that neoliberalism 
and financialization tend to impact income inequality and redistribution through long-term rather 
than short-term processes. 
In conclusion, this chapter raises an important point for future research: globalization has 
no doubt contributed to the rising income inequality in affluent nations; however, scholars should 
be as concerned with neoliberalism and financialization. I encourage scholars to join the 
theoretical debates about the impacts of financialization on inequality. As finance becomes a 
bigger player in the economy, these issues will grow in importance. I also encourage researchers 
to consider other avenues for measuring neoliberalism and financialization, as well as a broader 






CHAPTER 5: FREE MARKETS, FINANCE, AND FAT CATS: NEOLIBERALISM, 
FINANCIALIZATION, AND THE TOP 1% SHARE IN 18 AFFLUENT DEMOCRACIES 
5.1 Introduction 
Many scholars have noted a rise in the share of income and wealth controlled by the rich, 
particularly in the neoliberal era (Volscho and Kelly 2012; Picketty 2013; Picketty and Saez 
2015; Wright and Rogers 2015). While rising incomes for the rich are the general trend, the 
income shares for the rich have not been rising in all nations. In Figure 5.1, I display trends in the 
post-tax and post-transfer top 1% share of income for 18 affluent nations between 1981 and 
2011. Some nations, like Denmark and the Netherlands, have seen the top 1% share of income 
remain relatively stable over the 30-year period. Other nations, like Belgium, Finland, France, 
Italy, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland have seen relatively small but 
steady increases in the top 1% share. Australia, Canada, Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States have seen substantial increases in the top 1% share of income from 1981 to 
2011. The rise of top incomes in the United States has been particularly dramatic. Over the past 
few decades, the income shares of the top 1% in the United States have ballooned to levels not 
seen since the 1920s (Volscho and Kelly 2012). Despite variation, the top 1% share of income 
increased by an average of .08% per year during the period of 1981 to 2011. In this chapter, I 
shift the focus to examine how the incomes of the extremely wealthy are shaped by 
neoliberalism and financialization in 18 affluent nations from 1981 to 2011, which corresponds 




Figure 5.1: Trends in the Top 1% Share of Income in 18 Affluent Nations, 1981-2011 
 
Increasingly, scholars are interested in the factors shaping rising incomes for the rich, and 
the phenomena of neoliberalism and finance have been increasingly linked to rising top incomes 
in the United States (Volscho and Kelley 2012) and other affluent nations (Flaherty 2015). 
Flaherty’s (2015) study of the relationship between financialization and the top 1% share 
examined 14 OECD nations from 1990 to 2010 using a power resources framework that focuses 
on disparities between labor and capital caused by finance and policy. Conceptually, Flaherty 
(2015) examines several aspects of financialization. First, he examined the market capitalization 
of listed firms, which taps into the share volume and prices of companies listed on national stock 
exchanges. Second he looked at private sector credit, which I examine in this dissertation. Third 
he examined FIRE gross operating surplus, which represents the production activities and profits 
of financial firms as a percent of all sectors. And fourth, he looked at financial globalization, 
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which is a composite measure of assets and liabilities related to portfolio investment, foreign-
direct investment, financial derivatives, and other debt instruments. Flaherty’s top 1% share data 
comes from the World Wealth and Income Inequality Database (WWID), previously known as 
World Top Incomes Database (WTID). Overall, he found that financialization increases the top 
1% share, particularly the FIRE gross operating surplus variable; however, financialization’s 
impacts on the top 1% share are largely mediated by the bargaining power of capital relative to 
labor. 
In this chapter, I focus on one primary research question. How do neoliberalism and 
financialization impact the top 1% share of income in affluent nations? I improve upon previous 
research in several ways. First, I expand Flaherty’s sample of nations from 14 to 18 affluent 
nations with comparable and generalizable characteristics. Second, I examine the entire 
neoliberal period from 1981 to 2011. Third, despite losing some of the financialization concepts 
that Flaherty uses due to lack of data availability before 1990, I examine two aspects of 
financialization not examined by Flaherty: FIRE employment and financial crises. Fourth, I use 
error correction models (ECMs) with country-fixed effects to address the presence of unit roots 
and autocorrelation. As discussed in previous chapters, ECMs also have the advantage of being 
able to determine the timing of the effects of neoliberalism and financialization on the top 1% 
share. Finally, I use top 1% share data from the SWIID, which are based upon data from the 
World Wealth and Income Inequality Database (WWID), but improved by Solt (2009; 2013) to 
address concerns about cross-national comparability (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed 





5.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
I will briefly review the theory and hypotheses outlined in Chapter 2 about the 
relationships between neoliberalism, financialization, and the top 1% share during the neoliberal 
era. Neoliberalism, particularly policies related to the state, focuses on government spending and 
investments, decreasing top marginal tax rates, and government transfers through redistribution. 
These policies largely benefit the rich at the expense of others in society in several ways. First, 
many nations have seen a decline in government spending and investment (Kotz and 
McDonough 2010). While the rich can certainly benefit from government spending and 
investment, the well-being of the middle and working classes tend to be more positively affected 
because reduced government spending tends to increase unemployment and puts downward 
pressure on wages. Indeed, the average unemployment rates for France, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom nearly doubled in the transition from the previous SSA, segmentation, to the end of the 
neoliberal era.  
Second, the decline in top marginal tax rates for the rich in many nations has no doubt 
increased the incomes of the rich after taxes and transfers. The rich have been able to shift the 
taxation systems of many nations in their favor because they tend to participate more in the 
political process by lobbying, giving campaign donations (in nations that allow private 
donations), and through other means (Boyer 2010; Reich 2016). To better understand top 
marginal tax rates in affluent nations, it is important to distinguish between nominal and 
effective tax rates. Nominal tax rates are the tax rates that are the official tax rates that are in the 
books and are the rates that people are supposed to pay. Effective tax rates, on the other hand, are 




In the U.S., the nominal top marginal tax rate was approximately 90% in the 1960s under 
Eisenhower, a Republican president (Wright and Rogers 2015). Top marginal tax rates then 
steadily decreased under Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon to 35.5% in 1975. The top marginal tax 
rates were then dramatically reduced during the Reagan years to 26.7% in 1989. Clinton 
increased top marginal tax rates up to 39%; however, George W. Bush reduced them to 
approximately 33% during his tenure in office. Finally, President Obama increased top marginal 
tax rates to approximately 40%. 
While some of these nominal top marginal tax rates seem high, the effective tax rates of 
the rich are often much lower for a variety of reasons. For example, the wealthy in the United 
States make most of their income through capital gains (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2010; 
Wright and Rogers 2015), which is taxed at a much lower rate (around 15% currently). The 
wealthy can also reduce their tax burden through other subsidies and deductions, such as the 
deduction for contributing to charities or for paying off mortgages on homes. As a result, the 
effective income tax rates that the top 1% pay are often much lower than the top marginal tax 
rates. In response to lower taxes for the rich, the tax burden has largely been placed on the 
middle and working classes. For example, the United States’ income taxes for the median family 
were fairly constant between 1975 and 1990, hovering between 20 and 25% (Boyer 2015). 
While there is year-to-year variation across nations, similar downward trends in taxation 
for the wealthy occurred in nations like Belgium, Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom (Office of Tax Policy Research 2016). The 1980s and 1990s in particular saw 
very low taxation rates for the wealthy, with top marginal tax rates reaching an extreme low of 
11.5% in Switzerland between 1984 and 1996. Top marginal tax rates are highest in 
Scandinavian nations like Sweden and Finland, currently around 50%. 
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Third, social programs and public goods that supplement the incomes of the middle and 
working classes of affluent nations have slowly eroded over the past few decades, which have 
reduced their income shares relative to the top 1%. This is primarily due to fiscal constraints 
caused by declining tax revenue, which is tied to shifts in the tax burden from the wealthy to the 
middle class (Kotz and McDonough 2010). As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, programs like 
unemployment insurance, retirement pensions, disability insurance, and educational subsidies 
have increasingly faced cuts or have been eliminated. For the programs that remain, there is 
increased pressure from the ideological right to privatize them, which tends to exacerbate market 
inequalities. Scandinavian countries like Sweden, Norway, and Finland have largely resisted 
many of these changes, however. All in all, I predict that the historical movement toward 
neoliberalism in recent decades will result in larger income shares for the rich. For these reasons, 
I predict that:  
Hypothesis 5.1: The neoliberal state will increase the top 1% share. 
 Moving on financialization, the first concept is FIRE employment, which represents the 
size and economic and political power of the finance, insurance, and real estate industries. The 
literature suggests that FIRE employment, particularly in the financial industry, should increase 
the top 1% share for several reasons. First, financialization extracts rents from nonfinancial 
workers to disproportionately increase profits for firms and pay for top financial employees 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013). Indeed, the income 
growth for workers in the financial industry outpaced human capital and productivity gains for 
those same workers thus suggesting that financiers have disproportionately benefitted from 
economic growth over the past few decades. As revenues have grown rapidly for the financial 
sector, the incomes of the top 1% in highly financialized nations like the United States are 
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increasingly skewed by high incomes of CEOs and investment managers in commercial and 
investment banks, hedge funds, and other financial institutions (Raugh and Kaplan 2010). The 
United Kingdom, with its financial center being London, faced similar trends in growing wealth 
among financiers during the late 20th and early 21st centuries (Harvey 2010). While New York 
City and London have historically been the global centers of financial activity, many other 
nations have similar financial centers, such as Tokyo in Japan, Amsterdam in the Netherlands, 
and Paris in France. As financial activity intensifies in these global financial cities, the incomes 
and power of the top 1% tends to increase relative to everyone else as well (Sassen 2001).  
But FIRE employment is not simply a measure of employment: it represents the size and 
strength of the FIRE sector more generally. FIRE employment (and the compensation derived by 
FIRE sector workers) correlates with other key financial indicators like financial profits and 
market concentration in the banking sector (Wright and Rogers 2015), which tend to benefit the 
wealthy. As the financial sector grows in wages and profits, there is increased proclivity for 
firms to place primacy of the shareholder conception of the firm over the stakeholder conception. 
To review from Chapter 2, the shareholder conception of the firm means that management 
increasingly utilizes short-term planning that focuses on maximizing quarterly stock values and 
corporate profits instead of increasing the incomes and  livelihoods of their employees (Dobbin 
and Zorn 2005; Krier 2005). As a result, firms increasingly tried to minimize the costs of labor 
and other expenses in order to maximize profits, which satisfy investors and encourage 
investments in their stocks. These behaviors were encouraged in the United States and other 
affluent nations as CEO pay was increasingly tied to stock options instead of long-term market 
shares, sales, or production value (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). This led to ballooning 
CEO and managerial pay while the inflation-adjusted wages of the average worker remained 
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stagnant in highly financialized nations like the United States and United Kingdom (Wright and 
Rogers 2015). Taken together, this suggests that: 
Hypothesis 5.2: The percent of workers employed in FIRE industries will increase 
the top 1% share. 
 The second measure of financialization is credit expansion. As stated in Chapter 2, credit 
is a fundamental component of financialization because financial institutions play a vital role in 
both increasing and directing credit flows. Private sector credit growth, or credit related to the 
activities of banks and large corporations, tends to benefit the incomes of the wealthy for several 
reasons. Credit expansion tends to be accompanied by increased leverage, or rising levels of 
risky investments based on borrowed assets relative to capital reserves, which increases the 
variability in profits (Lapavitsas 2013). This creates the potential for much higher profits but also 
greater risk of larger losses—which now involve other people’s money. 
 Leveraging is a risky practice that can result in tidy gains; however, it spreads risk 
throughout the economy. The way that wealthy individuals and banks use leveraging is well-
illustrated by the following example adapted from Wright and Rogers (2015). Suppose there are 
two wealthy investors with $1,000,000 each in savings. Investor one buys $1,000,000 in stocks 
savings and then a year later, sells those stocks for $2,000,000. This investor made $1,000,000 in 
profits, or a 100% return on investment. Investor two, on the other hand, borrowed $900,000 and 
used $100,000 of his own money to buy $1,000,000 in stocks. When he sold the stocks for 
$2,000,000 a year later, he paid back the $900,000 loan plus $90,000 in interest. This gives you a 
profit of $910,000 (i.e., $2,000,000 minus the $900,000 loan and $90,000 interest and his 
original $100,000 investment), but now it is a 910% profit on his original investment of 
$100,000. By borrowing money on the original investment, the profit rates increase dramatically 
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assuming that the asset price goes up in value. If the prices of the investment decline, however, 
investor 2 would not have the money to pay back his loans and interest accumulation and would 
have to file for bankruptcy. If too many people use leverage and make bad deals, it can result in a 
financial crisis. So while increasing leverage and private sector credit can increase windfall 
profits for the financial sector and wealthy individuals investing in the stock market (Bank for 
International Settlements 2001; Borrio and Lowe 2002; Evans 2003), they also create potentially 
disastrous crises if speculative bubbles burst.  
Additionally, the wealthy typically insulate themselves from the risk caused by leveraged 
investments by using derivatives and other securities, which act as insurance for risky 
investments (Guttman 2008). The middle-class, on the other hand, typically do not have the 
money to buy securities for their investments, assuming they even own shares of stock, and thus 
are excluded from their protection. Risk caused by leveraging is often spread out across markets 
as debt gets packaged, rebundled, and traded among banks, which exposes the general public to 
the risky, leveraged behaviors of the wealthy. Data for derivatives and other securitized 
instruments is not widely available for the nations and years examined in this dissertation; 
however, private sector credit taps into these concepts because leveraging tended to increase with 
the deregulation of securities and other debt instruments (Guttman 2008). For these reasons: 
Hypothesis 5.3: The share of domestic credit provided to the private sector will increase 
the top 1% share. 
 While, the theoretical literature suggests that neoliberalism and financialization are 
largely beneficial to the rich, an overextension of leverage and other risky financial moves can 
become detrimental to the top 1%. Because leveraging creates an interlocking system of debt, 
financial crises can occur if markets begin to sour and prices fall. If financial markets get flooded 
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with too many risky investments and become unstable, then subsequent financial crises can cause 
the top 1% to temporarily face income losses because so much of their income is tied to capital 
gains (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2010).9 Indeed, the income losses of the rich tend to exceed 
those of the middle class and the poor thus decreasing the top 1% share (Picketty and Saez 2015; 
Saez 2015). This means that the middle class and poor do face losses; however, the rich are 
bigger losers in financial crises than the middle class and poor. While the risks associated with 
financial crises can be mitigated through derivatives and other securities, the top 1% still tends to 
face losses as derivatives only provide partial insurance for investments. As a result: 
Hypothesis 5.4: Financial crises will decrease the top 1% share. 
In the next section, I present the error correction models predicting the effects of 
neoliberalism and financialization on the top 1% share in 18 affluent capitalist democracies. 
First, I estimate the instantaneous and short-run effects using single-equation error correction 
models. I then use the Bewley transformation to estimate the long-run effects. In this chapter, I 
present tables for instantaneous, short-run, and long-run effects because there are a number of 
significant coefficients for each type of effect because the top 1% share has more annual 
variation than the Gini indices used in Chapter 4. In Chapter 4, I only presented tables for the 
long-run effects while briefly discussing the instantaneous and short-run effects. This is because 
there were very few instantaneous and short-run effects while there were a number of long-run 
effects. This is not surprising given that the Gini indices are less volatile and tend to have less 
variation from year to year. Finally, to anticipate the results for the reader, there are stronger 
                                                          
9 In countries like the United States, the rich tend to recover more quickly from financial losses than the 
general public (Picketty and Saez 2015; Saez 2015). The ECM analyses of Chapter 5 do not allow me to 
examine the recovery of top incomes, however. 
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findings for long-run effects for the top 1% while there are weaker effects for instantaneous and 
short-run effects. As a result, I present jackknife models for the long-run effects alone. 
5.3 Results 
 In Table 5.1, I present the results for the instantaneous effects of selected variables on the 
top 1% share in 18 affluent democracies between 1981 and 2011. These results show how a unit 
change in the independent variables impacts the rate of change in the top 1% share 
instantaneously—that is, during the same year. The error-correction rates are presented at the 
bottom of the table, and they range between -.332 and -.278. While error correction rates are also 
shown in Table 5.1, they are most relevant to the long-run effects therefore I will discuss them in 




Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate  0.061  0.059   0.057 0.051 0.058
(0.039) (0.041) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040)
Economic growth  0.051**  0.059**  0.061**  0.043*  0.043*  
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Government employment  0.150*   0.156*   0.148*  0.159*  0.174*  
(0.068) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068)
Union density -0.046  -0.062+  -0.063+  -0.058+ -0.043   
(0.033) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033)
Imports  0.012   0.007   0.007   0.008   0.008   
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Inward FDI   0.004    0.004     0.005   0.004   0.004   
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Neoliberal State  0.364**                               0.374** 
(0.114)                              (0.115)
FIRE employment           0.046                   0.064
          (0.058)                   (0.055)
Credit expansion                        0.002            0.002   
                     (0.002)          (0.002)
Financial crisis                               -0.124+ -0.089   
                              (0.071) (0.069)
Error-correction rate  -0.309*** -0.285*** -0.280***  -0.278*** -0.332***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062)
Constant  -2.453**  -0.036    1.843*   1.774**  -6.036***
(0.881) (0.699) (0.914) (0.603) (0.947)
R
2
0.226 0.204 0.204 0.212 0.243
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Table 5.1: Instantaneous Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on the Top 1% 







Labor market structure 
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Among the control variables, I find that unemployment, imports, and inward FDI have no 
effect on the top 1% share in all five models. Economic growth is associated with an increase in 
the rate of change for the top 1% income shares during the same year which shows that the rich 
benefit the most when the economy grows and supports the finding from Chapter 4 that 
economic growth increases income inequality. Somewhat surprisingly, government employment 
is associated with an increase in the rate of change for the shares of the top 1% in all five models. 
There are several possible explanations for this finding. One possibility is that the production of 
transportation and communication infrastructure, as well as other public goods, actually benefits 
the rich, despite the ideological complaints to the contrary. Alternatively, the effect of 
government employment is perhaps a result of controlling for a variety of other factors that are 
correlated with government employment, such as union density, unemployment, and 
neoliberalism, which may be explaining away the expected negative effect. Union density has a 
negative and marginally significant effect on the top 1% share in models 2-4; however, it is non-
significant in models 1 and 5. This suggests that union density may reduce the top 1% share as 
one would expect; however, unions appear to affect inequality through their influence (or lack 
thereof) in shaping the direction of the neoliberal state. In periods of union strength, they put 
pressure on governments to increase social spending and services, which largely benefit workers 
and less affluent citizens. 
Among the key variables of interest, more neoliberalized states are associated with an 
instantaneous increase in the rate of change in the top 1% share in models 1 and 5, which 
supports Hypothesis 5.1. For a one-unit increase in the neoliberal state, the top 1% share is 
expected to increase by .364% during that same year in model 1. Even after adding the 
financialization variables to the models, the predicted instantaneous effect of the neoliberal state 
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remains positive and significant in model 5. This suggests that reductions in state size and 
capacity provide immediate economic benefits to the affluent. As shown in models 2, 3, and 5, 
FIRE employment and credit expansion do not have immediate impacts on the top 1% share, 
however. Financial crises have a marginally significant negative effect on the rate of change in 
the top 1% share in model 4, thus providing some support for Hypothesis 5.4. This effect, 
however, no longer remains significant in model 5 after other key independent variables are 
included. Thus, the affluent experience an instantaneous drop in their share of income in the 
years affected by financial crises. 
In Table 5.2, I present the short-run effects for the selected variables on the top 1% share. 
Short-run effects predict how a one-unit change in the value of the independent variable last year 
impacts the change in the top 1% share this year, holding all other variables constant. Among the 
controls, unemployment, imports, and inward FDI have no significant effects on the top 1% 
share over the short run. Similar to what I found in the instantaneous effects, economic growth 
increase the rate of change in the top 1% share over the short run. These findings provide 
additional support that economic growth disproportionately benefits the affluent. As I found in 
the instantaneous effects, government employment is associated with an increase in the rate of 
change of the top 1% share of income. This provides further evidence that government 
employment may help the rich despite ideological views suggesting otherwise. Union density 
primarily decreases the rate of change in the top 1% share over the short run. In models 1, 3, and 
4, it has a marginally significant negative effect, and it has a significant negative effect in model 
2, as one would expect. But union density’s effect is nonsignificant in model 5. This suggests 
that unions decrease the top 1% share, but they do so through their ability to limit the impacts of 




Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate  0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.013 -0.004
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Economic growth  0.055*   0.068*  0.073**  0.054*   0.057*  
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Government employment  0.125*   0.123*  0.113*   0.106*   0.139** 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.048) (0.049) (0.051)
Union density  -0.022+   -0.031* -0.024+  -0.023+  -0.018   
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Imports  0.010   -0.001 -0.001    0.002    0.008   
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Inward FDI -0.002   -0.002 -0.001   -0.002   -0.001   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Neoliberal State  0.180+                                 0.190+  
(0.096)                               (0.098)
FIRE employment           0.067                        0.091+  
          (0.044)                       (0.048)
Credit expansion                    0.002               0.004** 
                  (0.001)            (0.002)
Financial crisis                              -0.249*  -0.223*  
                             (0.106) (0.105)
Error-correction rate -0.309*** -0.285*** -0.280*** -0.278*** -0.332***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062)
Constant -2.453** -0.036  1.843*  1.774** -6.036***
(0.881) (0.699) (0.914) (0.603) (0.947)
R
2
0.226 0.204 0.204 0.212 0.243
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Table 5.2: Short-Run Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on the Top 1% 










Among the key independent variables, higher values of the neoliberal state are marginally 
associated with an increase in the rate of change in the top 1% share in the short run. A one-unit 
increase in the neoliberal state index is predicted to increase the top 1% share by .180% after one 
year, holding all other variables constant. This marginally significant effect is relatively robust 
after controlling for the other key independent variables. This provides additional qualified 
support for Hypothesis 5.1.  Among the financialization variables, FIRE employment does not 
have a significant effect on the top 1% share over the short run in model 2. After accounting for 
the other key independent variables, it does have a marginally significant positive effect in model 
5. This provides some evidence for Hypothesis 5.2 and suggests that growth in FIRE 
employment associated with higher income shares for the top 1%. This finding should be viewed 
with caution given that it is only marginally significant. In model 3, one sees that credit 
expansion does not have a short-run impact on the top 1% share; however, it does have a 
significant positive effect after including the other key independent variables in model 5. This 
finding supports Hypothesis 5.3. A one-percent increase in private sector credit as a percent of 
GDP is predicted to increase the top 1% share by .004%, holding all other variables constant. 
One should note that credit expansion ranges between 23% and 329% in the descriptive statistics 
so this variable can have potentially substantial impacts depending on its year-to-year variation. 
The effect of a financial crises on the top 1% share is robust across models 4 and 5, however. In 
model 4, financial crises and their aftermaths are predicted to reduce the rate of change in the top 
1% share of income by .249% in the following year, holding all other variables constant. This 
effect is robust even after controlling for the other neoliberalism and financialization variables, 
and it provides evidence to support Hypothesis 5.4. 
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Finally, I present the long-run effects for the selected variables on the top 1% share in 
Table 5.3. Among the control variables, unemployment does not have a significant long-run 
impact on the top 1% share in models 1, 2, 3, and 5; however, it does have a significant negative 
long-run effect in model 4, which includes the controls and the financial crisis variable. 
Economic growth, government employment, and imports are all associated with larger shares for 
the top 1% shares over the long run. As one would predict from other research, union density is 
associated with smaller top 1% shares over the long run. Finally, inward FDI has a significant 
negative effect on the top 1% share over the long run and suggests that inward FDI actually hurts 




Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate  0.003 -0.010   -0.027  -0.048** -0.013
(0.016) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.017)
Economic growth  0.179***  0.239***  0.184***  0.196***  0.172***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.038) (0.028) (0.029)
Government employment  0.406***  0.431***  0.385***  0.381***  0.419***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.057) (0.046) (0.046)
Union density  -0.070***  -0.110***  -0.084***  -0.081*** -0.054***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
Imports  0.032**  -0.004 -0.012     0.006    0.025*  
(0.012) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
Inward FDI -0.007***  -0.006*** -0.004+    -0.006*** -0.004*  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Neoliberal State  0.582***                                   0.573***
(0.091)                                  (0.092)
FIRE employment             0.236***                         0.273***
           (0.042)                        (0.046)
Credit expansion                       0.006**              0.013***
                     (0.002)            (0.002)
Financial crisis                                  -0.894*** -0.672***
                                 (0.124) (0.119)
Error-correction rate -0.309*** -0.285*** -0.280***  -0.278*** -0.332***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (0.062)
Constant -2.453** -0.036  1.843*   1.774** -6.036***
(0.881) (0.699) (0.914) (0.603) (0.947)
R
2
0.226 0.204 0.204 0.212 0.243
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Table 5.3: Long-Run Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on the Top 1% 
Share in 18 Affluent Democracies, 1981-2011  (N=540)
Variable Model 1 Model 3
Financialization
Business cycle





Among the key independent variables, the neoliberal state significantly increases the top 
1% share over the long run, thus finding support for Hypothesis 5.1. In model 1, a one-unit 
increase in the neoliberal state index is predicted to increase the top 1% by .582% over the long 
run, holding the control variables constant. This finding is robust after controlling for the other 
key independent variables in model 5.  
The three measures of financialization also have significant impacts on the top 1% share 
over the long run. Higher levels of FIRE employment are associated with an increase in the top 
1% share in models 2 and 5, which supports Hypothesis 5.2. In model 2, one can see that a 1% 
increase in FIRE employment increases the top 1% share by .236%, holding the control variables 
constant. As finance, insurance, and real estate sectors grow in employment size and gain more 
market power and political clout, the wealthy tend to do better. Credit expansion is positively 
associated with the top 1% share over the long run in models 3 and 5, which supports Hypothesis 
5.3. A 1% increase in private sector credit relative to GDP is associated with an increase in the 
top 1% by .006% over the long run in model 3. As banks and large private enterprises increase 
their credit and leverage, incomes of the rich increase as debt-fueled activities lead to potentially 
lucrative profits. Finally, financial crises are associated with lower top 1% shares over the long 
run in models 4 and 5, which supports Hypothesis 5.4. For a one-unit increase in the financial 
crises variable, the top 1% share decreases by .894% in model 4. So while credit expansion and 
leveraging can increase the incomes for the top 1%, the rich can face income loss if the amount 
of risky investments in the economy reach unstable levels thus resulting in a financial crisis.  
The final things to note are the error correction rates at the bottom of the table, which 
vary between -0.332 and -0.278 in models 1 through 5. These are the same error-correction rates 
from Tables 5.1 and 5.2 because error-correction rates are estimated in the instantaneous and 
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short-run effect ECM models. However, they are most relevant to the long-run effects because 
they reveal how quickly long-run effects impact the top 1% share. To remind the reader, the error 
correction rate is the rate at which an economic shock causes the time series trend to correct, or 
readjust, after being affected by a covariate like an economic crisis in the next year. For example, 
if one has an error correction rate of -0.332 (which occurred in model 5 in Table 5.1 and is a 
relatively high value), then 33.2% of the initial shock will adjust after the first year, then 33.2% 
of what remains in the second year, then 33.2% of what remains in the third year, and so on. As a 
result, the effects of the covariates in the instantaneous model are relatively short-lived and 
dissipate quickly. In comparison to those in Chapter 4, which varied between -.258 and -1.62, 
economic shocks create shorter and deeper impacts to the top 1% share than they do MG 
inequality, redistribution, or SM inequality. 
Finally, I ran jackknife models of the long-run effects as a robustness check of the 
findings. I only focus on the long-run effects because they had the most significant findings and 
are most relevant to the theory. I estimated 18 sets of jackknife models by dropping one nation at 
a time from each set of models to determine if a particular nation is driving the findings. I then 
present the high and low values of the coefficients in the table. Additionally, I present the 
number of models that were discordant, defined as those that were nonsignificant or had 
coefficients in the opposite direction. I use model 5 from table 5.3 ECM model as the reference 
point.  
In Table 5.4, I present the results for the jackknife models of the long-run effects for 
neoliberalism and financialization predicting the top 1% share as a robustness check of the 
findings. Overall, the results for the long-run effects for neoliberalism and financialization are 
very robust in all of the jackknife models. For all four variables, there is not a single country that 
131 
 
when dropped causes the coefficients to become nonsignificant, thus providing strong evidence 
these results are consistent across all countries in the models. The coefficients for the neoliberal 
state range from .193 for the jackknife model dropping New Zealand and .663 for the model 
dropping Finland showing that neoliberalism is good for the rich over the long run. For FIRE 
employment, the coefficients range between .211 for the jackknife models that drop New 
Zealand and .304 for the models that drop Germany. The regression coefficients for credit 
expansion range between .007 for the model dropping the United States and .016 for the model 
dropping Germany. Finally, the coefficients for financial crises range between -.993 for the 
model dropping New Zealand and -.353 for the model dropping the United States. So while there 
are variations in the coefficients for the jackknife models depending on which country is 





Table 5.4. Jackknife Models of The Long-Run Effects Predicting the Top 1% Share 
 Full ECM Jackknife Low Jackknife High Discordant 
Models
a Variable Coefficient Coefficient Country Coefficient Country 
Neoliberalism       
Neoliberal State      0.573***      0.193* New 0.663*** Finland 0 
     (0.092)        (0.096) Zealand  (0.108)   
Financialization       
FIRE Employment      0.273***      0.211***  New 0.304*** Germany 0 
     (0.046)        (0.044) Zealand  (0.048)   
Credit Expansion      0.013***      0.007*** United   0.016*** Germany 0 
     (0.002)       (0.001) States  (0.002)   
Financial Crisis      -0.672***      -0.993*** New -0.356***  United 0 
     (0.119)        (0.133) Zealand  (0.116) States  
       
N       540       510     510   
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests). 
a—Number of country models with non-significant results from the jackknife analyses (out of a possible 18) at p < .10. “NA” 
means that the coefficient was not significant in the full model. 
Panel-Corrected AR1 Standard Errors in parentheses.  





5.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
 While Chapter 4 showed us how neoliberalism and financialization impacts income 
inequality and redistribution, Chapter 5 focuses on how these factors affect the top 1%, or the 
economic elite of nations, during the neoliberal era. This chapter examines the research 
questions: How does neoliberalism and financialization impact the top 1% share of income in 
affluent nations? In Table 5.5, I summarize the results from the analyses in Tables 5.1 to 5.4. 
Like Volscho and Kelley (2012) and Flaherty (2015), I find support that neoliberal policies and 
financialization, two of the dominant trends of the neoliberal SSA, have contributed to rising 
incomes for the top 1%. There are several new insights provided by the analyses. Below, I 
discuss the main contributions of this chapter to the literature on top incomes. 
 
First, I find that the neoliberal state increases the top 1% through instantaneous, short-
run, and long-run processes. Thus, neoliberal policies provide immediate increases to top 
incomes, as well as more long-term benefits. In other words, neoliberal countries enhance the 
bank accounts of the rich in a multi-faceted way, highlighting the benefits of error correction 
 Table 5.5: Comparing the Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on the Top 
1% Share of Income in 18 Affluent Democracies, 1981-2011  









           
 Neoliberalism         
  Neoliberal State  +  +  +   
 Financialization         
  FIRE Employment  0  +  +   
  Credit Expansion  0  +  +   
  Financial Crisis  0  -  -   
                     
Note: "+" and "-" represent significant positive and negative findings from Tables 5.1, 
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models. As the movement towards neoliberalism seems to be the trend in many affluent nations, 
one would expect that the economic power of the rich will also increase. Others, like Boyer 
(2010) and Reich (2016), have warned of the increasing political power that elites gain as 
economic inequality increases, which allow them to promote even more neoliberal policies, such 
as reduced top marginal tax rates and the provision of less public goods and services, to further 
entrench their wealth. These trends can create a feedback loop as increased economic capital 
leads to increased political capital that can further allow the rich to set the rules of the game in 
their favor. Ultimately, this process can threaten democracy as we know it as democratic 
societies are subverted into plutocracies. For those concerned with rising inequality and the 
corruption of politics by the wealthy, a movement away from neoliberal policies is likely 
necessary. 
 Second, FIRE employment is associated with higher top 1% shares in the short-run and 
long-run. While FIRE employment had an instantaneous effect on MG inequality in Chapter 4, 
no instantaneous effect is present for the top 1% share. This signals that FIRE employment 
increases top incomes less by changing the labor market composition of national economies and 
more as being representative of the economic and political power of the FIRE sector, 
exemplified by the shareholder conception of the firm (Dobbin and Zorn 2005; Krier 2005). As 
finance becomes more influential in shaping profits of national economies, one can expect that 
firms will increasingly value stock prices over the livelihood of stakeholders, like workers. If 
unchecked, one can expect that the incomes of the rich will continue to blossom. 
I also find that credit expansion contributes to economic inequality by increasing the 
incomes of the top 1% over the short run and long run. As the private sector relies more on credit 
and leveraging, the rich tend to capitalize on the climate of profit variability and speculative 
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bubbles induced by these processes (Bank for International Settlements 2001; Borrio and Lowe 
2002; Evans 2003). While speculation can increase profits due to windfall profits, it can also lead 
to major losses for the wealthy. Through derivatives and other securities, the wealthy hedge their 
bets and provide insurance to offset potential losses (Guttman 2008). The deregulation of 
securities markets thus incentivizes the rich to increasingly use leverage as a tool of capital 
accumulation. While the wealthy can insure some of their losses through securities, the middle 
class typically lacks access to those financial instruments, which contributes to rising incomes 
for the wealthy relative to everyone else. 
Credit-fueled activities come with some risk for the rich, however. If speculative bubbles 
burst and create a financial crisis like a stock market crash, the rich see their incomes decrease 
over the short run and the long run. The short-run effect means that the rich take a hit following 
the years affected by financial crisis. The error correction rates and the long-run effects illustrate 
that the rich continue to take small but significant reductions in their income shares for several 
years following a crisis, as well. This occurs because the incomes of the rich are increasingly tied 
to capital gains and the stock market during the neoliberal era (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 
2010). While the recoveries of the incomes of the wealthy tend to be quick during financial 
crises in the United States (Picketty and Saez 2015; Saez 2015), the incomes of the rich tend to 
return to normal more slowly net of economic growth and the other measures controlled for in 
this analysis. The recoveries that the rich see after a crisis are likely connected to economic 
growth increasing the incomes of the top 1% through instantaneous, short-run, and long-run 
effects in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. 
 The findings in this chapter raise an interesting policy issue. As it stands, neoliberal 
policies and the deregulation of finance have allowed the rich in some nations to see their 
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incomes rise to heights not seen in decades. Those same policies, such as relaxed restrictions on 
credit and leveraging resulting in potentially lucrative speculative bubbles and windfall profits, 
can actually temporarily hurt the incomes of the rich when the system comes tumbling down in 
financial crisis. Policy-makers need to think about increased regulation of financial activities if 
they want to curtail the economic and political power of the financial elite. At the moment, the 
potential gains of the rich through risky and speculative activities such as leveraging far 
outweigh the potential losses caused by financial crises. Additionally, derivatives and other 
securities allow the wealthy to hedge their losses and provides some insurance for them. Even 
when losses occur, economic growth (as I show in this chapter), as well as the recoveries from 
recessions, tend to disproportionately benefit the affluent. As a result, it is not surprising that 
speculation and risky activities that threaten the economies of affluent nations continue to occur 
even so shortly after many countries have come out of the greatest recession since the 1920s.  
While some nations have passed laws to increase regulation over finance, such as the Dodd-
Frank Bill in the United States, the Financial Services Act of 2012 in the United Kingdom, and a 
series of financial regulation laws passed in Germany, these laws have been slowly eroded as 
restrictions on certain types of financial activities have gradually retrenched. Others argue that 
they did not go far enough in the first place. This has many wondering not only if we will be 
moving into a new Gilded Age when there is so much difference between the fate of the rich and 
the rest of the population, but also if we may be recklessly triggering future financial crises that 
could have even more devastating effects on the global economy than the one of 2007 to 2009. 
Given that the dominant SSA in affluent nations has not fundamentally changed since the Great 
Recession and that the long-term repercussions to the rich do not yet outweigh their downsides, 
future crises could  become commonplace. 
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In conclusion, this chapter explored some of the main factors driving income gains for 
the top 1% during the neoliberal era. In summary, much like Volscho and Kelly (2012) and 
Flaherty (2015), I find that neoliberalism and financialization, two of the dominant modes of 
accumulation in the neoliberal SSA, increase the income shares for the top 1%. Unlike these two 
previous studies, I show that FIRE employment and financial crises, two relatively unexamined 
factors, also shape incomes for the rich. Additionally, I show that these effects occur through a 
combination of instantaneous, short-run and long-run processes, which can be masked in other 
types of analyses that do not utilize ECMs. In Chapter 6, I explore who is losing out to the rich 
during the neoliberal era as a result of neoliberalism and financialization. Is income inequality 
being driven primarily by upper-tail inequality, lower-tail inequality, or a combination or both? 
That is, are the incomes of the rich outpacing those of the middle class and the poor? Or are the 
incomes of the middle class, although stagnant or even in decline in many affluent countries, still 
outpacing the incomes of an increasingly destitute poor, thus increasing lower-tail inequality? 
These findings will help to create a clearer picture about how the income distribution is changing 
during the neoliberal era and why. 
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CHAPTER 6: RISING INCOMES FOR THE RICH AT THE EXPENSE OF WHOM? 
NEOLIBERALISM, FINANCIALIZATION, AND UPPER-TAIL, LOWER-TAIL, AND 
TOP-BOTTOM INCOME INEQUALITY 
6.1 Introduction 
In many affluent nations, the rich have become richer while the poor and the middle class 
have been increasingly left behind (Volscho and Kelley 2012; Flaherty 2015; Wright and Rogers 
2015; Picketty and Saez 2015). In this chapter, I explore how neoliberalism and financialization 
have impacted different parts of the income distribution using data from the Luxembourg Income 
Study. Chapter 4 established that neoliberalism and financialization increase income inequality 
by primarily increasing variation in market incomes and reducing redistribution of income 
through taxes and transfers, which leads to more inequality in the disposable incomes that many 
families in affluent nations receive. Chapter 5 established that the top 1% are big winners due to 
neoliberalism and financialization; however, it is unclear who is losing out to the rich as a result 
of neoliberalism and financialization. To date there have been no comparative studies using a 
wide range of affluent countries that have examined how neoliberalism and financialization 
impact different parts of the income distribution other than the top 1% share (Volscho and Kelly 
2012; Flaherty 2015; see Wallace, Gauchat, and Fullerton 2012 for a study of economic 
globalization and upper-tail and lower-tail inequality in U.S. metropolitan areas). This chapter 
fills this gap in the literature by examining three parts of the income distribution: a) upper-tail 
inequality, which is measured as the 90-50 income ratio; b) lower-tail inequality, which is 
measured as the 50-10 income ratio; and c) top-bottom inequality, which is measured as the 90-
10 income ratio. 
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 While the Gini index, the most popular and serviceable measure of income inequality, is 
excellent for describing what is going on in the middle of the income distribution, it is not very 
effective at capturing changes in the tails of the distribution (Atkinson 1970; Volscho and 
Fullerton 2005:1328). In an effort to more fully capture the dynamics of the income distribution, 
researchers are increasingly embracing different measures of income inequality as a means to 
determine what is happening in different parts of the distribution. I explore three of these 
measures in this chapter of the dissertation. Upper-tail inequality represents inequality between 
the very affluent, measured as the 90th income percentile, and the median worker, measured as 
the 50th percentile. The 50th percentile serves as an approximation of middle class income. 
Lower-tail inequality represents inequality between the median worker and the poor, measured 
as the 10th percentile.  
It is important to distinguish the differences between the top 1% and top 10%, or the 90th 
percentile, of the income distribution. In his 2013 documentary film Inequality for All, Robert 
Reich effectively captures this distinction in his discussion of the occupations and income 
sources of different parts of the income distribution. The top 1% represent CEOs, top managers, 
financiers, athletes, and pop culture icons and tend to acquire most of their income through 
capital gains. The 90th percentile, or the top 10%, also includes professionals such as doctors, 
lawyers, and dentists, as well as managers in small and large firms. While some of their income 
comes from capital gains, they are much less reliant on capital gains and tend to make most of 
their money from salaries and bonuses.  
The differences in occupations and income sources for the 50th and 10th percentiles 
relative to the 90th percentile are more dramatic. The 50th percentile, or the median worker, 
represents the middle class (Wright and Rogers 2015). These households tend to hold white 
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collar jobs that require a college degree. In nations where unions are strong, the 50th percentile 
may also be in blue collar manufacturing jobs. The 10th percentile represents the poor. These 
individuals may work in jobs with low-skill requirements and low pay and may depend on 
government assistance to make ends meet. By examining the three parts of the income 
distribution, we gain a more comprehensive view of what parts of the income distribution are 
impacted by changes in inequality. 
In the United States, upper- and lower-tail inequality increased simultaneously during the 
early 1980s (Neckerman and Torche 2007). By 1987, lower-tail inequality slowed and contracted 
slightly during the 1990s while upper-tail inequality continued to rise (Atkinson 2003; Blau and 
Kahn 2002; Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto 2005). Previous research has shown that the rise of 
lower-tail inequality during the 1980s and its stalling in the 1990s were tied to changes in the 
minimum wage adjusted for inflation (Card and Dinardo 2002; Lee 1999; Lemieux 2006). 
Factors related to rising upper-tail inequality in the United States include the decline of union 
membership (Card et al 2004), the shift of employment from manufacturing to services, 
deregulation in many industries, a rise in contingent labor (Berhardt et al 2001; Fligstein and 
Shin 2004; and Morgan and Cha 2007), economic globalization (Wallace, Gauchat and Fullerton 
2011), and the rise of shareholder value over stakeholder value, which is a component of 
financialization (Fligstein and Shin 2004). Other components of neoliberalism and 
financialization have been understudied; in addition, there is no current cross-national research 
examining the impacts of neoliberalism and financialization on upper- and lower-tail inequality.  
While upper-tail inequality increased in many nations during the neoliberal era, there is 
variation across countries. In Figure 6.1, trends in upper-tail inequality are presented. There are 
three important things to note from this figure. First, as discussed in Chapter 3, there are 
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relatively few data points in these scatterplots due to the small sample size, and there are 
different numbers of observations by nation due to the unbalanced panel design. Second, there 
are dramatic differences in the levels of inequality by nation. For example, countries like the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia have relatively high levels of upper-tail inequality. 
Countries like France, Germany, and Canada are in the middle range. Finally, nations like 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway had relatively low levels of upper-tail inequality. Third, the 
small number of data points and the erratic pattern of years represented within make it difficult to 
offer a conclusive statement about time trends within countries. Among the 16 nations, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States all experienced upward trends in upper-tail inequality. Other nations, like Denmark, 
France, and Netherlands had relatively stable levels of upper-tail inequality during the period. 
Italy ended the period with approximately the same level of upper-tail inequality as when it 
began despite fluctuation in the intervening years. Ireland and Switzerland saw decreasing levels 
of upper-tail inequality. On the whole, much of the variation in upper-tail inequality is between 
nations rather than within nations. In many ways, this particular finding suggests that it is 
important to account for country-level differences in the estimation of models for upper-tail 
inequality.  Additionally, the very affluent have left the median worker behind in many affluent 
nations; however, there was fluctuation between nations. Finally, on average, there appears to be 




Figure 6.1: Trends in the Upper-Tail Inequality in 16 Affluent Nations, 1981-2011 
 
 
 There is a different pattern for lower-tail inequality in the 16 nations from 1981 to 2011, 
which is presented in Figure 6.2. Again, it is important to note both the between country and 
within country variation. First, there is greater between country variation in lower-tail inequality 
compared to upper-tail inequality. The United States had by far the most lower-tail inequality 
over the period followed by Canada and Australia. Italy, Ireland, and the United Kingdom were 
in the middle range. The rest of the nations tended to have lower values, with Sweden, 
Netherlands, and Finland having the lowest values. Lower-tail inequality actually decreased in 
the United States from 1981 to 2011 partially due to increases in the minimum wage, which have 
increased the incomes for those at the bottom of the income distribution (Neckerman and Torche 
2007). Despite decreasing lower-tail inequality, the United States still had the highest lower-tail 
inequality of the neoliberal era. Several other nations, like Denmark and France, also saw 
decreasing lower-tail inequality over the period. Nations like Australia, Canada, Netherlands, 
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Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland saw lower-tail inequality stay relatively stable over the 
period. Other nations like Austria, Ireland, and the United Kingdom experienced rising lower-tail 
inequality leading up to the mid-1990s and decreasing inequality afterwards. Finally, nations like 
Finland, Italy, and Germany saw rising lower-tail inequality during the neoliberal era. While 
upper-tail inequality may have been driving most of the inequality in affluent nations during the 
1990s onward, the trends of lower-tail inequality show that the gap between the median worker 
and poor followed very different patterns across nations. Overall, there appears to be a positive 
curvilinear pattern in these data; however, this pattern varies by country. 
Figure 6.2: Trends in the Lower-Tail Inequality in 16 Affluent Nations, 1981-2011
 
 
 Finally, I present the trends for top-bottom inequality, or the income ratios between the 
90th and 10th percentiles, in Figure 6.3. Again, it is important to notice the levels and trends in these 
data. First, the United States has the most top-bottom inequality followed by Australia, the United 
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Kingdom, Canada, and Ireland. Most of the other countries fall into the middle range, except 
Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, and Finland, which have relatively low values. Second, 
there is variation in the trends of these nations. Top-bottom inequality increased in Australia, 
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Top-bottom 
inequality stayed level in several countries, like Austria, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, and 
Switzerland, despite fluctuations. There was a decreasing gap between the very affluent and the 
poor in Denmark, France, and Ireland. While the neoliberal era is often characterized as having 
rising inequality between the very affluent and the poor in affluent nations, this generalization is 
only true for some nations. For 9 of the 16 nations in this sample, this characterization is 
misleading. Much like upper- and lower-tail inequality, there appears to be a slight curvilinear 
relationship between top-bottom inequality and time. 




 Beyond fluctuations in the business cycle, labor market transformations, and 
globalization, this chapter explores the following research question: How have neoliberalism and 
financialization contributed to the variation in upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality 
in 16 affluent nations from 1981 to 2011? While Chapter 5 established that neoliberalism and 
two of the three components of financialization—FIRE employment and credit expansion—
increase the incomes for big winners in the income distribution sweepstakes, the top 1%, this 
chapter explores the incomes of the losers in this scenario. As discussed previously, the top 1% 
and the 90th percentile are not exactly the same group (although of course the top 10% includes 
the top 1%): they are distinguished by their occupations and sources of income. Instead, this 
chapter examines the interconnections of the incomes for the 90th percentile, or the very affluent, 
the 50th and the 10th percentiles by examining three questions: First, has neoliberalism and 
financialization contributed to upper-tail inequality by increasing incomes for the very affluent 
and undercutting wages for workers in the middle of the income distribution in an effort to cut 
labor costs and maximize shareholder value (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011)? Second, has 
neoliberalism and financialization caused the poor to fall behind the middle class as low-wage 
service jobs increase as a proportion of total employment in order to cater to the needs of the 
financial elite (Moller et al. 2009) and social services and programs that supplement the incomes 
of the poor are undercut (Kotz and McDonough 2010)? And third, have neoliberalism and 
financialization contributed to top-bottom inequality by increasing incomes for those at the top 
while disproportionately reducing incomes for the poor? It is important to note that these 
questions are not mutually exclusive. 
In the next section, I describe the theoretical literature and hypotheses linking 
neoliberalism and financialization to upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom income inequality. I 
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then use data from the Luxembourg Income Study and CWS to empirically examine these 
relationships. 
6.2 Theory and Hypotheses 
While there is a dearth of empirical research relating the processes of neoliberalism and 
financialization to upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality, there is substantial 
theoretical and historical work that is useful for developing hypotheses about these relationships. 
Neoliberalism, particularly the neoliberal state, can impact upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom 
inequality in a variety of ways. A key component of neoliberalism is reduced taxes, particularly 
for the affluent and rich (Kotz and McDonough 2010), which benefits the 90th income 
percentile’s incomes after taxes. Additionally, the reduction of government spending and 
investment can reduce the incomes for the middle class and the poor after taxes and transfers. 
Government employment and investment in research provides many middle class families stable, 
middle-wage incomes that might not be provided by the free market due to underutilized demand 
(Volscho and Fullerton 2005). Finally, the reduction of government spending, public goods, and 
social services can have devastating impacts on the incomes of the poor (Wright and Rogers 
2015). While the 10th percentile does acquire some of its income from wage labor, many 
households at this income level also rely on government programs to help make ends meet and to 
improve the quality of their lives. In the absence of these programs, their incomes will also 
decrease, particularly in nations with low minimum wages. For these reasons, I predict that: 
Hypothesis 6.1: The neoliberal state will increase upper-tail inequality and top-bottom 
inequality. It is unclear how it will impact lower-tail inequality. 
 FIRE employment is the first component of financialization and represents both the 
relative size of employment in finance, insurance, and real estate industries, as well as more 
generally the economic and political power of finance. There are a variety of ways that the 
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growth of FIRE employment can impact upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality. First, 
FIRE employment can boost the incomes of the 90th income percentile in several ways. FIRE 
employment has spurred the growth in financial incomes which have vastly exceeded income 
growth for nonfinancial workers, even after controlling for productivity and human capital 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Outside of the financial sector, financial managers in 
nonfinancial firms have also experienced disproportionate wage growth. Additionally, managers’ 
incomes are increasingly tied to stock performance, which incentivizes management to focus on 
maximizing shareholder value (Fligstein and Shin 2007).  
Second, FIRE employment and the growth of finance more generally can reduce the 50th 
and 10th income percentiles by putting downward pressure on labor’s share of income. As 
finance becomes more influential in shaping the economy and shareholder value becomes a 
larger priority for firms, there is increased pressure to reduce labor costs, which can include 
management measures to reduce or eliminate the influence of unions in wage determination 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). This undercuts wages for workers in the middle of the 
income distribution. Additionally, the shareholder value conception of the firm incentivizes 
management to use profits to reinvest in the stock market instead of investing in workers and 
productive infrastructure. The incomes of the 10th percentile may be particularly vulnerable 
because individuals at this income level tend to have less education, skill, and bargaining power: 
thus their compensation packages tend to be more elastic as management can easily find 
replacements if these workers demand higher compensation. Further, as the financial sector 
grows in relative size, there is increased demand for low-wage, low-skill work to cater to the 
needs of the elite, which increases the proportion of individuals in the bottom of the income 
distribution (Moller et al 2009; Sassen 2001). All in all, I predict that: 
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Hypothesis 6.2: The percent of workers employed in FIRE industries will increase upper-
tail inequality and top-bottom inequality. It is unclear how it will impact lower-tail 
inequality. 
 The second component of financialization is credit expansion in the private sector. To 
remind the reader, credit expansion taps into the capacity of the financial sector to leverage their 
investments, that is, utilize other people’s money as a higher percentage of their investment 
portfolios. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 5, private sector credit expansion and leveraging 
primarily benefit the very affluent as they are afforded opportunities to boost their incomes and 
profits for corporations through speculation (Lapavitsas 2013). Leveraging and speculation can 
lead to tidy profits that benefit the incomes of the wealthy; however, they can lead to major 
losses if prices fall. The wealthy can hedge their risky investments by using derivatives and other 
forms of securities to provide partial insurance if a deal goes bad (Guttman 2008); however, the 
poor and middle class rarely have the capital to take advantage of these opportunities. While the 
top 1% are more heavily dependent upon capital gains and investments for their income 
(Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2010; Wright and Rogers 2015), the 90th percentile tends to be more 
reliant on salaries and bonuses. As a result, private sector credit may not benefit the 90th 
percentile as much as it does the top 1%. Further, as private sector credit increases, there may be 
added pressure to decrease wages for the middle class and the poor in an effort to minimize labor 
costs and maximize profits and shareholder value. Therefore, since private sector credit 
expansion mainly serves the interests of the wealthy I offer the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6.3: The share of domestic credit provided to the private sector will increase 




The final component of financialization is financial crises. It is unclear from the literature 
how financial crises will impact upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality. The top 1% 
share takes a major hit in incomes relative to everyone else during a financial crises as their 
incomes are dependent on capital gains (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2010; Wright and Rogers 
2015), which was confirmed Chapter 5 of this dissertation. The 90th income percentile as a whole 
will tend to have a higher percentage of their income derived from capital gains than the rest of 
the income distribution income. Despite this, they are much more reliant on salaries and bonuses 
than the top 1% alone. So while the 90th percentile may receive pay cuts or job losses due to 
financial crises, the losses that they experience are less tied to financial markets than major 
losses that the top 1% experiences through depleted capital gains income. The middle class and 
the poor tend to take large hits in income during financial crises because many lose jobs through 
unemployment, face pay cuts, or see reductions in their hours worked (Heathcote, Perri, and 
Violante 2010). As I showed in Chapter 4, the welfare state does reduce inequality some during 
financial crises through automatic stabilization of social services and programs that supplement 
income losses for the middle class and poor (Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl 2012); however, it does not 
necessarily stave off all the inequality caused by financial crises. It is unclear from the literature 
whether the poor or middle class take a bigger hit during financial crises, however. Income 
losses for the middle class and poor are likely dependent upon the welfare generosity of the 
state—particularly unemployment insurance—which is highly variable across countries. Given 
the previous discussion, I predict that: 
Hypothesis 6.4: Financial crises will increase upper-tail and top-bottom inequality. It is 




6.3 Data and Methods Review 
 As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, there are several data and methodological differences 
in Chapter 6 compared to Chapters 4 and 5 that are worth reviewing before discussing the 
results. The Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) is the only dataset available that has reliable 
longitudinal data for a representative set of affluent countries on the entire income distribution, 
making it possible to create the measures of income inequality examined in this chapter (i.e., 
upper-tail inequality, lower-tail inequality, and top-bottom inequality). LIS data were appended 
to the Comparative Welfare States dataset, the primary dataset in this dissertation. The LIS has 
only 120 observations for 16 affluent nations between 1981 and 2011. The resulting dataset is 
unbalanced with an uneven number of years per country and uneven intervals between 
observations. First, two nations, Japan and New Zealand, are excluded altogether from the 
analyses. Second, the remaining 16 nations are represented anywhere between five (Switzerland) 
and 11 (Italy) years in the analyses. Third, the data in Chapter 6 are slightly skewed toward the 
latter half of the neoliberal era. All these things mean that the sample of country-years used in 
this chapter is slightly different than the samples in Chapters 4 and 5; however, these differences 
are not substantial given the comparison of sample means conducted in Chapter 3. Finally, 
upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality are all derived from measures of post-tax and 
transfer household income, so these analyses are most comparable to the “SM Inequality” 
measures used in Chapter 4. 
The unbalanced panel design has several important implications for the analyses. First, 
the uneven intervals between observations in the dependent variable limit the use of differences 
and lags of the dependent variables that are necessary to estimate error correction models 
(ECMs) that were used in Chapters 4 and 5. As a result, the dependent variables in this chapter 
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are measured as levels of upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality. However, the 
unbalanced panel design does not affect the lag structure of the independent variables. Second, 
ECMs are not used in Chapter 6 because the dependent variable cannot be differenced or lagged. 
Instead, I use OLS regression models with lagged independent variables and Driscoll-Kraay 
standard errors. These models address three of the four major problems that are typically present 
in macroeconomic time series analysis: autocorrelation, panel heteroscedasticity, and cross-
sectional dependence. In ECM models, the fourth potential problem associated with 
macroeconomic time series data, unit roots, is addressed by differencing and lagging the 
dependent variables in order to make them stationary. In the models estimated in this chapter, it 
is impossible to determine whether unit roots are present because Fisher panel unit root tests fail 
to work due to the small sample size. Despite this one shortcoming, OLS models with lagged 
independent variables and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are most appropriate to address the 
research question in Chapter 6. Finally, the smaller sample size in Chapter 6 (120) compared to 
Chapters 4 and 5 (540) limits the degrees of freedom, which has implications for hypothesis 
testing. As a result and also because there is less extant empirical and theoretical research on the 
effects of neoliberalism and financialization on the dependent variables used in this chapter, the 
analyses in Chapter 6 are largely exploratory and caution should be used in drawing strong 
substantive conclusions from this chapter.  
An additional issue to consider for this chapter is unobserved heterogeneity by country 
and year. Determining the proper specification for time is particularly complex for these data. As 
illustrated in Figures 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3, there was significant country-level variation in the 
dependent variables, which suggests that country fixed effects are appropriate for these models.  
Additionally, the time trends appeared to be curvilinear despite moderate variation across 
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countries. For the reader’s benefit, I show a series of different models for each dependent 
variable using a combination of country fixed effects, year fixed effects, and time trend variables 
to illustrate the decision-making process with regard to model specification. First, I estimated 
three separate sets of analyses for the three dependent variables—upper-tail inequality, lower-tail 
inequality, and top-bottom inequality. Within each set of analyses, I ran five separate models 
with different specifications of year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and time trend variables 
in order to determine the optimal model specification for the results. In model 1 of each table, the 
independent variables are lagged and there are no year or country fixed effects or time trend 
variables. In model 2, I add only year fixed effects to determine if there is unobserved 
heterogeneity related to year-specific factors and do not include country fixed effects. In model 
3, I add only country fixed effects to determine if there is unobserved heterogeneity among 
countries. In model 4, I include both year and country fixed effects. This model is the most 
conservative model, but it is costly in degrees of freedom as there are only 120 observations and 
16 country fixed effects and 26 fixed effects for year.10 In model 5 of each table, I include 
country fixed effects and time and time squared. Careful examination of these alternatives 
reveals that (a) country fixed effects are absolutely necessary to properly specify the model, and 
(b) time and time squared perform as well as year fixed effects and conserve 24 degrees of 
freedom. Based on these considerations, in the analyses below I put the most emphasis on the 
model with country fixed effects and time and time squared (i.e., model 5) in each set. In Figure 
6.4, I present scatterplots of country-centered values for each dependent variable across time and 
then plot the line of best fit for each scatterplot. Country-centered values for each dependent 
variable are derived by subtracting each country’s observed values from that country’s mean 
                                                          




values. This process removes the between-country variation from the dependent variables and 
reveals within-country time trends in each series. As one can see, each of the three dependent 
variables has a modest positive curvilinear trend, which suggests that time and time squared are 
appropriate specifications for time. Additionally, I ran fixed effects models predicting upper-tail, 
lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality with time and time squared, and both time variables were 
significant in each model. Moreover, this model was superior to a model with country fixed 
effects and a linear time trend alone.  All this evidence provides overwhelming support that using 





Figure 6.4: Within Country Variation in Upper-Tail, Lower-Tail, and Top-Bottom Inequality in 16 
Affluent Nations, 1981-2011. 
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Below, I present the analyses of the relationships between neoliberalism, financialization, 
upper-tail inequality, lower-tail inequality, and top-bottom inequality from 1981 to 2011.  
6.4 Results 
 There are several stages of analyses in this chapter. For each dependent variable, I run 
five models to illustrate how model specification impacts the results. In Table 5.1, I present the 
OLS models with lagged independent variables and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors predicting the 
relationship between neoliberalism, financialization, and upper-tail inequality. To remind the 
reader, upper-tail inequality is measured as the income ratio between the 90th and 10th percentiles 
and represents inequality between the very affluent and the median worker or middle class. I will 
begin with the discussion of the control variables. In models 1 through 5, unemployment is 
positively associated with upper-tail inequality. This effect is robust across alternative 
specifications with year fixed effects, country fixed effects, and time and time squared in the 
models. This provides evidence that unemployment disproportionately hurts the bargaining 
power of middle class workers, thus decreasing their wages, while increasing the incomes of the 
wealthy. Economic growth, as one would expect, increases upper-tail inequality in models 1 and 
2; however, the effect is not significant in models 3 through 5 where country-fixed effects are 
added into the models. This suggests that economic growth disproportionately benefits the very 
affluent more than the middle class; however, this effect largely operates through unobserved 
characteristics that differ by nation. Similarly, government employment reduces upper-tail 
inequality in models 1 and 2; however, the effect is no longer significant in the models with 
country fixed effects, which are models 3, 4, and 5. This provides some evidence that 
government employment reduces upper-tail inequality by providing higher incomes for the 
middle class; however, this effect operates through unobserved differences by country. As one 
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would expect, union density also reduces upper-tail inequality in models 1 and 2, which suggests 
unions help middle class wages by improving their bargaining power. The effect of unions is not 
significant in models 3, 4, and 5 with country fixed effects, though. This suggests that unions 
affect upper-tail inequality through some unobserved country characteristics. Somewhat 
surprisingly imports has a negative and significant effect on upper-tail inequality in models 1, 2, 
3, and 5; however, the effect is not significant in model 4 with country and year fixed effects. 
This effect may be due to imports decreasing incomes for the top 10% instead of increasing 
incomes for the top 50% as the profits from imports are primarily sent abroad. Finally, inward 
FDI increases upper-tail inequality in models 1, 2, and 4; however, the effect is nonsignificant in 
models 3 and 5. This suggests that inward FDI can undermine the wages of the middle class; 
however, this effect appears to operate through unobserved time characteristics in a similar 





Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate   0.018***  0.018**   0.009***   0.010**    0.009** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Economic growth  0.009***  0.017*   0.001 0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Government employment  -0.008***  -0.008*** -0.007 -0.005     -0.006   
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Union density  -0.002*    -0.002*   0.000 -0.001     -0.001   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Imports  -0.007***  -0.007***  -0.003*    -0.001     -0.002*  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Inward FDI 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001     0.002***  0.001   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Neoliberal State  0.028***  0.024**   0.013*    0.018  0.015*  
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005)
FIRE employment -0.004 -0.004  0.007**    0.017**    0.009*  
(0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004)
Credit expansion 0.001**  0.001**  0.000 0.000     0.000   
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Financial crisis -0.002 0.002 0.001  0.003      0.001   
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001)
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Time and time squared No No No No Yes
Constant  1.891***  1.900***  1.819***  1.676***  1.774***
(0.071) (0.097) (0.108) (0.136) (0.104)
Total R
2
0.763 0.795 --- --- ---
Within R
2
--- --- 0.299 0.450 0.302
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Table 6.1: The Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on Upper-Tail Inequality 







Labor market structure 
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 Moving on to the key independent variables, the neoliberal state is associated with an 
increase in upper-tail inequality in models 1, 2, 3, and 5, which supports Hypothesis 6.1. In 
model 4 with both country and year fixed effects, the coefficient is similar in size to the other 
models (.018) and in the same direction; however, the standard error increases dramatically due 
to fewer degrees of freedom compared to the other models. In model 5, a one unit increase in the 
neoliberal state index is associated with a .015 unit increase in the 90-50 income ratio the 
following year. Overall, the results provide moderately strong evidence that neoliberalism 
increases upper-tail inequality in affluent nations by decreasing the tax burden for the very 
affluent and undermining social spending and programs that supplement the incomes of the 
middle class. 
 Among the financialization variables, FIRE employment is not significant in models 1 
and 2, which do not include country fixed effects; however, it has a significant positive effect in 
models 3, 4, and 5, which do include these effects. This is likely because unobserved differences 
among countries mask the effects of FIRE employment on upper-tail inequality. These findings 
provide moderate support for Hypothesis 6.2. In model 5, a one-percent increase in FIRE 
employment is associated with a .009 unit increase in the 90-50 income ratio the following year. 
This suggests that FIRE employment increases the gap between the very affluent and the middle 
class by undermining wages for middle class workers and improving incomes for FIRE 
employees (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Credit expansion is positively associated with 
upper-tail inequality in models 1 and 2. When country fixed effects are added to models 3, 4, and 
5, this effect is no longer significant. These nonsignificant results signal that credit expansion is 
associated with upper-tail inequality; however, this relationship is caused by unobserved 
differences among nations. One potential component of financialization that may mediate this 
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relationship is financial deregulation, which is not available for all of the countries and years in 
this analysis. In sum, these findings provide weak support at best for Hypothesis 6.3. Finally, 
financial crises do not have a significant impact on upper-tail inequality in models 1 through 5, 
so I find no support for Hypothesis 6.4. The coefficients in models 2 through 5 are in the 
predicted direction, though. 
 In Table 6.2, I present the results for the OLS models with lagged independent variables 
and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors predicting the relationships between neoliberalism, 
financialization, and lower-tail inequality for 16 nations from 1981 to 2011. To remind the 
reader, lower-tail inequality is measured as the income ratio between the 50th and 10th income 
percentiles, which represents the amount of inequality between the median worker, or the middle 
class, and the poor. I start with a brief discussion of the control variables. The unemployment 
rate is positively associated with lower-tail inequality in models 1 and 2. This effect is no longer 
significant when the country fixed effects are included in the models. This suggests that 
unemployment may be associated with lower incomes for the poor; however, this effect is no 
longer present when unobserved country characteristics are accounted for. Economic growth is 
associated with lower-tail inequality in models 1, 2, and 4. This effect is not significant in 
models 3 and 5. This provides some evidence that economic growth helps the middle class more 
than the poor despite being largely beneficial to the very affluent as shown in analyses of upper-
tail inequality and the top 1% share in Chapter 5. Government employment has no significant 
effect on lower-tail inequality in models 1 through 5. Union density has a marginally significant 
negative effect in model 4. Models 1, 2, 3, and 5 have a nonsignificant effect, so there is not 
strong evidence that unions significantly impact lower-tail inequality one way or the other. 
Imports is associated with a reduction in lower-tail inequality in models 1 and 2. This effect is 
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nonsignificant in models 3, 4, and 5, which include country fixed effects. This suggests that 
imports may be associated with a reduction in income for the median worker relative to the poor; 
however, this effect is mediated by unobservable country characteristics, such as differences in 
the sources and types of imports. Finally, inward FDI is positively associated with lower-tail 
inequality in models 1, 2, and 4. This effect is not significant in models 3 and 5. This provides 
some evidence that inward FDI can hurt incomes for the poor, particularly if wages for low-




Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate   0.017**    0.017*    -0.004   -0.003 -0.004
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Economic growth  0.022*     0.040*   0.004  0.010**  -0.001
(0.008) (0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Government employment 0.002 0.001 -0.007  0.004     -0.002   
(0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Union density -0.001 -0.002 0.002  -0.003+    0.000   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Imports -0.009***   -0.009*** -0.001  0.002     0.002   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Inward FDI  0.003**    0.003**   -0.001    0.002*   0.000   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 0.000
Neoliberal State  0.086***   0.086***  0.022    0.052*    0.036+  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
FIRE employment  -0.018+    -0.017  0.012*   0.048***  0.029*  
(0.009) (0.013) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012)
Credit expansion 0.002***  0.002*** 0.000  0.000     0.000   
0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.001)
Financial crisis 0.000 0.011 0.004  0.004     0.003   
(0.005) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Time and time squared No No No No Yes
Constant  1.669***  1.595***  1.845***  1.320***  1.546***
(0.141) (0.128) (0.181) (0.240) (0.233)
Total R
2
0.652 0.745 --- --- ---
Within R
2
--- --- 0.163 0.466 0.217
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Table 6.2: The Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on Lower-Tail Inequality 










 Before moving into the discussion of the key independent variables, I want to remind the 
reader that I did not hypothesize the relationships between neoliberalism, the three components 
of financialization, and lower-tail inequality. The neoliberal state is associated with greater 
lower-tail inequality in models 1, 2, and 4 and marginally associated with greater lower-tail 
inequality in model 5. In model 5, a one-unit increase in the neoliberal state variable results in a 
.036 unit increase in the ratio of the 50th and 10th income percentiles in the following year. The 
effect is not significant in model 3, which includes fixed effects but no time trend or year fixed 
effects. If time (either by year fixed dummies or time and time squared) is accounted for, then 
more neoliberal states tend to spur greater inequality between the median worker and the poor. 
While a reduction in government spending and social programs impacts the middle class, the 
poor are more highly dependent on these programs and therefore face a much larger reduction in 
income (Wright and Rogers 2015), thus increasing lower-tail inequality.  
 Among the financialization variables, FIRE employment is associated with greater lower-
tail inequality in models 3, 4, and 5 while there is a positive and marginally significant effect in 
model 1. In model 5, a one-percent increase in FIRE employment is associated with a .029 unit 
increase in the income ratio of the 50th and 10th percentiles in the following year. In model 2, 
FIRE employment is not associated with lower-tail inequality when only year fixed effects are 
accounted for. These findings provide partial support for Hypothesis 6.2. As FIRE employment 
increases creating higher incomes for workers in finance and related industries, there is increased 
demand for low-wage and low-skill workers to provide services to cater to the financial elite 
(Moller et al. 2009). Credit expansion is associated with greater lower-tail inequality in models 1 
and 2; however, the effect is nonsignificant in models 3, 4, and 5, which include country fixed 
effects. Hypothesis 6.3 did not include a prediction for the relationship between credit expansion 
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and lower-tail inequality. The positive association in models 1 and 2 perhaps indicates that 
increased credit and leverage in the economy can result in greater pressure to reduce low-skill 
workers’ wages in an effort to minimize labor costs; however, this effect seems to be mediated 
by unobserved country-level characteristics. I encourage future research to explore in greater 
detail the relationship between private sector credit, as well as other types of credit, and lower-
tail inequality. Finally, financial crises are not associated with lower-tail inequality in models 1 
through 5; thus, there is no evidence that these crises impact either the middle class or the poor 
disproportionately. While the poor and middle class both take hits during financial crises, the 
relative income ratio between the two is not affected. 
 Finally, Table 6.3 presents the results for the OLS models with lagged independent 
variables and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors predicting the relationship between neoliberalism, 
financialization, and top-bottom inequality. To remind the reader, top-bottom inequality 
represents inequality between the 90th and 10th income percentiles, or the gap between the very 
affluent and the poor. These results help triangulate the results of the other two analyses by 
ascertaining whether rising inequality in the previous tables is driven by the 90th, 50th, and 10th 
percentiles given that ratios include information from two different parts of the income 
distribution. Again I will begin the discussion by discussing the results of the control variables. 
Unemployment is associated with increased top-bottom inequality in models 1 and 2; however, 
this effect becomes nonsignificant in models 3, 4, and 5. This suggests that unemployment 
impacts top-bottom inequality through unobserved country characteristics. Economic growth is 
associated with an increase in top-bottom inequality in models 1, 2, 3, and 4, but it is not 
significant in model 5. This suggests that most of the benefits of economic growth tend to go to 
the very affluent; however, this finding is not robust to all model specifications. Government 
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employment is not associated with top-bottom inequality in models 1 through 5; since 
government employment mainly generates middle class white collar jobs, it affords very little 
direct employment or income benefit to the poor. Union density has a significant negative effect 
in model 4 and a marginally significant effect in model 1; however, it is not significant in models 
2, 3, and 5. This provides some evidence that unions can reduce the gap between the very 
affluent and the poor, but this finding is not particularly strong given that it is only significant 
under few specifications. On the whole, this does suggest that government employment and 
union density are providing middle class jobs more than they are providing lower-income jobs; 
therefore, their weak to nonsignificant effects on top-bottom inequality are not surprising. 
Imports are associated with a reduction in top-bottom inequality in models 1 and 2; however, the 
inclusion of country fixed effects makes this effect nonsignificant in models 3, 4, and 5. This 
suggests that unobserved country characteristics are actually mediating the relationship between 
imports and top-bottom inequality. Finally, inward FDI is associated with greater top-bottom 
inequality in models 1, 2, and 4, but it is not significant in models 3 and 5. This provides some 
evidence that inward FDI benefits the very affluent while hurting the poor; however, this effect is 




Model 2 Model 4 Model 5
Unemployment rate   0.067***  0.067**   0.009    0.012+    0.010
(0.012) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Economic growth  0.062**   0.113**   0.010*   0.026**   0.000
(0.018) (0.037) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005)
Government employment -0.013 -0.014 -0.023  0.001     -0.012  
(0.011) (0.010) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023)
Union density  -0.005+   -0.006 0.002  -0.010*    -0.002  
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Imports  -0.032***  -0.031*** -0.007  0.001      -0.001  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Inward FDI  0.010***  0.010***  -0.000    0.006***   0.001  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Neoliberal State  0.222***  0.212***  0.062+   0.125**    0.093* 
(0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.038) (0.038)
FIRE employment -0.043 -0.042  0.037**  0.125***   0.073* 
(0.025) (0.035) (0.010) (0.025) (0.028)
Credit expansion  0.006***  0.006*** 0.000  0.001      0.001  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Financial crisis -0.003 0.025 0.010  0.012      0.007  
(0.011) (0.019) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No
Country fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes
Time and time squared No No No No Yes
Constant   3.130***  3.014***  3.439***  2.188**  2.798***
(0.375) (0.381) (0.500) (0.627) (0.558)
Total R
2
0.732 0.795 --- --- ---
Within R
2
--- --- 0.215 0.475 0.253
*--p <.05, **--p <.01, *** p--<.001, †-- p< .10 (two-tailed tests).
Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors in parentheses. 
Note: Time trend variables and country dummies are not shown.
Table 6.3: The Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on Top-Bottom Inequality 
in 16 Affluent Democracies, 1981-2011 (N=120)
Variable Model 1 Model 3
Financialization
Business cycle





 Moving on to the key independent variables, the neoliberal state is positively associated 
with top-bottom inequality in models 1, 2, 4, and 5 while it has a positive and marginally 
significant effect in model 3. In model 5, a one-unit increase in the neoliberal state index is 
associated with a .093 unit increase in the ratio between the 90th and 10th income percentiles in 
the following year. Because neoliberalism is associated with a reduction in the tax burdens for 
the very affluent and a reduction of public goods and social services used by the poor, the gap 
between the very affluent and poor widens. These results provide support for Hypothesis 6.1.  
 Finally, among the financialization measures, FIRE employment is not associated with 
top-bottom inequality in models 1 and 2; however, there is a positive association in models 3, 4, 
and 5, which include country fixed effects. This suggests that unobserved country-level 
characteristics are masking the results of FIRE employment in models 1 and 2. In model 5, a one 
percent increase in FIRE employment is associated with a .029 unit increase in the income ratio 
of the 90th and 10th percentiles in the following year. Overall, this provides support for 
Hypothesis 6.2. As FIRE employment grows, the incomes of the very affluent increase as 
financial sector workers are paid more money (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). Additionally, 
more low-skill service jobs develop to cater to the needs of the very affluent (Moller et al. 2009). 
Credit expansion is positively associated with top-bottom inequality in models 1 and 2; however, 
it is positive but no longer significant in models 3, 4, and 5, which include country fixed effects. 
Much like the results for upper- and lower-tail inequality, this suggests that credit is associated 
with top-bottom inequality; however, this effect operates through some unobserved country 
characteristics, such as financial deregulation. This provides weak support for Hypothesis 6.3. 
Finally, financial crises are not associated with greater top-bottom inequality in models 1 through 
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5, which does not support Hypothesis 6.4. While the very affluent and the poor both face reduced 
incomes during financial crises, neither is more severely impacted than the other. 
6.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
 While income inequality has been rising in many affluent nations primarily due to gains 
by the top 1% (Picketty and Saez 2015), this chapter explores what is happening in different 
parts of the income distribution. Building upon Chapters 4 and 5 in the dissertation, Chapter 6 
examines how neoliberalism and financialization impact upper-tail inequality, lower-tail 
inequality, and top-bottom inequality in 16 affluent nations. Previous research examining the 
determinants of upper- and lower-tail inequality has focused on declining union membership 
(Card et al. 2004); the shift from manufacturing to services, deregulation in many industries, a 
rise in contingent labor (Berhardt et al 2001; Fligstein and Shin 2004; Morgan and Cha 2007), 
and economic globalization (Wallace, Gauchat and Fullerton 2012). To date, there has been little 
cross-national research examining the impacts of neoliberalism and financialization on upper- 
and lower-tail inequality in affluent nations during the neoliberal era barring Fligstein and Shin’s 
(2004) study of the impacts of the shareholder value conception of the firm on inequality in the 








 Table 6.4: Comparing the Effects of Neoliberalism and Financialization on Upper-
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+ / - — Positive/negative coefficient from Model 5 is in the predicted direction and 
statistically significant.  
[+] / [-] — Positive/negative coefficient from Model 5 is in the predicted direction but 
not statistically significant.  
(+) / (-) — Positive/negative coefficient from Model 5 is in the predicted direction and 
statistically significant when country fixed effects are not included, but becomes 





In Table 6.4, I summarize the findings from the models predicting upper-tail (Table 6.1), 
lower-tail (Table 6.2), and top-bottom inequality (Table 6.3). I focus on the results from 
preferred model 5 in each table with country fixed effects and time and time squared as it is the 
most parsimonious and best fitting model. The table summarizes three broad types of outcomes 
that occur in the tables: a) whether the result is in the predicted direction and statistically 
significant; b) whether the result is in the predicted direction but not statistically significant; and 
c) whether the result is in the predicted direction and statistically significant when country fixed 
effects are not included, but nonsignificant when country fixed effects are added. For the purpose 
of this table, I treat the predictions for lower-tail inequality as being in the same direction as 
those for upper-tail and top-bottom inequality even though formal predictions for lower-tail 
inequality were not made.  
 The first and most obvious result to be gleaned from this summary table is that none of 
the results for the key independent variables are in an unanticipated direction which offers broad, 
but thin, support for the general hypotheses about neoliberalism, financialization, and income 
distribution.11 Turning to specific results, the effect for the neoliberal state in model 5 is positive 
and significant for upper-tail inequality, lower-tail inequality, and top-bottom inequality. These 
findings provide strong support for the general hypothesis that the very affluent 
disproportionately benefit from neoliberalism relative to the middle class and the poor, and also 
that the middle class benefit at the expense of the poor. Not only does neoliberalism boost the 
incomes of the affluent after taxes by reducing their tax burdens, they also undermine the 
incomes of the middle class by reducing government spending and investment, as well as cutting 
                                                          
11 It should be noted that there were a few models in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 where the sign of the coefficient was 
not significant and in the direction not predicted by the hypotheses, but these instances occurred exclusively in 
models in which country fixed effects were not included. As noted elsewhere, the country fixed effects are necessary 
to properly specify the model. 
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social programs (Kotz and McDonough 2010). And while the middle class and poor lose out to 
the very affluent because of neoliberalism, the poor are more dramatically affected because their 
incomes are more tightly tied to cutbacks in the provision of public goods and services by the 
state. 
 Similarly, FIRE employment was significant and positive in model 5 for all three 
dependent variables. This suggests that as employment in finance, insurance, and real estate 
increases, the very affluent leave behind both the middle class and the poor, which supports two 
of the three hypotheses. Not only are workers in the finance industry paid at a much higher rate 
than those in nonfinancial industries (Wright and Rogers 2015), but the same applies to financial 
managers and accountants in nonfinancial firms (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). As the 
financial sector grows in size and economic and political influence, this tends to benefit the very 
affluent and the rich. The middle class and poor are disproportionately disadvantaged when FIRE 
employment grows for several reasons. First, the shareholder value conception of the firm 
encourages firms to reduce labor costs to the minimum in order to maximize profits and boost 
stock prices and shareholder value (Fligstein and Shin 2007). This hurts middle class jobs and 
incomes because one strategy used by managers is to target unionized employees, which often 
have better benefits and pay (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). The poor seem to be more 
vulnerable in this scenario; however, as FIRE employment is also associated with greater lower-
tail inequality, which suggests that the poor are falling behind the middle class. Because lower-
income workers have less bargaining power due to a lack of in-demand skills, they may be more 
vulnerable to cost-cutting efforts associated with shareholder value. In particular, cost-cutting 
technology, such as automatic checkout lines at grocery stores, used to boost profits and 
shareholder value may disproportionately impact the poor over the middle class. Indeed, 
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Fligstein and Shin (2007) argue that companies who use cost-cutting technology tend to fire 
lower-skilled workers and replace them with fewer high-skilled workers. These changes in 
workplace practices may disproportionately put low-income workers at risk of income loss. 
 The analyses in this chapter provide less robust support that credit expansion has affected 
upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality. Overall, credit expansion was associated with 
greater upper-tail and lower-tail inequality in models where country-fixed effects were not 
included; however, it was not significant in the models that included country fixed effects. This 
suggests that private sector credit is related to upper- and lower-tail inequality; however, this 
relationship is mediated by unobserved country characteristics, such as financial deregulation or 
other factors. While private sector credit expansion does increase inequality and the top 1% share 
by allowing the rich to use leverage to make speculative moves (Guttman 2008), those benefits 
may not extend fully to the very affluent, represented by the 90th percentile. I encourage future 
research to explore the relationship between private sector credit and different parts of the 
income distribution in greater detail. There was no significant effect of credit expansion on top-
bottom inequality; however, it was positive and in the predicted direction. 
 Finally, the analyses in this chapter signal that financial crises, net of other variables, do 
not have a significant impact on upper-tail, lower-tail, or top-bottom inequality. The coefficients 
in model 5 for each dependent variable are positive and in the correct direction; however, they 
fail to reach standard significant levels in each model. While it is encouraging that these effects 
are consistently in the predicted direction, the lack of statistical significance suggests caution, 
especially considering that financial crises were found to increase MG and SM inequality in 
Chapter 4. It is possible that the very affluent may face income losses in years affected by 
financial crises; however, this effect may vary significantly across nations thus masking the 
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effect. Alternatively, financial crises may affect upper-tail and lower-tail inequality through 
unemployment and economic growth, which are used as controls in these analyses. Finally, the 
effect of financial crises may have been significant if the entire balanced sample of 18 nations 
from 1981 to 2011 were available or if ECM models were feasible; however, it is impossible to 
determine this with the data limitations. I encourage future research to explore this finding in 
greater detail in the future. 
 While much of the political and scholarly attention focuses on rising incomes for rich and 
affluent and stagnant wages for the middle class (see Leicht and Fitzgerald 2014 for a summary), 
there has been less attention to what is going on with the poor. The analyses of this chapter show 
that neoliberalism and financialization has actually benefitted the affluent at the expense of both 
the middle class and the poor; however, the poor have disproportionately fallen behind the 
middle class as well. The reduction of social services and public goods (Kotz and McDonough 
2010), as well as the rise of low-wage, low-skill and contingent work in response to 
neoliberalism and financialization (Moller et al. 2009), has caused the poor to fall farther and 
farther behind. Individuals without college degrees, who tend to be over-represented in the 
bottom 10% of income earners, are increasingly at risk of experiencing a loss of income and 
well-being in affluent nations with higher levels of neoliberalism and financialization (The 
Economist Staff 2014). Indeed, college wage premiums rose in several affluent nations during 
the 2000s like France, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. In 2011, the college 
degree income premium in the United States was 77%, in other words, the average person with a 
college degree made 77% more money than those without a college degree. The college 
premium was typically lower in other nations: 57% in the United Kingdom, 47% in France, and 
just 25% in Sweden. One should note that the nations with higher college degree premiums tend 
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to also have greater levels of neoliberalism and financialization. This may not be a causal 
relationship, but it does provide grist for future research to explore this connection in greater 
detail. While the incomes of the middle class have been targeted by cost cutting initiatives in 
government programs and financialization through shareholder value, the results in this chapter 
suggest that policy-makers should be more attentive to the poor as they appear to face 
disproportionate losses in nations with higher levels of neoliberalism and financialization.  
If nations want to reduce inequality, one of two options would need to occur at the 
minimum. The first option would be to move away from the shareholder value conception of the 
firm and reinvest profits gained in production and trade into workers and local communities. 
This would reduce market-generated (MG) inequality and create a more equal distribution of 
disposable income. If financialization and the shareholder value of the firm are trends that cannot 
be easily thwarted, then a movement toward less neoliberalism, stronger welfare states, and more 
expansive social programs could reduce income inequality through redistribution. Decoupling 
income from the market (such as providing a universal basic income), providing more generous 
unemployment insurance to help workers in times of crisis, and increasing investments in 
education and skill-building would help middle class workers boost their incomes and especially 
help the poor break out of poverty. These two options together would be particularly effective at 
reducing inequality. In the next chapter, I summarize the dissertation, build upon the suggestions 
mentioned above, and discuss the future of income inequality in affluent nations as they march 





CHAPTER 7: REFLECTING ON INCOME INEQUALITY IN THE ERA OF 
NEOLIBERAL FINANCIALIZATION 
7.1 Introduction 
 In many affluent nations, economic inequality has been rising during the neoliberal era, 
primarily due to an increase the share of income and wealth controlled by the rich (Volscho and 
Kelly 2012; Picketty 2013; Picketty and Saez 2015; Wright and Rogers 2015). In this 
dissertation, I provide a comprehensive examination of the impacts of neoliberalism and 
financialization—corresponding to two of the dominant transformations of the social structures 
of accumulation during the neoliberal era—on income inequality in affluent nations from 1981 to 
2011. While a growing number of studies have examined the relationships between 
neoliberalism and income inequality (Bergh and Nilsson 2008) and financialization and income 
inequality (Moller and Rubin 2008; Zalewski and Whalen 2010; Assa 2012; Kus 2012; Volscho 
and Kelly 2012; Arnum and Naples 2013; Flaherty 2015), there are still unresolved issues in the 
literature. This dissertation improves upon previous research in several ways. First, much of the 
current research on financialization and income inequality tends to focus on a single measure—
often FIRE employment or FIRE value added—to represent a multifaceted concept. This 
dissertation improves upon previous research by examining three components of 
financialization—FIRE employment, credit expansion, and financial crises—to better capture the 
complexity of the concept.  
Second, most of the previous research tends to focus on one measure of income 
inequality, often measured as the Gini index before or after taxes, which does not reveal if 
neoliberalism and financialization impact income inequality by creating unequal market 
incomes, limiting redistribution, or a combination of the two. To address this shortcoming, I 
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examine market-generated (MG) inequality, redistribution, and state-mediated (SM) inequality in 
Chapter 4. Third, barring a few studies (i.e., Volscho and Kelly 2012; Flaherty 2015), much of 
the previous research tends to focus on the Gini index, which is a common and effective 
summary measure of income inequality. A weakness to the Gini index is that it tends to be biased 
towards changes in the middle of the income distribution and provides little information about 
how different parts of the income distribution are impacted. To address this shortcoming, I 
explore the impacts of neoliberalism and financialization on the top 1% share of income in 
Chapter 5 and upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality (measured as the 90-50, 50-10, 
and 90-10 income ratios, respectively).  
Fourth, I improve upon previous research by examining a standard collection of 18 
affluent nations for the entire neoliberal period in order to improve the generalizability of 
previous research to other affluent nations. And finally, I use error-correction models (ECMs) in 
Chapters 4 and 5 to address several issues related to macroeconomic time series analyses—
namely unit roots, autocorrelation, and panel heteroscedasticity. Additionally, ECMs decompose 
effects into instantaneous, short-run, and long-run effects, which allow researchers to better 
understand the dynamics of inequality.  
 To conclude this dissertation, I first provide an overview of the findings in the three 
empirical chapters to summarize the main results. I then discuss the implications of these 
analyses by returning to SSA theory in order discuss the ways that changes in capital 
accumulation have shaped income inequality in the neoliberal era in order to think about the big 
picture of where inequality may be headed in affluent nations. Finally, I discuss the limitations of 




7.2 Summary of Findings 
 The empirical chapters of this dissertation explore the ways that one measure of 
neoliberalism, the neoliberal state, and three measures of financialization—FIRE employment, 
credit expansion, and financial crises—affect income inequality in affluent nations from 1981 to 
2011. In Chapter 2, I outline the theory and hypotheses associated the key independent variables 
on each of the seven measures of income inequality—MG inequality, redistribution, and SM 
inequality in Chapter 4; the top 1% income share in Chapter 5; and upper-tail, lower-tail, and 
top-bottom inequality in Chapter 6.  
 Before discussing the results, I will first summarize the methods of each chapter. Chapter 
4 examined the impacts of neoliberalism and financialization on three measures of income 
inequality—MG inequality, redistribution, and SM inequality—in 18 affluent nations from 1981 
to 2011. ECMs are utilized to address unit roots, autocorrelation, and panel heteroscedasticity 
and to decompose effects into instantaneous, short-run, and long-run effects. Overall, the focus 
was on long-run effects because they were the strongest and most theoretically relevant; 
however, I discuss significant instantaneous and short-run effects when present, as well. Below, I 
summarize the findings from each chapter. Chapter 5 examines the effects of neoliberalism and 
financialization on the top 1% share of income and uses ECMs in the analyses, much like 
Chapter 4. The key difference in Chapter 5 is that instantaneous, short-run, and long-run effects 
are given equal consideration discussion. Not only are there more significant instantaneous and 
short-run effects due to the variable being more volatile and having more year-to-year variation, 
but the timing of the effects is theoretically important for the top 1% share, as well. Finally, 
Chapter 6 examines the impacts of neoliberalism and financialization on upper-tail, lower-tail, 
and top-bottom inequality in 16 affluent nations from 1981 to 2011. Due to the unbalanced panel 
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design, limited sample size (120 observations), and uneven intervals between observations, 
ECMs were not appropriate for these analyses. While I explored a variety of different model 
specifications, I ultimately decided that OLS models with country fixed effects, time and time 
squared, lagged dependent variables, and Driscoll-Kraay standard errors to analyze the results 
were the most appropriate given the structure of the data, the time trends in the dependent 
variables, and the need for parsimony. 
 In Table 7.1, I summarize the key findings from Chapters, 4, 5, and 6. Whereas the 
organization of the chapters has been based on the dependent variables, the discussion in this 
chapter will be organized around the influence of the independent variables. In other words, I 
will focus on one key independent variable at a time spanning all three chapters, starting with the 
neoliberal state. In Chapter 4, I found that the neoliberal state increased MG inequality, 
decreased redistribution, and increased SM inequality over the long-run, which supports 
Hypothesis 4.1. In other words, decreasing top marginal tax rates and government consumption 
and investment not only creates more unequal market incomes as it limits the amount of middle 
wage jobs, but it also reduces redistribution by decreasing tax burdens for the rich and often 
leads to cuts in social programs and services that help bolster the incomes of the middle class and 









Table 7.1: Summary of Findings from Chapters 4, 5, and 6
Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6
Depedendent Variable MG inequality Redistribution SM inequality Top 1% share Top 1% share Top 1% share Upper-tail Lower-tail Top-bottom
Neoliberalism
Neoliberal state + - + + + + + + +
Financialization
FIRE employment + - + 0 + + + + +
Credit expansion + - + 0 + + (+) (+) [+]
Financial Crises + + + 0 - - [+] [+] [+]
Method ECM long-run ECM long-run ECM long-run ECM instantaneous ECM short-run ECM long-run OLS DK OLS DK OLS DK
 + / - — Positive/negative coefficient from Model 5 is in the predicted direction and statistically significant in Tables 4.1, 4.3, 4.5, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. 
 [+] / [-] — Positive/negative coefficient from Model 5 is in the predicted direction but not  statistically significant in Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. 
 (+) / (-) — Positive/negative coefficient from Model 5 of Tables 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 is in the predicted direction and statistically significant when country fixed effects are not  
included, but becomes nonsignificant when country fixed effects are added.
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In Chapter 5, I establish that the neoliberal state increases the income shares of the top 
1% through instantaneous, short-run, and long-run effects, which supports Hypothesis 5.1. Not 
only do reductions in top marginal tax rates immediately increase the incomes of the rich after 
accounting for taxes, the neoliberal state provides additional short-term and long-term benefits to 
the top 1% as it reduces state capacity to provide government consumption and investment that 
limits the amount of middle income jobs in the economy (Kotz and McDonough 2010).  
Finally, Chapter 6 provides evidence that the very affluent, represented by the 90th 
income percentile, also benefit from neoliberalism at the expense of the middle class, represented 
by the 50th percentile, and the poor, represented by the 10th percentile. The neoliberal state 
increases upper-tail inequality, or the 90-50 income ratio, by reducing tax burdens for the very 
affluent and limiting government consumption and investment, which benefit the middle class 
(Kotz and McDonough 2010). While middle class lose out to the very affluent as a result of the 
neoliberal state, the poor fall even farther behind as the neoliberal state increases lower-tail 
inequality, or the 50-10 income ratio. It is true that the middle class certainly benefit from 
government consumption and investment; however, the incomes of the poor are particularly 
vulnerable to the neoliberal state because cuts in social programs such as unemployment 
insurance, education and skill development, healthcare, and welfare disproportionately impact 
the poor. The neoliberal state, perhaps unsurprisingly given the last two findings, also increases 
top-bottom inequality, or the 90-10 income ratio. Overall, the neoliberal state is good for the rich 
and very affluent while not so beneficial to the middle class and the poor. These findings support 
Hypothesis 6.1. 
Turning to the first measure of financialization—finance insurance, and real estate 
(FIRE) employment—Chapter 4 shows that FIRE employment increases MG inequality, 
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decreases redistribution, and increases SM inequality over the long run, which supports 
Hypothesis 4.2. As FIRE employment increases, the economic and political power of finance 
increases, as well. This creates more unequal market incomes as financial sector employees, as 
well as those working financial services in nonfinancial firms, have experienced disproportionate 
income growth over the last few decades as the shareholder value conception of the firm has 
become dominant in financialized economies (Fligstein and Shin 2007; Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Lin 2011; Wright and Rogers 2015). Additionally, the growth in FIRE employment reduces 
redistribution over the long-run. While there are several possibilities of the mechanisms behind 
this effect, the growth of the FIRE sector likely allows finance to shift tax policies in favor of the 
rich and corporations, which can help bolster corporate profits and encourage additional 
investment in stocks, and to limit taxes on capital gains. Ultimately, these two processes 
combined result in greater SM inequality, or more unequal disposable incomes, in affluent 
nations.  
Chapter 5 affirms that growth in FIRE employment primarily benefits the rich over the 
short-run and long-run thus supporting Hypothesis 5.2; however, there is no instantaneous effect. 
This suggests that the growth in FIRE employment symbolizes a macroeconomic shift in which 
finance is more economically and politically powerful and the shareholder conception value of 
the firm is more dominant (Fligstein and Shin 2007). FIRE employment likely has no 
instantaneous effect on the top 1% share because the FIRE sector has some disproportionately 
high income jobs but also middle and low income jobs thus masking the instantaneous labor 
market effect.  
Chapter 6 shows that FIRE employment benefits the very affluent at the expense of the 
middle class and the poor. Increased FIRE employment is associated with greater upper-tail 
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inequality as FIRE disproportionately creates high-income jobs (Tomaskovic-Devy and Lin 
2011). Additionally, the shareholder value conception of the firm puts downward pressure on 
middle class wages in order to minimize labor costs and maximize profits to attract more 
investment in corporate stocks (Fligstein and Shin 2007). Increased FIRE employment is also 
associated with greater lower-tail inequality. While the middle class lose out to the very affluent, 
the poor also fall behind the middle class as a result of the growth in the FIRE sector. The 
incomes of the poor are particularly vulnerable to the shareholder value conception of the firm 
due to the implementation of labor-saving technologies, which often replace the jobs of low-
skilled workers (Fligstein and Shin 2007). This has not only led to a reduction in the wages and 
number of jobs at the bottom, it has also deskilled the work of many occupations, which 
decreases their bargaining power. Intuitively, FIRE employment also increases top-bottom 
inequality as the poor fall behind the rich in their relative incomes. These findings all support 
Hypothesis 6.2. 
The second measure of financialization is credit expansion, which represents the amount 
of leveraging built into the private sector of affluent nations. Barring Flaherty’s (2015) study of 
financialization and the top 1% share in 16 affluent nations, credit expansion is a relatively 
unexplored piece of the puzzle in the relationship between financialization and income 
inequality. In Chapter 4, I establish that rising levels of private sector credit relative to the size of 
the economy increase MG inequality, reduce redistribution, and increase SM inequality over the 
long run, which supports Hypothesis 4.3. As private sector credit increases, the amount of 
leveraging in the economy leads to potentially lucrative profits but also potentially devastating 
losses due to the interlocking nature of the financial system, which largely serve the interests of 
the rich (Lapavitsas 2013). Additionally, credit expansion decreases redistribution as financial 
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firms and large corporations put pressure on the state to reduce their tax burdens. Ultimately this 
leads to more unequal SM inequality, or inequality in disposable incomes.  
In Chapter 5, I provide evidence of the assertion that credit expansion largely serves the 
interests of the rich as it increases the top 1% share in affluent nations over the short run and 
long run thus supporting Hypothesis 5.3; however, there is not a significant instantaneous effect. 
The growth of private sector leverage allows wealthy investors and financial institutions to use 
risky speculative activities to reap potentially huge rewards (Lapavitsas 2013). The development 
of derivatives and other types of complex financial instruments allows the rich to hedge their 
losses in the event that their investments go sour (Guttman 2008), which is a protection that the 
middle class and poor often lack. The poor and middle class are exposed to the risky behaviors of 
speculators because the interlocking nature of the financial markets. 
Chapter 6 provides weak support for Hypothesis 6.3 that credit expansion increases 
upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom inequality as it was not significant in the final model; 
however, it was significant in models 1 and 2, which did not include country fixed effects. There 
are several potential explanations for this finding. First, the fact that the effect becomes 
nonsignificant in models with country fixed effects suggests that some unobserved country-level 
variable, like financial deregulation, might explain the positive relationships found in models 1 
and 2. Second, it is possible that credit expansion is more strongly tied to the incomes of the top 
1% than it is the 90th income percentile. As a result, 90th income percentile may benefit from 
credit expansion, but it does not disproportionately benefit relative to the middle class and the 
poor.  
Finally, the third measure of financialization is financial crises, which is measured as 
stock market crises, and represents instability and volatility in financial markets caused by 
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speculative activities that become more common in highly financialized nations. In Chapter 4, 
there are two competing hypotheses related the relationships between financial crises and income 
inequality and redistribution: the austerity hypothesis and the welfare stabilization hypothesis. 
Both agree that financial crises should increase MG and SM inequality over the long run as the 
middle class and poor tend to experience greater income losses than higher income households 
because of job losses, wage cuts and freezes, and losses in benefits (Heathcoate, Perri, and 
Violante 2010). The main difference between the two hypotheses is in relation to the expectation 
of financial crises’ effects on redistribution. The austerity thesis, Hypothesis 4.4a, predicts that 
years affected by financial crises will reduce redistribution as nations enact neoliberal austerity, 
such as cutting social programs and services, in order to balance the government budget, which 
faces fiscal strain during crises (Harvey 2010). The welfare stabilization thesis, Hypothesis 4.4b, 
expects that financial crises increase redistribution by causing automatic stabilizers in existing 
social programs, such as unemployment insurance, food assistance, and other types of social 
welfare, kick in to reduce some, but not all, of the inequality created by financial crises (Dolls et 
al. (2012; Baird 2014). The analyses in Chapter 4 show that financial crises increase MG 
inequality, redistribution, and SM inequality, which supports Hypothesis 4.4b or the welfare 
stabilization hypothesis.  
Chapter 5 explores the impacts of financial crises on the top 1% share of income and 
finds that years affected by financial crises see a reduction in the top 1% share in the short run 
and long run, which supports Hypothesis 5.4; however, there is no significant instantaneous 
effect. Because the incomes of the rich are often tied to capital gains, years affected by stock 
market crises hurt the rich compared to other parts of the income distribution (Picketty and Saez 
2015). Chapter 6 then explores the ways that financial crises affect upper-tail, lower-tail, and 
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top-bottom inequality. While the rich face losses during financial crises, the very affluent, 
represented by the 90th income percentile, do not face quite the same penalty relative to other 
income groups. Indeed, the effects of financial crises on upper-tail, lower-tail, and top-bottom 
inequality are positive; however, they are not significant in any of the models. I encourage future 
research to more fully explore these findings. 
All in all, the analyses of this dissertation show that neoliberalism and financialization 
typically increase income inequality in affluent nations in a variety of ways. Primarily, they both 
help the rich and very affluent at the expense of the poor and the middle class. In the next 
section, I return to SSA theory and discuss the connections between capital accumulation and 
incomes of the rich during the era of neoliberal financialization. I then provide a discussion of 
the future of inequality given recent changes in the economies of affluent nations. 
7.3 Theoretical Implications 
 There are several key theoretical implications that can be derived from the analyses of 
this dissertation. The first implication relates to the major theoretical framework of this 
dissertation: SSA theory. Coming out of World War II, many affluent nations experienced a 
decline in income inequality as steady economic growth and development and the strength of 
labor allowed wages to be strong and the middle class grew (Bowles and Gintis 1982). In an 
effort to rein in the power of labor in the post-World War II era, capitalists developed 
bureaucratic control, or complex layers of hierarchical management within firms, to better 
control workers (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). Additionally, capitalists divided workers 
by race, class, gender, occupation, and industry in order to undermine class consciousness and 
break the strength of organized labor. During the 1970s, capitalists were increasingly under a 
crunch due to stagflation: a combination of sluggish economic growth and inflation caused by a 
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global shift in incomes and profits from affluent Western nations to oil-rich nations in the Middle 
East and other parts of the world (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). In an effort to reboot the 
economy and reclaim the dominance of the rich over the economies of affluent nations, SSA 
scholars argue that the neoliberal era, or the period from 1981 to the present, is defined by three 
separate and distinct SSAs: spatialization (Brady and Wallace 2010), neoliberalism (Kotz and 
McDonough 2010), and financialization (Tabb 2010). The SSA literature divides these three 
processes out into three separate camps, but this dissertation shows the interrelations of each of 
these processes and how they complement each other as strategies of capital accumulation that 
are used together. While these three processes may have contributed to creating some new 
economic growth, they have primarily allowed capitalists to tilt the global economy in their 
favor. I show that these three new developments, primarily focusing on neoliberalism and 
financialization, in the neoliberal SSA create economies that work very well for the rich while 
the middle and lower classes struggle. Indeed, economic growth in the neoliberal era even 
increases income inequality and boosts the incomes of the top 1% as is illustrated in the results 
of Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. This speaks to the frustrations of many workers in the United 
States, United Kingdom, Germany, and other affluent nations that feel that the economy is rigged 
and serves the interests of a few elites while neglecting the middle class and poor. 
 While the neoliberal era has brought upon many positive developments, such as new 
communication technology, cheaper goods for consumers like TVs, computers, and other 
electronics, and the spread of different cultures across the globe, neoliberalism and 
financialization in particular also mark a structural shift in social, economic, and political power 
that favors the rich. This dissertation illustrates that neoliberalism and financialization not only 
create more unequal market incomes but also put fiscal pressure on the state to reduce 
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redistribution, which shifts the income distribution in a way that benefits the rich at the expense 
of the poor and the middle class. Deregulation of finance allows the rich to increase leveraging 
and speculative activities that can lead to periods of prosperity and massive income growth for 
the rich; however, unsustainable levels of leverage and private sector credit will ultimately lead 
to financial crises. Indeed, Minsky (1982) noted that financial crises are part and parcel of to the 
business cycles of capitalism; however, he warned that economic growth based on speculative 
activities and leveraging, which are more common in financialized capitalism, can lead to deeper 
and more frequent cycles of booms and busts. However, the interlocking nature of the financial 
system in affluent nations means that the general public is increasingly exposed to the risky 
behaviors of the wealthy. While the rich face income losses during financial crises (that they 
largely contribute to), the rebound in income of the top 1% during economic recoveries vastly 
exceeds those of the middle class and poor (Picketty and Saez 2015). Thus, in highly 
financialized nations, neoliberalism and financial deregulation have created a social structure of 
accumulation that largely serves the interests of the rich during good times and spreads the 
consequences of their risky behaviors throughout the global economy, largely on the backs of 
governments and the general public. In other words, there is little accountability for the actions 
of the rich in the era of neoliberal financialization. 
 In order to reorient the economy towards serving the interests of the general public 
instead of a wealthy few, policy-makers need to consider a mixture of new and old actions. First, 
increased government regulation over finance is needed in order to ensure accountability for the 
actions of speculators in the financial sectors of affluent nations. After the Great Recession, there 
was tough rhetoric over reigning in the power of finance in the United States and other affluent 
nations. Years later, much of the tough talk and initial regulations has died down among policy-
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makers due the lobbying power of the financial elite (Reich 2016). The Dodd-Frank Act in the 
United States, the Financial Services Act of 2012 in the United Kingdom, and a series of 
financial regulation laws passed in Germany helped to curtail some of the risky activities that 
contributed to the 2007-2008 collapse; however, many of the strictest regulations have been 
fended off by the financial sector who argue that they reduce competiveness and efficiency in the 
global economy. The reality of the 21st century economy is that the global economic and 
financial elite’s interests are interpreted as the interests of the general public and thus are held as 
the utmost priority. And global competition means that financial regulations in affluent nations 
puts financial firms at a disadvantage compared to growing financial centers in Asia, such as 
Shanghai, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Thus, business as usual resumes, and financial regulation 
is stymied in an effort to maintain competiveness. Given that the dominance of finance over the 
global economy is unlikely to fade, governments and international organizations need to think of 
ways to create regulations that are effective yet are not easily eroded by the lobbying efforts of 
finance. 
 A second development that nations need to consider is the reversal of neoliberal policies 
regarding the state, welfare systems, and labor, which is a difficult but necessary task to 
undertake. Financialization and growing gaps in the returns on education in affluent nations are 
likely to continue to create unequal incomes and opportunities in the labor markets of affluent 
nations. Intervention by the welfare state in the form of unemployment insurance, government 
investment in research, infrastructure, and jobs, education and skill programs, and the provision 
of public goods can help protect workers from the instability of financial markets caused by 
speculation and other risky activities. Increased protections for workers to organize and 
collectively bargain can allow workers to fight for better wages, benefits, and working 
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conditions, which can boost incomes for those in the bottom half of the income distribution. 
These changes would mean lower income shares for the top 1%; however, it does not mean that 
they would be worse off than they are now. Indeed, increased incomes for the middle class and 
poor help stimulate economic activity, which helps the businesses of the rich and increases their 
incomes (Reich 2016). The economy is not a zero-sum game. There are ways to make the 
economies of affluent nations more equitable yet still strong that need to be explored in the 
future.  
 These would be lofty goals in today’s political climate, though. It would require that 
workers and the general public organize to create socially and politically powerful movements to 
reclaim both politics and the economy to favor all instead of a select few. In the United States, 
reform to get money out of politics would be necessary, such as overturning Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission: a Supreme Court Case decision that allowed for the creation of 
Super-PACs and unlimited campaign spending in the United States. At the moment, the rich and 
the financial sector in the United States have unprecedented access to politicians from both 
Democrats and Republicans, which have helped shift policy in their favor. While the United 
States often stands out as the epitome of neoliberalism, other affluent nations face similar 
challenges and trends as the rich have benefitted from lobbying and ideological campaigns that 
promote neoliberalism. In order to reverse some of these trends, massive social and political 
campaigns will be necessary. 
 Finally, this dissertation also speaks to debates on rising income inequality. Often, 
policy-makers and scholars in economics, sociology, and political science have focused on the 
decline in the size and power of the middle class in affluent nations (see Leicht and Fitzgerald 
2014 for a summary of these debates). While the middle class has no doubt suffered as a result of 
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neoliberalism and financialization, the results from Chapter 6 show that the poor are falling 
behind both very affluent and the middle class. In other words, the poor seem to be the biggest 
losers as there has been a growth in employment concentration in low-wage, low-skill service 
sector jobs that are increasingly under attack by cost-saving technologies, anti-union tactics by 
employers, and the threat of outsourcing in an effort to maximize profits, satisfy shareholders, 
and fatten the salaries of management and owners (Fligstein and Shin 2007; Wright and Rogers 
2015). Indeed, the 2016 presidential election campaigns of the Democratic and Republican 
Parties in the United States have largely focused on the middle class and white working class 
while the working poor and unemployed, who are disproportionately people of color, are largely 
placed in the backseat of priorities. This dissertation serves as a reminder to policy-makers and 
scholars that the poor are some of the biggest losers in the economies of affluent nations affected 
by neoliberalism and financialization and that solutions to income inequality focusing primarily 
on the middle class while leave many behind. 
7.4 Limitations and Future Research 
 While the findings of this dissertation do provide new insights into the ways that 
neoliberalism and financialization affect income inequality in affluent nations, there are several 
limitations to this research that point to avenues for future research. First, the selection of 18 
affluent nations traditionally used in quantitative cross-national research allows the findings to be 
robust to affluent nations during the neoliberal era; however, any expansion to other nations 
would require empirical evidence to support its claims. A natural extension of this study would 
be to shift the sample to a second tier of the 19th to the 50th most affluent nations, including post-
Communist nations, in order to examine the differences between the sample of 18 nations used in 
this dissertation. Neoliberalism is likely to be lower in post-Communist nations; however, it is 
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unclear whether neoliberal reform in these nations would increase income inequality as 
dramatically as they do in affluent nations. The degree of financialization in this second tier of 
nations is also likely to be lower, except in East Asian nations like Singapore, Taiwan, and 
China. It is quite possible that the results would be largely the same in these nations; however, it 
is also possible that they would be significantly different. Empirical evidence is necessary to 
answer these questions. 
Neoliberalism and financialization have arguably been more devastating in lower income 
nations as they are more vulnerable to neoliberal austerity often caused by sovereign debt crises 
and the subsequent intervention from international financial organizations like the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (Harvey 2010). While there are many empirical 
questions about neoliberalism, financialization, and income inequality in Latin America, Africa, 
and Asia, quantitative studies are limited by a lack of quality data. Not only is economic 
inequality for the entire neoliberal era difficult or impossible to acquire, different measures of 
financialization and neoliberalism would be required. For example, data on debt owed to the IMF 
or other international financial organizations, the occurrence of sovereign debt crises and 
hyperinflation, and the size and strength of public and private banks would likely be more 
appropriate for lower income nations. Additionally, welfare state capacity and spending is much 
lower in these nations, which limits redistribution. As additional data become available on lower 
income nations, there is much opportunity to examine the effects of neoliberalism and 
financialization in these nations and compare and contrast that to the processes that occur in 
affluent nations. 
 Quality data of different measures of economic inequality and financialization also offer 
opportunities for future research in affluent nations. The World Wealth and Income Database 
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(Alvaredo et al. 2016) is currently expanding its data availability of wealth inequality and 
income to wealth ratios over the next few years, which provide new ways to understand 
distributions of wealth that are traditionally understudied. The data expansion currently 
underway will include information about the entire wealth and income distribution instead of just 
the top of the distribution, as it currently does. Given the increased scholarly attention to wealth 
inequality and disparities in income relative to wealth after the release of Thomas Piketty’s 
(2013) Capital in the 21st Century, these new data will allow researchers to empirically test 
Picketty’s claims, as well as develop new theory on economic inequality in the contemporary 
SSA.  
Additionally, there is increasing data availability on different aspects of financialization, 
which are primarily being developed by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 
Information on stock market capitalization, FIRE value added, and the size of the assets of the 
largest banks are available after the year 2000; however, there is little to no data before 2000. In 
other words, the period when financial deregulation was at its peak has data available; however, 
earlier periods when deregulation was not as widespread are less covered. These data can be used 
to better understand financialization in the contemporary era; however, I was not able to use 
these data in this dissertation given my focus on long-run processes and the entire neoliberal era 
starting in 1981. 
 Finally, this dissertation raises questions about the effects of neoliberalism and 
financialization on social processes beyond income inequality. For example, Chapter 6 raised 
questions about why the poor lose out more relative to the middle class as a result of 
neoliberalism and financialization. While the poor tend to rely more on social programs and 
public goods to boost their incomes than the middle class, many of the poor still work and make 
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incomes in the market. Given that the shareholder value conception of the firm has encouraged 
companies to use cost-saving technologies to eliminate low-skilled jobs and undercut wages 
(Fligstein and Shin 2007), there may be a higher return to education, such as college degrees, in 
more financialized nations. I encourage future research to explore this avenue of inquiry. 
 Overall, neoliberalism and financialization have largely contributed to income inequality 
in affluent nations during the neoliberal era by creating a more unequal distribution in market 
incomes and by reducing redistribution. The rich have been the big winners, while the middle 
class and poor have been left behind. This dissertation raises concerns about the trends in 
neoliberalism and financialization on the social welfare of citizens in affluent nations. Reducing 
economic inequality will likely be a difficult task, though. Indeed, many middle and working 
class citizens in the United States, United Kingdom, and other affluent nations are politically 
polarized on how to proceed. As we move forward in the 21st century, it will be interesting to see 
how nations respond. Will it be blaming immigrants and the government while issuing an attack 
on the welfare? Or will nations enact increased financial regulation and expand social welfare 
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